Than Shwe’s Selective Diplomacy Demands Caution

By AUNG ZAW

Since US president Barrack Obama came to power in the White House, news reports have suggested that Burma’s leaders want to repair their strained relationship with the world’s most powerful nation. Likewise, Washington has said its Burma policy is under review.

However, it won’t be an easy task for the Obama administration to deal with the regime in Naypyidaw. Aside from a critical and strategic approach, extreme caution is needed.

The regime leaders who have survived the last two decades without relinquishing their grip on power are not to be underestimated. Face may be lost, but every means at our disposal—from diplomacy to outright pressure—must be employed.

Although the West and the international community have so far shown willingness to assist and engage Burma, there is little sign that Burmese leaders wholeheartedly welcome the idea.

As usual, they are selective and careful when choosing friends abroad. Why? The ultimate goal of the regime is to remain in power and it knows very well that full-scale engagement with the international community could eventually erode its reign of power.

So it’s safe to say that the regime leaders will selectively pick friends as they like and will dump them when they find they are no longer helpful.

The diplomacy exercised by the regime so far has proved to be very selective, exposing its inferiority complexity and xenophobia.

One only has to look at how the regime divides and exploits the West, Asean and United Nations.

We should not forget how junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe snubbed UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and how he treated those of his allies in favor.

Three months ago, Than Shwe welcomed Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Naypyidaw, where the junta leader happily briefed his visitor on Burma’s domestic situation, the country’s “democratic process and economic development, based on the principles of independence and self-determination,” including the progress of reconstruction work in the cyclone-hit Irrawaddy delta.

Last month, Than Shwe’s henchman, Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein, reportedly told his Thai counterpart at the Asean summit in Hua Hin that his government would allow Gambari to “monitor” the election process in 2010.

Gambari was not invited to witness voting in last year’s referendum, although, interestingly enough, Burmese state-run newspapers reported that diplomats from Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam were welcome visitors at polling stations.

Gambari, by now something of a lame duck, was also snubbed at Burma’s urging at an Asean summit in Singapore in November, 2007, two months after the regime’s suppression of monk-led demonstrations.

Gambari wanted to brief Asean leaders on the Burma situation, but a scheduled meeting was abruptly cancelled after Thein Sein told Asean leaders that the UN envoy “should report only to the UN Security Council and not to Asean or the East Asia Summit.”

Thein Sein said: “Myanmar [Burma] had every confidence in managing Prof Gambari's mission and the good offices of the UN.” This was totally untrue—the regime’s confidence in Gambari will last only as long as he remains useful in helping it achieve its goal. And with the US, it will be the same.

Since Obama took office in January, former regime diplomats have reportedly been visiting Washington to sound out the new administration’s policy on Burma. After US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Asia last month, Chinese officials and “researchers” hurried to Thailand to meet Burmese dissident groups and exiles and sound out whether Washington is really reviewing its Burma policy.

Exiled dissidents believe that regime officials are interested in holding a second round of informal meetings with US representatives in the region, possibly in Beijing. The first such meeting took place between Burmese ministers and then US deputy assistant secretary of state Eric John in 2006 in Beijing.

But, as a respected Burmese scholar graphically put it, “A spinster is too shy to find a husband.” (No insult is intended to spinsters, though.)

The Burmese regime knows well that it could prove costly to repair its relationship with the US. Major concessions would have to be made, since it is likely that the US will continue to demand the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and to make the “road map” more inclusive.

A Washington Post editorial this week on Burma advised caution in any review of US policy towards the regime.

“It may be that the US review can lead to smarter and more targeted sanctions, with better coordination among allies and neighbors,” the editorial said.

Then it rightly noted: “Certainly, we hope that Ms Clinton will make clear to Burma's government that the United States could never ease sanctions without first conducting full and free consultations with Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's rightful ruler. Aung San Suu Kyi's party overwhelmingly won an election in 1990, but the junta ignored the results and has kept her isolated and under house arrest for most of the time since. Her release, and that of thousands of other political prisoners—and their families—remains essential.”

It’s well known, however, that the Burmese regime rarely agrees to compromise unless there are benefits for its own interests, and particularly those of Than Shwe.