The D’s that could Determine a Viable Burma Policy

By AUNG ZAW

Burma is a moral minefield where we all need to tread carefully, critically and creatively, bearing in mind a number of “D” factors.

Some observers were alarmed when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently outlined a foreign policy based on the “three D’s” of defense, diplomacy and development.

They drew attention to a fourth “D”— democracy—and asked where it fit into the Obama administration’s foreign policy. Vice President Joe Biden mentioned this fourth “D” when he addressed a conference in Munich, Germany, last month.

In a recent interview with The Irrawaddy, US Ambassador to Thailand Eric John said: “Defense, diplomacy and development—the ‘three D’s’ as Secretary Clinton framed them—will indeed be the pillars of the Obama administration’s foreign policy, but I contend that all three of the components are intrinsically tied to democracy promotion and that this theme will remain central to the new administration’s foreign policy agenda.
In other words, democracy is inherent in all three pillars.”
The promotion of democracy has long been a central component of US foreign policy and will clearly continue to be so under the Obama administration.

When Secretary of State Clinton visited Asia last month she said that Washington’s Burma policies of sanctions and engagement had failed and she promised a policy review.

Her statement further fueled speculation about US policy on Burma, with some government officials, including Chinese, wanting to know more about such a possible policy shift.

In The Irrawaddy interview, Ambassador John indicated that the Obama administration’s Burma policy would remain essentially the same as Bush’s, saying: “The end policy goal remains the same: the start of a genuine, inclusive political dialogue in Burma and the release of all political prisoners.”

His answer should satisfy many Burmese democracy and campaign groups inside and outside Burma, who are united in their desire to see the US maintain a tough policy until the regime offers some genuine political gesture, such as releasing political prisoners and making the “road map” more inclusive.

Clinton would do well to stick to the four D’s on Burma and retain smart sanctions against the regime and its cronies until some genuine movement is seen. But it should be a two-pronged policy, not confined to sanctions alone.

The US needs to engage with Burma’s neighbors and such powerful allies as India and China. More importantly the US must be creative in finding a way to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

As Ambassador John said: “The United States intends to consult with a broad range of stakeholders as we conduct our review of US policy on Burma to ensure that it is a collaborative process based on the vital exchange of information with key actors and friends in the region.”

It is important to bear in mind that Burma is strategically located between India and China. Washington must take into account that the world’s two most populous countries are competing for Burma’s energy and natural resources. It must be aware of China’s geopolitical interest in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean and Beijing’s ambition to open up its landlocked Yunnan Province.

For those reasons, it is inevitable that Burma in the future will require the West’s influence, assistance and investment to counter China.

While engaging Burma’s friends and possible foes in the region, the US should not lose sight of opportunities to open a channel to the regime leaders as well as to members of the country’s opposition.

Without compromising its objectives, the US could engage military leaders of Burma with the aim of making diplomacy work.

In this regard, the US policy on Burma should also be more thoughtful and resourceful if it is intended to assist ordinary Burmese, civil society groups and agents of change inside the country and within the armed forces—and this covers preparations for a post-Than Shwe era.

Within Burma, the country’s main opposition party and winner of the 1990 general election, the National League for Democracy (NLD), appears to be stuck with two Ds—democracy and dialogue.

The NLD made a blunder last month when it released a “special statement” focused on the two decades-old question of dialogue between the party and the ruling military junta. The statement said: “It [the question] could not be discussed as we still did not know the causes for economic development and how to bring it about."

Burmese colleagues say this careless statement and Clinton’s remarks only allowed some agenda-driven people and apologists to attack the NLD and the US sanctions policy.

The party members and leaders who have faced merciless onslaught and decapitation by the regime should look beyond the two Ds. They could be more creative in searching for an alternative to break the political deadlock.

It’s clear, of course, that under the repressive conditions reigning in Burma, the NLD cannot function like a normal opposition party as long as its leaders and senior members remain in prison, under house arrest or live in a climate of fear.

The NLD should speak about Burma’s humanitarian crisis, health, education, environment and poverty and how to rebuild the country. Since the regime is incapable of solving Burma’s problems, the party needs to expand its influence by adopting a tone of pragmatism and perhaps kicking the ball back into the regime’s court. The NLD could be more creative in breaking the ice and finding a new area where it has space to move around.

The party will then be seen moving beyond the two D’s. The bottom line remains the achievement of a political solution as a matter of urgency. This is my humble opinion.