By THE IRRAWADDY
Win Tin, a leader of the National League for Democracy, spoke to The Irrawaddy regarding the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Question: Do the authorities have a strong case against Aung San Suu Kyi?
Answer: I don’t think so. This is a conspiracy. The matter of her security is totally in their hands. If the authorities don’t open up the compound, no person can enter it. At this time, they [the authorities] have rejected her appeal and even charged her with another case. I believe that it is a conspiracy. I believe they did it because they don’t want to release her. They want to ban her from being involved in politics in the future.
Q: What do you think will be the outcome of the trial?
A: Ideally, they want to put her into prison. But politically, they can’t do that. The international community is voicing its concern and even demanding she be released. We [the NLD] also don’t accept the charges and demand she be released.
If the case proceeds, we demand justice during the court process. The court must open up to the public so people can witness the court process. They must allow enough lawyers to defend her in court. It means that the number of lawyers must be enough not only for the defense at court but also for the legal preparation, to collect data and facts on the case.
A fair trial would allow the families of the defendants as well as the public to observe. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has sons in England. They should issue visas for them to come to Burma. Likewise, the family of Daw Khin Khin Win lives abroad. The authorities must allow them to come here if they wish. Even if the family members are foreign citizens, they must issue visas.
Media must be allowed to report the case. Journalists should have the right to ask the defense lawyers and the prosecutor questions. They should have the right to ask the opinions of people who come to the court to see the trial.
Another issue is security. We can’t say that the security is good, and they won’t threaten her security even in the courtroom set-up in the prison compound. They must guarantee Daw Suu’s security. They must also guarantee the security of her lawyers.
Q: In the past 20 years, Aung San Suu Kyi has been attacked and detained for many years. She has been under house arrest for more than 13 years. What is her mental state?
A: I didn’t see her, but [her lawyer] U Kyi Win saw her. What I first want to say is to repeat the comments of U Kyi Win: Daw Suu is mentally strong and firm in her stand. Regarding the case [of John W. Yettaw], she clearly told her lawyer that she didn’t breach any laws. Based on these facts, Daw Suu’s position is strong and firm. Although I haven’t seen her for years, based on our past experiences and her political stance and sacrifice during these 20 years, I can say that she will never feel depressed and give up or change her political stance.
Q: Why do you think the government wants to continue to detain her?
A: The truth is that it’s because of Daw Suu’s personal fame and the world’s recognition of her position. She has become the main enemy of the military regime. But putting aside personal fame and looking at things from the point of view of current politics, the situation has largely changed. In the past, we asked for a parliament to draw up a constitution in accordance with the 1990 election results, which we have consistently supported. Now, we recently called for parliament to review the constitution and for a dialogue [with the military]. We changed our position to be flexible in order to bring about a dialogue.
Daw Suu has been in a very important position for solving political problems through the dialogue method since 1988. Gen Saw Maung pointed out the importance of arranging a dialogue when there are many parties involved. Many parties gave their mandate to Daw Suu to engage in dialogue with the military. The NLD also gave its mandate to her. Even today, if we have a dialogue with the military regime, I think all ethnic nationalities will want her to speak on behalf of them.
Daw Suu is a key player if we are to solve the current political situation through a dialogue. Therefore, the present charges against Daw Suu mean that they [the generals] are trying to eliminate her from the stage. I feel that they are trying to destroy the possibility of political dialogue and national reconciliation by political means.
Q: Dr Tin Myo Win, Aung San Suu Kyi’s family doctor, was detained for nearly a week. How is he related to this case?
A: At first, we heard that Dr Tin Myo Win had also been brought to court and that there would be five persons in this case. But he was not on the list. Perhaps, he was under interrogation and was tortured. He has endured such an experience in the past. I am worried that they are putting pressure on Dr Tin Myo Win to say things that they want him to say. Or they will prosecute him with other charges because this case can only warrant three to five years imprisonment.
Another option is that they can put Dr Tin Myo Win on the witness list. If so, we are not worried about him because he is not a person who is easily persuaded to say what others wish. We know his political beliefs and opinions, and his personal history. We also respect him. We are not worried about that.
If they brought him to the court as a witness, he would tell what really happened. What he did is not much; Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told him to report Yettaw’s first entry last year to the authorities, and he went to the Home Ministry to report it. He has no more than that to say. We don’t expect him to say he had a personal encounter with Yettaw.
Showing posts with label Online Interview. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Online Interview. Show all posts
May 19, 2009
April 29, 2009
Donor in the Delta
By THE IRRAWADDY
The Irrawaddy speaks to the country director of Save the Children in Burma, Andrew Kirkwood, about the challenges of operating in the Irrawaddy delta.
Question: What do you think about the situation one year after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma?
Answer: I think it depends very much on where you go in the delta. In the commercial centers all around the delta and in villages closer to Rangoon, most people have recovered, in certain senses, a normal life. In most commercial centers, you can see that people have rebuilt homes, markets are working and there’s a great deal of commercial activity.
But in the southwestern part of the delta, in rural areas, the places where cyclone hit, people are still many, many years away from recovering a way to make a living. So, these people don’t have enough water to drink and wash with. They are reliant on food distribution from aid agencies. They lost their family members, their homes and all their ways of making a living. So it’s going take these people many, many years to recover.
Q: Can you estimate how many children became orphans after Cyclone Nargis? What is your organization doing for them?
A: We have registered about 1,000 children who are no longer living with their families, who have lost their families. Those children have been entered in a database which is used by many agencies so we can match parents who have lost their kids with kids who have lost their parents.
Most of those children have either been reunited with their families or placed with extended family members or with foster families in their community. But so many of these children are living in orphanages run by local churches or local monasteries, and we are supporting those orphanages to improve the conditions that these children have for living and for education.
Q: What difficulties and restrictions did you face when your organization was operating aid deliveries in the delta?
A: By far the biggest challenges are logistical. The villages that we are working in are very isolated and can only be reached, most of them, by boats. And some of them are very far south in the delta, where the rivers are very big, the tides are very difficult and the weather—we’re coming now into the monsoon season—can be very dangerous. This is by far the biggest challenge that we face.
Q: The report titled “After the Storm: Voices from the Delta,” which was released by a non-governmental organization in exile and a human rights group, said that INGOs working in the delta reported little about human rights violations. What is your comment on the report?
A: The report by Emergency Assistance Team (EAT) gives the wrong impression of what happened with the relief effort in the delta. Number one, the report focuses very largely on the first month of the cyclone response, when things were most difficult, which doesn’t give a very balanced picture of the Nargis response.
It also doesn’t talk about what was achieved. For example, Save the Children was able to reach 160,000 people with assistance in the first two weeks after the cyclone, including in the very southwestern tip of the delta, where the cyclone struck first. It’s really unfortunate that the report doesn’t give a more balanced picture of how the cyclone relief efforts went.
Q: Do you have any suggestion for the Burmese regime in terms of cooperating with aid agencies for further humanitarian assistance?
A: Save the Children works very closely with some parts of the government. We have a very good relationship with the Department of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. With their cooperation, we are able to do a lot of community-based assistance. So, it’s really not right to say that all parts of the government are not being cooperative.
The Irrawaddy speaks to the country director of Save the Children in Burma, Andrew Kirkwood, about the challenges of operating in the Irrawaddy delta.
Question: What do you think about the situation one year after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma?
Answer: I think it depends very much on where you go in the delta. In the commercial centers all around the delta and in villages closer to Rangoon, most people have recovered, in certain senses, a normal life. In most commercial centers, you can see that people have rebuilt homes, markets are working and there’s a great deal of commercial activity.
But in the southwestern part of the delta, in rural areas, the places where cyclone hit, people are still many, many years away from recovering a way to make a living. So, these people don’t have enough water to drink and wash with. They are reliant on food distribution from aid agencies. They lost their family members, their homes and all their ways of making a living. So it’s going take these people many, many years to recover.
Q: Can you estimate how many children became orphans after Cyclone Nargis? What is your organization doing for them?
A: We have registered about 1,000 children who are no longer living with their families, who have lost their families. Those children have been entered in a database which is used by many agencies so we can match parents who have lost their kids with kids who have lost their parents.
Most of those children have either been reunited with their families or placed with extended family members or with foster families in their community. But so many of these children are living in orphanages run by local churches or local monasteries, and we are supporting those orphanages to improve the conditions that these children have for living and for education.
Q: What difficulties and restrictions did you face when your organization was operating aid deliveries in the delta?
A: By far the biggest challenges are logistical. The villages that we are working in are very isolated and can only be reached, most of them, by boats. And some of them are very far south in the delta, where the rivers are very big, the tides are very difficult and the weather—we’re coming now into the monsoon season—can be very dangerous. This is by far the biggest challenge that we face.
Q: The report titled “After the Storm: Voices from the Delta,” which was released by a non-governmental organization in exile and a human rights group, said that INGOs working in the delta reported little about human rights violations. What is your comment on the report?
A: The report by Emergency Assistance Team (EAT) gives the wrong impression of what happened with the relief effort in the delta. Number one, the report focuses very largely on the first month of the cyclone response, when things were most difficult, which doesn’t give a very balanced picture of the Nargis response.
It also doesn’t talk about what was achieved. For example, Save the Children was able to reach 160,000 people with assistance in the first two weeks after the cyclone, including in the very southwestern tip of the delta, where the cyclone struck first. It’s really unfortunate that the report doesn’t give a more balanced picture of how the cyclone relief efforts went.
Q: Do you have any suggestion for the Burmese regime in terms of cooperating with aid agencies for further humanitarian assistance?
A: Save the Children works very closely with some parts of the government. We have a very good relationship with the Department of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. With their cooperation, we are able to do a lot of community-based assistance. So, it’s really not right to say that all parts of the government are not being cooperative.
March 24, 2009
KNU in Serious Crisis
By THE IRRAWADDY
The Karen National Union, which has no ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military regime, has grown gradually weaker since the loss of Marnerplaw in 1995, the headquarters of the armed group. This is perhaps the KNU’s weakest moment in its history.
Recent key events include the death of the armed group’s leader, Gen Saw Bo Mya in 2007; the assassination of General-Secretary Phado Mann Shah in Thailand in 2008. the loss of important KNU-controlled areas; and various battalions that defected from the KNU to join the military regime. Although the KNU has conducted ceasefire negotiations with the junta, it has yet to reach any agreement. The KNU has had close relations with Burmese opposition groups in exile and increasingly relies on outside support for its survival.
Phado David Htaw, a member of the KNU Central Executive Committee, talked to The Irrawaddy about where the KNU finds itself today.
Question: Recently KNU leaders living in Thailand on the border have been ordered back to KNU-controlled areas in Burma. How is that affecting the leadership?
Answer: A change came after the KNU conference in 2008. When we were clear that the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council] didn’t want to continue ceasefire negotiations, we closed some offices of the KNU. For example, Maj Soe Soe’s liaison office with the SPDC. Thailand misunderstood and thought we were closing a window of opportunity offered by the SPDC.
After the conference, there were armed clashes in the area of Brigade 6, where Battalion 201 and 203 were stationed. At the request of the Burmese regime, Thailand blocked some roads, resulting in the loss of some areas from the KNU. In some cases, the KNU couldn’t send food to the battalions and encountered attacks by the regime’s army at the rear of KNU positions.
In February, we received a letter from the Thai authorities. The letter said that Thailand would not allow KNU commanders to command their troops from Thai soil. It said that the KNU commanders who were giving orders to their troops must leave by February 25.
Another reason that the letter was sent is that there was a bomb blast in Myawaddy (opposite Mae Sot) during the visit of Tomas Ojea Quintana, the United Nations’ Human Rights Special Envoy to Burma. They accused us of the bomb blast. When the regional commander of the Burmese army’s Southeast Division conducted an investigation, Thailand seemed to be concerned and increased pressure on us. When anti-KNU propaganda by the Burmese regime increases, Thailand worries about another assassination like that of the KNU leader Phado Mann Shah.
Speaking frankly, we had a decision before the assassination of Phado Mann Shah. We decided to live together with our troops in the KNU-controlled areas in order to receive their respect as well as the people’s respect. But the actual implementation of that idea didn’t materialize after the death of Phado Mann Shah.
As the command center is now in Mae Sot, the Karen people never see the KNU leaders and it can erode our reputation. They see us only when they receive our yearly calendar. In fact, we should have gone back to our previous homes after the conference made the decision. We should be with the troops and encourage them as much as we can. We should meet with the villagers who left their villages and sought refuge in areas controlled by the troops. When leaders like us live and work from this bank of the river (from Thai soil), other commanders want to live here. The other commanders who can’t stay in Thailand become depressed by seeing our separation from them.
Q: If the KNU concludes a ceasefire agreement [with the SPDC], would you maintain control of your own area?
A: The regional commander of the Southeast Division said that they would give us an area located north of Three Pagoda Pass during a ceasefire discussion in 2005. They said that all KNU troops would have to be stationed within that area in Karen State.
The DKBA [Democratic Karen Buddhist Army] and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are also stationed in that area. There may be less threat to the SPDC, but we will fight against each other for the control of the land. The other armed groups don’t want to see that. They are satisfied with possessing a tiny bit of land for their survival.
Q: If some of the KNU’s battalions negotiate a ceasefire with the SPDC on their own, what is your position?
A: We have no such problems in our battalions. But if there were such a problem, it would be from the Special Battalion formed by Gen Bo Mya. They believe that they are Gen Bo Mya’s royalists. The problems started with this different viewpoint. In fact, the troops should be under the control of one loyal KNU commander.
Some officers like Tikhal, who was dismissed by Brigade 6, were reassigned by Gen Mya. He also has a relation with the DKBA. Bo Maha Swe, living in the camp of Gen Mya, has no connection with us.
Due to these factors, the formal structure of our troops has become weaker. Since we have focused more on Brigades 3, 4, 5, and 6, and less on Special Battalions, it appears like they are Gen Mya’s troops. And Gen Mya only lets his sons lead the Special Battalions, which makes it look like a family army; others don’t like that situation. Gen Mya has also recruited soldiers from Marnerplaw and other battle zones.
As we have two kinds of troops with some stationed in central command and others stationed in outlying areas, it is difficult to control them all. Sometimes we don’t know whether we have to take actions [against a commander] or make concessions to them. We are breaking up one by one: first the breakaway of the DKBA and then the Bo Htein Maung group— two separations for different reasons. The KNU army is not united.
Q: How many soldiers does the KNU have now?
A: No more than 3,000. The strongest is Brigade 5. Although we have troops, like Battalions 9, 10 and 11 in the Tavoy and Mergui areas, we don’t have any conflict there. According to the statistical data, we have X number of troops, but we can’t say accurately how many soldiers we have in reality.
Q: Could the SPDC defeat the KNU in an all-out attack?
A: In my opinion, they need us to continue to fight against them. They can point their fingers to us and justify their grip on power due to our existence. On the other hand, the mentality of our troops is still strong, and they fight the Burmese army with mines and ambush attacks.
Q: Politically, are there real differences between the ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups?
A: For the non-ceasefire groups, we can still be involved in the fight for political change in cooperation with other democratic opposition groups in the process of mobilizing international pressure [on the SPDC]. Politically, we still have hope for change.
For the ceasefire groups, although some of them aren’t satisfied with their current status, their ceasefire with the regime can effectively reduce deaths [in battles]. But human rights violations [by the Burmese army] may still exist in their area. Another advantage of these groups is that they have a chance to become associated with the people. I see it as very beneficial to them. They can share their beliefs and opinions with their people.
For us, we can’t effectively talk to the people whenever the SPDC does propaganda against us. Although we use media to communicate with the people, it ends up usually as a statement. We can’t gather the people in the villages and talk about the situation because the SPDC’s troops are now stationed everywhere. Now, our villagers gather with us in some activities, and they can still support us when we want them to do something. But in the past, we could easily gather villagers and explain to them what was happening.
Q: How deeply have you discussed the cease fire issue with the current regime?
A: In our last meeting with Gen Khin Nyunt, we discussed our fundamental needs. But since he was sacked 2004, we haven’t discussed such matters with the new authorities. They just said that if we come in [to the legal framework], then we could have such discussions. If you are not happy with it, then you can return to the way you were before.
After that, they attempted to split the KNU into smaller groups and persuaded them [some units] to break away from the KNU. If I were the SPDC, I would use a similar method. The reason we can’t have a ceasefire with them is due to our political beliefs. Although there may be some troops in the KNU willing to have a ceasefire with them, they have to follow the political policy adopted by the KNU conference.
Q: Do you think some of the ceasefire groups will ever again fight against the SPDC?
A: To put it simply, they don’t want to fight again. They can fight [the SPDC] with political means or mass movements. The SPDC has to consider carefully if they wage a battle with the UWSA [United Wa State Army] ceasefire group because they are now receiving support from China. China can control the UWSA and their exit door also is China. Once what was a forest in Kachin State has now become a town, and the KIO [Kachin Independence Organization] invested in the economy there. So, they won’t consider another battle against with the SPDC.
There are many soldiers in these groups because there are no battles to fight. If there is a battle, maybe the soldiers won’t go to the battle field.
Q: What is your view of the KNU, the democratic opposition groups and the Alliance Front?
A: Currently, the KNU has a leading role in the alliance fronts. When the NCUB [National Council of the Union of Burma] prepared to form a new parallel government, the KNU supported whatever way they chose if it is to fight against our enemy.
But they didn’t consider the consequent problems and the situation become complicated. It is not possible for the ceasefire groups to get involved in this move. Their way is different. Can they give up the current opportunities that they get [from the SPDC] to follow our way which doesn’t have a clear outcome?
Q: Did assassinated KNU leader Phado Mann Shah have many enemies?
A: There were disagreements with Phado Mann Shah because he was general secretary of the KNU and was responsible for guiding KNU’s policies. Before his assassination, there were letters distributed by the DKBA and the SPDC. The car bomb blasts and the death of Ko Kyi Linn [a KNU Lt-Col who went to the SPDC for negotiation] were attributed to plots of Mann Shah. He had a very high profile in the KNU. Moreover, he denied road building and dam projects [in Karen State] carried out by Thailand, in accordance with the KNU policies. In this way, Mann Shah was portrayed as a difficult KNU leader to deal with. I don’t think that he had many enemies. Finally, he shouldered the burden of the KNU as a whole.
Q: What do you think the position of the ethnic armed groups will be after the 2010 election?
A: Will the SPDC use its armed forces to force the ceasefire groups to surrender their arms? Or will they use the ceasefire groups to fight against the non-ceasefire groups? That depends on the policy of the new government.
Although we believe that we will be in a status quo, we don’t know what the new government will do. After the 2010 election, the SPDC will face more challenges. We may face more difficult situations than we do now. The KNU is living in a crisis situation. We have financial difficulty and it is difficult to recruit—many difficulties.
Q: It’s difficult to provide for the soldiers?
A: Of course! Currently, our Karen people are becoming refugees. They can’t support us as they did before. A family can struggle for themselves, but we need support for the troops. We are now trying to cope with assistance from international organizations.
Although we have money, it is difficult to buy arms and ammunitions. Thailand started to stop such assistance in 1990. Due to the arms left before that time, we have sustained our fight to date.
Q: Do you think the KNU’s political policies could change in the near future?
A: They could. To prevent further splits, the KNU could change its policies. It is likely to be a peaceful co-existence policy between those who left the KNU and those who remain in it: that is, the DKBA broke away and fights the KNU; so did Htein Maung.
Another factor is that due to the increasing fragmentation of the various control areas, some groups couldn’t break away as easily as previous groups did. They may choose to join other groups. It depends on the policy of Thailand as well. Before, Thailand wanted us to make a ceasefire from a united position. If we broke into various groups, it would be difficult to control the situation. But now their policy is just to get a ceasefire by any means.
Q: What is your opinion? Should the KNU enter a ceasefire agreement or not?
A: I don’t want to show my hand. In any case, it would require meetings with the SPDC. In the past, that was possible. But now, even we wanted to meet the SPDC, it is difficult.
Q: If the KNU made a ceasefire agreement [soon], would it enter into the 2010 election?
A: No. We don’t see any significance to our joining the 2010 election. We need to do a lot of public organization. The reality is we can’t even put up ballot boxes. If we want to do election politics, we have a lot of work to do. We have to rebuild the KNU.
The Karen National Union, which has no ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military regime, has grown gradually weaker since the loss of Marnerplaw in 1995, the headquarters of the armed group. This is perhaps the KNU’s weakest moment in its history.
Recent key events include the death of the armed group’s leader, Gen Saw Bo Mya in 2007; the assassination of General-Secretary Phado Mann Shah in Thailand in 2008. the loss of important KNU-controlled areas; and various battalions that defected from the KNU to join the military regime. Although the KNU has conducted ceasefire negotiations with the junta, it has yet to reach any agreement. The KNU has had close relations with Burmese opposition groups in exile and increasingly relies on outside support for its survival.
Phado David Htaw, a member of the KNU Central Executive Committee, talked to The Irrawaddy about where the KNU finds itself today.
Question: Recently KNU leaders living in Thailand on the border have been ordered back to KNU-controlled areas in Burma. How is that affecting the leadership?
Answer: A change came after the KNU conference in 2008. When we were clear that the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council] didn’t want to continue ceasefire negotiations, we closed some offices of the KNU. For example, Maj Soe Soe’s liaison office with the SPDC. Thailand misunderstood and thought we were closing a window of opportunity offered by the SPDC.
After the conference, there were armed clashes in the area of Brigade 6, where Battalion 201 and 203 were stationed. At the request of the Burmese regime, Thailand blocked some roads, resulting in the loss of some areas from the KNU. In some cases, the KNU couldn’t send food to the battalions and encountered attacks by the regime’s army at the rear of KNU positions.
In February, we received a letter from the Thai authorities. The letter said that Thailand would not allow KNU commanders to command their troops from Thai soil. It said that the KNU commanders who were giving orders to their troops must leave by February 25.
Another reason that the letter was sent is that there was a bomb blast in Myawaddy (opposite Mae Sot) during the visit of Tomas Ojea Quintana, the United Nations’ Human Rights Special Envoy to Burma. They accused us of the bomb blast. When the regional commander of the Burmese army’s Southeast Division conducted an investigation, Thailand seemed to be concerned and increased pressure on us. When anti-KNU propaganda by the Burmese regime increases, Thailand worries about another assassination like that of the KNU leader Phado Mann Shah.
Speaking frankly, we had a decision before the assassination of Phado Mann Shah. We decided to live together with our troops in the KNU-controlled areas in order to receive their respect as well as the people’s respect. But the actual implementation of that idea didn’t materialize after the death of Phado Mann Shah.
As the command center is now in Mae Sot, the Karen people never see the KNU leaders and it can erode our reputation. They see us only when they receive our yearly calendar. In fact, we should have gone back to our previous homes after the conference made the decision. We should be with the troops and encourage them as much as we can. We should meet with the villagers who left their villages and sought refuge in areas controlled by the troops. When leaders like us live and work from this bank of the river (from Thai soil), other commanders want to live here. The other commanders who can’t stay in Thailand become depressed by seeing our separation from them.
Q: If the KNU concludes a ceasefire agreement [with the SPDC], would you maintain control of your own area?
A: The regional commander of the Southeast Division said that they would give us an area located north of Three Pagoda Pass during a ceasefire discussion in 2005. They said that all KNU troops would have to be stationed within that area in Karen State.
The DKBA [Democratic Karen Buddhist Army] and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are also stationed in that area. There may be less threat to the SPDC, but we will fight against each other for the control of the land. The other armed groups don’t want to see that. They are satisfied with possessing a tiny bit of land for their survival.
Q: If some of the KNU’s battalions negotiate a ceasefire with the SPDC on their own, what is your position?
A: We have no such problems in our battalions. But if there were such a problem, it would be from the Special Battalion formed by Gen Bo Mya. They believe that they are Gen Bo Mya’s royalists. The problems started with this different viewpoint. In fact, the troops should be under the control of one loyal KNU commander.
Some officers like Tikhal, who was dismissed by Brigade 6, were reassigned by Gen Mya. He also has a relation with the DKBA. Bo Maha Swe, living in the camp of Gen Mya, has no connection with us.
Due to these factors, the formal structure of our troops has become weaker. Since we have focused more on Brigades 3, 4, 5, and 6, and less on Special Battalions, it appears like they are Gen Mya’s troops. And Gen Mya only lets his sons lead the Special Battalions, which makes it look like a family army; others don’t like that situation. Gen Mya has also recruited soldiers from Marnerplaw and other battle zones.
As we have two kinds of troops with some stationed in central command and others stationed in outlying areas, it is difficult to control them all. Sometimes we don’t know whether we have to take actions [against a commander] or make concessions to them. We are breaking up one by one: first the breakaway of the DKBA and then the Bo Htein Maung group— two separations for different reasons. The KNU army is not united.
Q: How many soldiers does the KNU have now?
A: No more than 3,000. The strongest is Brigade 5. Although we have troops, like Battalions 9, 10 and 11 in the Tavoy and Mergui areas, we don’t have any conflict there. According to the statistical data, we have X number of troops, but we can’t say accurately how many soldiers we have in reality.
Q: Could the SPDC defeat the KNU in an all-out attack?
A: In my opinion, they need us to continue to fight against them. They can point their fingers to us and justify their grip on power due to our existence. On the other hand, the mentality of our troops is still strong, and they fight the Burmese army with mines and ambush attacks.
Q: Politically, are there real differences between the ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups?
A: For the non-ceasefire groups, we can still be involved in the fight for political change in cooperation with other democratic opposition groups in the process of mobilizing international pressure [on the SPDC]. Politically, we still have hope for change.
For the ceasefire groups, although some of them aren’t satisfied with their current status, their ceasefire with the regime can effectively reduce deaths [in battles]. But human rights violations [by the Burmese army] may still exist in their area. Another advantage of these groups is that they have a chance to become associated with the people. I see it as very beneficial to them. They can share their beliefs and opinions with their people.
For us, we can’t effectively talk to the people whenever the SPDC does propaganda against us. Although we use media to communicate with the people, it ends up usually as a statement. We can’t gather the people in the villages and talk about the situation because the SPDC’s troops are now stationed everywhere. Now, our villagers gather with us in some activities, and they can still support us when we want them to do something. But in the past, we could easily gather villagers and explain to them what was happening.
Q: How deeply have you discussed the cease fire issue with the current regime?
A: In our last meeting with Gen Khin Nyunt, we discussed our fundamental needs. But since he was sacked 2004, we haven’t discussed such matters with the new authorities. They just said that if we come in [to the legal framework], then we could have such discussions. If you are not happy with it, then you can return to the way you were before.
After that, they attempted to split the KNU into smaller groups and persuaded them [some units] to break away from the KNU. If I were the SPDC, I would use a similar method. The reason we can’t have a ceasefire with them is due to our political beliefs. Although there may be some troops in the KNU willing to have a ceasefire with them, they have to follow the political policy adopted by the KNU conference.
Q: Do you think some of the ceasefire groups will ever again fight against the SPDC?
A: To put it simply, they don’t want to fight again. They can fight [the SPDC] with political means or mass movements. The SPDC has to consider carefully if they wage a battle with the UWSA [United Wa State Army] ceasefire group because they are now receiving support from China. China can control the UWSA and their exit door also is China. Once what was a forest in Kachin State has now become a town, and the KIO [Kachin Independence Organization] invested in the economy there. So, they won’t consider another battle against with the SPDC.
There are many soldiers in these groups because there are no battles to fight. If there is a battle, maybe the soldiers won’t go to the battle field.
Q: What is your view of the KNU, the democratic opposition groups and the Alliance Front?
A: Currently, the KNU has a leading role in the alliance fronts. When the NCUB [National Council of the Union of Burma] prepared to form a new parallel government, the KNU supported whatever way they chose if it is to fight against our enemy.
But they didn’t consider the consequent problems and the situation become complicated. It is not possible for the ceasefire groups to get involved in this move. Their way is different. Can they give up the current opportunities that they get [from the SPDC] to follow our way which doesn’t have a clear outcome?
Q: Did assassinated KNU leader Phado Mann Shah have many enemies?
A: There were disagreements with Phado Mann Shah because he was general secretary of the KNU and was responsible for guiding KNU’s policies. Before his assassination, there were letters distributed by the DKBA and the SPDC. The car bomb blasts and the death of Ko Kyi Linn [a KNU Lt-Col who went to the SPDC for negotiation] were attributed to plots of Mann Shah. He had a very high profile in the KNU. Moreover, he denied road building and dam projects [in Karen State] carried out by Thailand, in accordance with the KNU policies. In this way, Mann Shah was portrayed as a difficult KNU leader to deal with. I don’t think that he had many enemies. Finally, he shouldered the burden of the KNU as a whole.
Q: What do you think the position of the ethnic armed groups will be after the 2010 election?
A: Will the SPDC use its armed forces to force the ceasefire groups to surrender their arms? Or will they use the ceasefire groups to fight against the non-ceasefire groups? That depends on the policy of the new government.
Although we believe that we will be in a status quo, we don’t know what the new government will do. After the 2010 election, the SPDC will face more challenges. We may face more difficult situations than we do now. The KNU is living in a crisis situation. We have financial difficulty and it is difficult to recruit—many difficulties.
Q: It’s difficult to provide for the soldiers?
A: Of course! Currently, our Karen people are becoming refugees. They can’t support us as they did before. A family can struggle for themselves, but we need support for the troops. We are now trying to cope with assistance from international organizations.
Although we have money, it is difficult to buy arms and ammunitions. Thailand started to stop such assistance in 1990. Due to the arms left before that time, we have sustained our fight to date.
Q: Do you think the KNU’s political policies could change in the near future?
A: They could. To prevent further splits, the KNU could change its policies. It is likely to be a peaceful co-existence policy between those who left the KNU and those who remain in it: that is, the DKBA broke away and fights the KNU; so did Htein Maung.
Another factor is that due to the increasing fragmentation of the various control areas, some groups couldn’t break away as easily as previous groups did. They may choose to join other groups. It depends on the policy of Thailand as well. Before, Thailand wanted us to make a ceasefire from a united position. If we broke into various groups, it would be difficult to control the situation. But now their policy is just to get a ceasefire by any means.
Q: What is your opinion? Should the KNU enter a ceasefire agreement or not?
A: I don’t want to show my hand. In any case, it would require meetings with the SPDC. In the past, that was possible. But now, even we wanted to meet the SPDC, it is difficult.
Q: If the KNU made a ceasefire agreement [soon], would it enter into the 2010 election?
A: No. We don’t see any significance to our joining the 2010 election. We need to do a lot of public organization. The reality is we can’t even put up ballot boxes. If we want to do election politics, we have a lot of work to do. We have to rebuild the KNU.
March 16, 2009
In Her Father’s Footsteps
By THE IRRAWADDY
Wai Hnin Pwint Thon studies economics in London. She is the eldest daughter of Mya Aye, a leader of the 88 Generation Student Group who is detained in Loikaw Prison in Kayah (Karenni) State. She is a campaign officer in the London-based Burma Campaign UK. Her father was arrested again along with Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi because of his involvement in the demonstrations in August 2007. She talked to The Irrawaddy about her campaign work and life in Britain.
Question: You were very young when your father was first arrested.
Answer: My father was sentenced to eight years in jail when I was five months old. When I first saw him, I was four years old. My mother showed me his photograph and taught me to call him “Daddy” during that time. I recognized him as my father in my heart. When I saw him for the first time, he was behind iron bars, and I only had a chance to touch his fingers, and we couldn’t hug each other. When I was eight years old, I again saw my father [when he was released from prison].
Q: When did you understand that your father is a politician?
A: When my mother took me to see him in Insein Prison the first time, I just knew that I was going to see my father. I didn’t expect to go to such a place [like prison] and the experience was very surprising to me. But after my mother was able to talk to me about him, I respected him very much and felt very sorrow for his life.
After being released from jail, my father has continued to be involved in politics. In 2004 when many political prisoners were released who came from the 88 Generation Students Group, he joined the group again. Since then, I have been worried about when he was going to be arrested again.
I graduated in 2005, and prepared to go to the university. But I didn’t have a chance to study what I wished [in Burma]. My parents decided to send me abroad to receive a quality education. The last time I saw my father was two years ago. Although I studied in London, I kept up with his continuous involvement in politics.
On the morning of August 22, 2007, I phoned just before he was arrested. I asked him if his political activities were going well and told him that it really encouraged me because many people supported his group. But when I told him to do things cautiously, he said: “Don’t worry. The change in our country is going to happen.” That evening, I received a call that my father was arrested.
I said, “No, I phoned him just this morning.” Even though I expected it to happen one day, I was shocked when I heard the news. My father had told me to expect it, so I cope with the situation and continue to do what I should do.
I left for London in November 2006. My father was sentenced to 65 years in prison, and I am doing whatever I can in the movement to work for the release all political prisoners. My mission is to work for the release of my father and the freedom of all Burmese people.
Q: What do you want to say about the signature campaign for the release of all political prisoners?
A: I am so happy to see that everybody is taking part, to some extent, in this movement. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi once said that if the country is to reconcile, all political prisoners must be freed. If they are released, that’s the first step.
Q: What is your understanding of the human rights situation in Burma?
A: I knew my father was involved in politics because of the suffering of the people. I knew how atrocious this regime is. From the speeches of U Min Ko Naing, U Pyong Cho and U Ko Ko Gyi, I knew what they wanted—human rights and democracy. But since I never lived under human rights, I didn’t know what human rights were.
Only when I came to Britain did I see human rights and realize that they relate to all the people. For example, students here have the right to study whatever they wish. Students want to study new things and to do what they believe in. But for students in Rangoon, as soon as they enter a university campus, it feels like a small prison. The library has nothing and the classrooms don’t have enough material. No computers.
Burmese people are normally called prisoners only when they live in a prison. But living in Burma feels like living behind bars. For instance, people can’t read what they want to, use the Internet freely or express their beliefs. All the people of Burma are prisoners.
Although I heard about human rights when I was living in Burma, I didn’t understand the essence of human rights because I never lived under that situation.
Q: Did you experience any discrimination in your secondary school because your father is a politician.
A: At that time, my friends didn’t know my father was a politician, because I didn’t have a chance to express it. When I was young, my friends didn’t know about political prisoners. When I learned about political prisoners, I explained it to my friends, but they didn’t want to hear about it. They said, “We understand you and respect your father.
But please don’t talk to me about him. Our parents are doing business, and we don’t want to get involved in it.”
It was a limitation, because my friends were afraid of getting into trouble. The only real friends I have are my father, U Min Ko Naing, U Pyong Cho and U Ko Ko Gyi. I learned a lot from them. They are the only group that I have regular conversations with.
Apart from conversations with them, I spend my time helping my mother and studying my school lessons. I rarely go out for leisure time. Writing is my hobby. I didn’t have many friends when I was young.
Q: What else do you want to say about Burma and the campaign for national reconciliation?
A: I will never give up. Buddha taught: nothing is permanent, everything changes. When change happens [in Burma], we can all live together happily. The military government will reap what it sowed. The same people can’t always hold on to power.
Wai Hnin Pwint Thon studies economics in London. She is the eldest daughter of Mya Aye, a leader of the 88 Generation Student Group who is detained in Loikaw Prison in Kayah (Karenni) State. She is a campaign officer in the London-based Burma Campaign UK. Her father was arrested again along with Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi because of his involvement in the demonstrations in August 2007. She talked to The Irrawaddy about her campaign work and life in Britain.
Question: You were very young when your father was first arrested.
Answer: My father was sentenced to eight years in jail when I was five months old. When I first saw him, I was four years old. My mother showed me his photograph and taught me to call him “Daddy” during that time. I recognized him as my father in my heart. When I saw him for the first time, he was behind iron bars, and I only had a chance to touch his fingers, and we couldn’t hug each other. When I was eight years old, I again saw my father [when he was released from prison].
Q: When did you understand that your father is a politician?
A: When my mother took me to see him in Insein Prison the first time, I just knew that I was going to see my father. I didn’t expect to go to such a place [like prison] and the experience was very surprising to me. But after my mother was able to talk to me about him, I respected him very much and felt very sorrow for his life.
After being released from jail, my father has continued to be involved in politics. In 2004 when many political prisoners were released who came from the 88 Generation Students Group, he joined the group again. Since then, I have been worried about when he was going to be arrested again.
I graduated in 2005, and prepared to go to the university. But I didn’t have a chance to study what I wished [in Burma]. My parents decided to send me abroad to receive a quality education. The last time I saw my father was two years ago. Although I studied in London, I kept up with his continuous involvement in politics.
On the morning of August 22, 2007, I phoned just before he was arrested. I asked him if his political activities were going well and told him that it really encouraged me because many people supported his group. But when I told him to do things cautiously, he said: “Don’t worry. The change in our country is going to happen.” That evening, I received a call that my father was arrested.
I said, “No, I phoned him just this morning.” Even though I expected it to happen one day, I was shocked when I heard the news. My father had told me to expect it, so I cope with the situation and continue to do what I should do.
I left for London in November 2006. My father was sentenced to 65 years in prison, and I am doing whatever I can in the movement to work for the release all political prisoners. My mission is to work for the release of my father and the freedom of all Burmese people.
Q: What do you want to say about the signature campaign for the release of all political prisoners?
A: I am so happy to see that everybody is taking part, to some extent, in this movement. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi once said that if the country is to reconcile, all political prisoners must be freed. If they are released, that’s the first step.
Q: What is your understanding of the human rights situation in Burma?
A: I knew my father was involved in politics because of the suffering of the people. I knew how atrocious this regime is. From the speeches of U Min Ko Naing, U Pyong Cho and U Ko Ko Gyi, I knew what they wanted—human rights and democracy. But since I never lived under human rights, I didn’t know what human rights were.
Only when I came to Britain did I see human rights and realize that they relate to all the people. For example, students here have the right to study whatever they wish. Students want to study new things and to do what they believe in. But for students in Rangoon, as soon as they enter a university campus, it feels like a small prison. The library has nothing and the classrooms don’t have enough material. No computers.
Burmese people are normally called prisoners only when they live in a prison. But living in Burma feels like living behind bars. For instance, people can’t read what they want to, use the Internet freely or express their beliefs. All the people of Burma are prisoners.
Although I heard about human rights when I was living in Burma, I didn’t understand the essence of human rights because I never lived under that situation.
Q: Did you experience any discrimination in your secondary school because your father is a politician.
A: At that time, my friends didn’t know my father was a politician, because I didn’t have a chance to express it. When I was young, my friends didn’t know about political prisoners. When I learned about political prisoners, I explained it to my friends, but they didn’t want to hear about it. They said, “We understand you and respect your father.
But please don’t talk to me about him. Our parents are doing business, and we don’t want to get involved in it.”
It was a limitation, because my friends were afraid of getting into trouble. The only real friends I have are my father, U Min Ko Naing, U Pyong Cho and U Ko Ko Gyi. I learned a lot from them. They are the only group that I have regular conversations with.
Apart from conversations with them, I spend my time helping my mother and studying my school lessons. I rarely go out for leisure time. Writing is my hobby. I didn’t have many friends when I was young.
Q: What else do you want to say about Burma and the campaign for national reconciliation?
A: I will never give up. Buddha taught: nothing is permanent, everything changes. When change happens [in Burma], we can all live together happily. The military government will reap what it sowed. The same people can’t always hold on to power.
March 6, 2009
Washington’s Man in Thailand Discusses Obama’s Asia Policies
By THE IRRAWADDY
In a wide ranging interview with The Irrawaddy, US Ambassador to Thailand Eric G John spoke about what Asia and the countries of Asean in particular can expect from the foreign policy program of Barack Obama’s presidency. He also confirmed that the Obama administration will review Washington’s policy on Burma.
Question: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Asia was seen by many as a sign that President Obama wants to focus his foreign policy on this region. What can the US do to improve its relations with Asia, particularly Asean?
Answer: We’ve had a long-standing relationship with Asean, one that spans more than 30 years. I understand the perception recently may be that we have not paid enough attention to Asia or Asean, but a closer look will reveal that we have always been engaged with this region. During the last administration, we established the US-Asean Enhanced Partnership, and we have taken definitive steps to improve bilateral cooperation with many Asean members in recent years.
Having said that, the Obama administration has sent a clear signal of its intention to make relations with Asia an even greater priority. Last month, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made her first official overseas visit as Secretary of State to Asia, the first time this has happened in nearly 50 years. During her tour of Asia, Secretary Clinton became the first US Secretary of State—and the highest ranking US official—to visit the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. I believe that her visit to Asean’s headquarters marks a new era in US-Asean relations, and one that will see unprecedented engagement between the United States and Asean member countries.
As Secretary Clinton announced in Jakarta, President Obama and his administration will soon launch a formal interagency process to pursue accession to Asean’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This is a major step forward in our relationship with Asean. The Secretary also told Asean Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan that she plans to travel to Thailand in July to participate in the Asean Post-Ministerial and Asean Regional Forum. The US Ambassador for Asean Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot A Marciel—the first such ambassador appointed among Asean’s 10 dialogue partners—represented Washington at the Asean Summit in Cha-am, Thailand February 27-28. The participation of these high-level US government officials in these critical regional fora certainly reflects the importance we place on our relationship with Asean.
Looking forward, there will be many opportunities for the US and Asean to work together. The economic development and well-being of all Asean nations is of great importance to the United States and increasing trade with Asean will be a key objective for the new Obama administration. The United States provides a huge market for Asean’s exports. In 2007, we purchased US $111 billion in Asean goods. US private sector investment in Asean exceeds $130 billion, more than in China, Japan or India. In turn, the United States each year exports more than $60 billion in goods to Asean, our fourth largest market.
In addition to trade, the United States will also look to partner with Asean to make progress on climate change, counterterrorism, disease control, the situation in Burma, disaster relief and many other issues of importance to the region. The US and Thailand will co-chair the Asean Regional Forum Intersessional process on Disaster Relief Management, for instance. I am certain that under President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s leadership the US-Asean partnership will strengthen an already vigorous relationship, and we will engage in dialogue and action with Asean to address the full range of these issues in the months and years to come.
Q: Many export-dependent countries in Asia are worried about the “Buy American” provision in the recent stimulus package. How do you respond to concerns about protectionism? Will Asian companies benefit from stimulus-related projects in the US?
A: I think we can look to recent statements by Secretary Clinton to gauge the reality of concerns about a move towards protectionism. During her tour of Asia, Secretary Clinton said that the global financial crisis requires every nation to look inward for solutions, but that none of us can afford to become so introspective that we overlook the critical role that international partnerships must play in stabilizing the world’s economy and putting all of us back on the path to prosperity. The Obama administration is committed to making sure that even as the US government takes steps to strengthen the economy that we are doing so in a way that actually will enhance the ability of trading partners, like those in Asia, to work with us in addressing this global economic crisis.
The Recovery Act that was signed into law by President Obama on February 17, 2009, is an unprecedented effort to jumpstart the U.S. economy. The Act is an extraordinary response to a crisis unlike any in the last half century, and includes a range a measures aimed at getting the US economy back on track. The legislation ensures that it will be implemented consistent with US obligations under international agreements. The G20 leaders pledged last November to refrain from raising new barriers to trade in good and services, and no new barriers to trade are being raised now. Neither has our approach to forging reciprocity in procurements practices over the past decade changed with the enactment of the Act. The “buy American” provisions, as signed into law, specifically ensure that many of our trading partners, including Canada, the EU, and Japan, will continue to have access to procurement under the new stimulus package in accordance with our international obligations either under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or through our Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
Let me take a moment to touch on this issue in the context of US-Thai trade relations. I want to stress that the financial crisis will not affect relations between our two countries. The breadth and depth of our relationship stands unchanged, and we will continue to trade and invest in Thailand as before. We will work together closely to deal with the effects of the crisis. Thailand has long been a favorite destination for US investors. Our trade totals over $30 billion per year and accumulated investment is estimated at over $23 billion, and promoting this healthy trade relationship will remain a focus of the US Mission here in Thailand.
In these difficult economic times, US investment in Thailand is dropping a bit, as is investment throughout the region. That said, Thailand remains an attractive destination for US investors and part of my job is to promote and protect US commercial interests. In so doing, we are working with the Thai government to help create a positive investment environment. This includes respect for protecting intellectual property rights, opening markets, reducing corruption and, perhaps most importantly, improving customs laws. One of the biggest obstacles to foreign investment in Thailand, and not just for American businesses, is its archaic customs laws, which have been on the books for 80 years now. To remain competitive in the region, it is crucial that Thailand modernize its customs legislation.
Q: Secretary of State Clinton recently outlined a foreign policy based on the “Three D’s” of defense, diplomacy and development. Where does the fourth “D”—democracy—fit into the Obama administration’s foreign policy?
A: It is important to recognize that it is still quite early in the Obama administration and not all policy initiatives have been cemented into concrete plans of action. Defense, diplomacy and development—the “three D’s” as Secretary Clinton framed them—will indeed be the pillars of the Obama administration’s foreign policy, but I contend that all three of the components are intrinsically tied to democracy promotion and that this theme will remain central to the new administration’s foreign policy agenda. In other words, democracy is inherent in all three pillars.
Democracy promotion has long been a central component of US foreign policy and will clearly continue to be so under the Obama administration. Supporting democracy helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global environment in which mutual interests, such as expanding open markets, promoting economic development, and combating international terrorism and crime, can be advanced more effectively.
Q: On Burma, Secretary of State Clinton has said that both engagement and sanctions have failed and that the new administration is considering a shift in its Burma policy. Does this mean that the US will start to engage with the Burmese junta? What other options does the administration have?
A: As Secretary Clinton stated while on her tour of Asia, the US administration is currently reviewing its policy towards Burma. In her words, “We want to see the best ideas about how to influence the Burmese regime.” The end policy goal remains the same: the start of a genuine, inclusive political dialogue in Burma and the release of all political prisoners. As you have pointed out, Secretary Clinton noted that neither sanctions nor efforts to reach out and engage the regime have proven successful in influencing the authorities in Burma towards this end, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and Asean Foreign Ministers. Moving forward, the United States intends to consult with a broad range of stakeholders as we conduct our review of US policy on Burma to ensure that it is a collaborative process based on the vital exchange of information with key actors and friends in the region.
Although we welcome the recent release of some political prisoners by the Burmese government, I note that the regime continues to hold more than 2,100 prisoners of conscience. We will continue to call on the government of Burma to immediately set free all remaining political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking members of the country’s democracy movement, so that an inclusive dialogue can begin on Burma’s political future.
Q: The UN reports that there is now 33 percent more land under poppy cultivation in Burma than in 2006. Meanwhile, Burmese-made methamphetamines have been flooding into neighboring Thailand and China for years. What more can the US government do to help control drug production and its trade?
A: The US Mission in Thailand places great importance on combating narcotics trade in the region, while targeting drug trafficking organizations responsible for smuggling controlled substances into the United States and the international market. We have a successful track record in fighting the illegal drug trade that is based on mutual cooperation between US and local law enforcement entities.
Here in Thailand, we work diligently to support the Royal Thai Government's counter-narcotics efforts through initiatives that build domestic capacity to combat trafficking in illegal drugs and related transnational organized crime, and moving forward we will continue to cooperate closely with our partners in the region to stem the flow of the cross-border narcotics trade.
Q: You recently said that the US did not revoke an entry visa for ousted Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra. You have also expressed confidence in Abhisit Vejjajiva, the new prime minister. How seriously has Thailand’s political upheaval affected Thai-US relations?
A: Not at all. The relationship remains rock solid because of our shared long history and our mutual appreciation of freedom and liberty. Thailand is our oldest friend, partner and ally in Asia. Last year marked the 175th anniversary of our two countries’ historic friendship, one that goes back to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed on March 20, 1833. Since that day nearly two centuries ago, ours has been a story about cooperation in times of peace and in times of war, about the exchange of ideas and the exchange of goods and commerce, and about working together to make this region and this world a better place.
Though events in recent years have provided both opportunities and challenges to this relationship, relations between the United States and Thailand continue to be vibrant and strong. The core values at the bedrock of our longstanding friendship remain unfettered: Thais and Americans alike hold close the idea of democracy and political liberty.
It is these common values and shared interests that form the basis of our enduring relationship with Thailand, one that remains as solid and deep today as it has in years past.
Q: Are you concerned about the stability of Thailand’s democracy? Do you feel the political situation here has had an adverse impact on the region?
A: No nation’s path to democracy is smooth or straight. Along the way, there are bound to be stumbles. You need only look at the history of my country to see that. And it is true that democracy in Thailand suffered several setbacks in recent years, but I think we must look beyond these past events and consider the democratic tradition that has long been a part of the Thai political landscape. Democratic values are deeply rooted in Thailand and what we have witnessed during this recent period of tension are political disagreements resolved within a constitutional framework. We must recognize that key pillars of democratic societies—freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to assemble—remained intact through these turbulent times. The strongest democracies flourish from frequent and lively debate emanating from diverse viewpoints, but they endure when people find a way to peacefully set aside differences in service of a greater purpose.
Q: The alleged mistreatment of Rohingya boat people by the Thai navy has hurt Thailand’s reputation and has become a serious concern in other countries in the region. What practical solutions to this problem would you like to see emerge from the Asean summit?
A: Assisting refugees is one of the top strategic priorities of the US Mission in Thailand and one to which I am fully committed. Thailand is home to approximately 140,000 recognized refugees from Burma living in camps along the Thai-Burma border. The United States has resettled more than 33,000 Burmese refugees in our country. Let me also point out that in fiscal year 2008, the Refugee and Migration Affairs office of the US Embassy in Bangkok resettled more refugees to the United States than any other US Embassy office in the world. We will have one of the world’s largest resettlement programs again this fiscal year.
Now, speaking specifically to the Rohingya issue, media coverage over recent months has put a spotlight on the plight of Rohingya refugees, particularly those who have allegedly been mistreated in Thailand.
We must recognize that the root of the problem lies in the situation in Burma. The Rohingya are systematically persecuted for their religion and ethnicity by the Burmese regime, which does not recognize them as citizens despite their centuries-long presence within the modern day boundaries of Burma. They are fleeing a situation of severe persecution, which includes strict limits on their ability to find livelihoods in their own villages, in order to seek opportunities in other countries to feed themselves and their families.
Without improvements in their treatment in Northern Rakhine State, and verifiable guarantees by authorities that they won’t be punished for departing, the United States strictly opposes the forced repatriation of the Rohingya into the hands of Burmese officials. We welcome efforts by concerned governments, particularly those in the Asean region, to work together on a common regional approach for the Rohingya. We are encouraged by reports that the governments of Thailand and Indonesia discussed the issue of Rohingya refugees at the Asean summit that took place in February, as well plans to address a regional approach at the Bali Process forum to be held in Indonesia in early March. We support efforts by Asean nations to develop viable solutions that will ensure that the rights of these individuals are protected and look forward to seeing what concrete plans of action come out of the sideline meetings held at the Asean summit held recently in Thailand.
Q: Human rights issues are a matter of concern in all Asian countries. Asean now has a charter. Do you see any new ways to strengthen human rights protection?
A: The protection of fundamental human rights was a cornerstone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of US foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Asean has taken the steps to fulfill this commitment, but its success will depend on the hard work and resolve of its member nations to act against those who stand in violation of human rights. As a longtime friend of Asean, the United States stands ready to assist in helping Asean live up to its commitments.
The Obama Administration has pledged to reach beyond ministerial buildings and official meeting halls, as important as those are, to engage the public and civil society to strengthen the foundations needed to support human rights, including good governance, religious tolerance, free elections and a free press.
And we are ready to listen, too. President Obama and Secretary Clinton recognize that actively listening to our partners can also be a source of ideas to fuel our common efforts. The United States is committed to a foreign policy that values what others have to say. Secretary Clinton has said she will focus her energies on human rights, engaging a wide range of audiences through both traditional and untraditional means to improve the lives of those around the globe who are deprived of basic human rights. She has espoused the value of open dialogue and has said that we will hold ourselves and others accountable as we work to create a world that respects those rights. I think this approach will only serve to bolster our ability and resolve to strengthen human rights protection.
In a wide ranging interview with The Irrawaddy, US Ambassador to Thailand Eric G John spoke about what Asia and the countries of Asean in particular can expect from the foreign policy program of Barack Obama’s presidency. He also confirmed that the Obama administration will review Washington’s policy on Burma.
Question: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Asia was seen by many as a sign that President Obama wants to focus his foreign policy on this region. What can the US do to improve its relations with Asia, particularly Asean?
Answer: We’ve had a long-standing relationship with Asean, one that spans more than 30 years. I understand the perception recently may be that we have not paid enough attention to Asia or Asean, but a closer look will reveal that we have always been engaged with this region. During the last administration, we established the US-Asean Enhanced Partnership, and we have taken definitive steps to improve bilateral cooperation with many Asean members in recent years.
Having said that, the Obama administration has sent a clear signal of its intention to make relations with Asia an even greater priority. Last month, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made her first official overseas visit as Secretary of State to Asia, the first time this has happened in nearly 50 years. During her tour of Asia, Secretary Clinton became the first US Secretary of State—and the highest ranking US official—to visit the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. I believe that her visit to Asean’s headquarters marks a new era in US-Asean relations, and one that will see unprecedented engagement between the United States and Asean member countries.
As Secretary Clinton announced in Jakarta, President Obama and his administration will soon launch a formal interagency process to pursue accession to Asean’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This is a major step forward in our relationship with Asean. The Secretary also told Asean Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan that she plans to travel to Thailand in July to participate in the Asean Post-Ministerial and Asean Regional Forum. The US Ambassador for Asean Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot A Marciel—the first such ambassador appointed among Asean’s 10 dialogue partners—represented Washington at the Asean Summit in Cha-am, Thailand February 27-28. The participation of these high-level US government officials in these critical regional fora certainly reflects the importance we place on our relationship with Asean.
Looking forward, there will be many opportunities for the US and Asean to work together. The economic development and well-being of all Asean nations is of great importance to the United States and increasing trade with Asean will be a key objective for the new Obama administration. The United States provides a huge market for Asean’s exports. In 2007, we purchased US $111 billion in Asean goods. US private sector investment in Asean exceeds $130 billion, more than in China, Japan or India. In turn, the United States each year exports more than $60 billion in goods to Asean, our fourth largest market.
In addition to trade, the United States will also look to partner with Asean to make progress on climate change, counterterrorism, disease control, the situation in Burma, disaster relief and many other issues of importance to the region. The US and Thailand will co-chair the Asean Regional Forum Intersessional process on Disaster Relief Management, for instance. I am certain that under President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s leadership the US-Asean partnership will strengthen an already vigorous relationship, and we will engage in dialogue and action with Asean to address the full range of these issues in the months and years to come.
Q: Many export-dependent countries in Asia are worried about the “Buy American” provision in the recent stimulus package. How do you respond to concerns about protectionism? Will Asian companies benefit from stimulus-related projects in the US?
A: I think we can look to recent statements by Secretary Clinton to gauge the reality of concerns about a move towards protectionism. During her tour of Asia, Secretary Clinton said that the global financial crisis requires every nation to look inward for solutions, but that none of us can afford to become so introspective that we overlook the critical role that international partnerships must play in stabilizing the world’s economy and putting all of us back on the path to prosperity. The Obama administration is committed to making sure that even as the US government takes steps to strengthen the economy that we are doing so in a way that actually will enhance the ability of trading partners, like those in Asia, to work with us in addressing this global economic crisis.
The Recovery Act that was signed into law by President Obama on February 17, 2009, is an unprecedented effort to jumpstart the U.S. economy. The Act is an extraordinary response to a crisis unlike any in the last half century, and includes a range a measures aimed at getting the US economy back on track. The legislation ensures that it will be implemented consistent with US obligations under international agreements. The G20 leaders pledged last November to refrain from raising new barriers to trade in good and services, and no new barriers to trade are being raised now. Neither has our approach to forging reciprocity in procurements practices over the past decade changed with the enactment of the Act. The “buy American” provisions, as signed into law, specifically ensure that many of our trading partners, including Canada, the EU, and Japan, will continue to have access to procurement under the new stimulus package in accordance with our international obligations either under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or through our Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
Let me take a moment to touch on this issue in the context of US-Thai trade relations. I want to stress that the financial crisis will not affect relations between our two countries. The breadth and depth of our relationship stands unchanged, and we will continue to trade and invest in Thailand as before. We will work together closely to deal with the effects of the crisis. Thailand has long been a favorite destination for US investors. Our trade totals over $30 billion per year and accumulated investment is estimated at over $23 billion, and promoting this healthy trade relationship will remain a focus of the US Mission here in Thailand.
In these difficult economic times, US investment in Thailand is dropping a bit, as is investment throughout the region. That said, Thailand remains an attractive destination for US investors and part of my job is to promote and protect US commercial interests. In so doing, we are working with the Thai government to help create a positive investment environment. This includes respect for protecting intellectual property rights, opening markets, reducing corruption and, perhaps most importantly, improving customs laws. One of the biggest obstacles to foreign investment in Thailand, and not just for American businesses, is its archaic customs laws, which have been on the books for 80 years now. To remain competitive in the region, it is crucial that Thailand modernize its customs legislation.
Q: Secretary of State Clinton recently outlined a foreign policy based on the “Three D’s” of defense, diplomacy and development. Where does the fourth “D”—democracy—fit into the Obama administration’s foreign policy?
A: It is important to recognize that it is still quite early in the Obama administration and not all policy initiatives have been cemented into concrete plans of action. Defense, diplomacy and development—the “three D’s” as Secretary Clinton framed them—will indeed be the pillars of the Obama administration’s foreign policy, but I contend that all three of the components are intrinsically tied to democracy promotion and that this theme will remain central to the new administration’s foreign policy agenda. In other words, democracy is inherent in all three pillars.
Democracy promotion has long been a central component of US foreign policy and will clearly continue to be so under the Obama administration. Supporting democracy helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global environment in which mutual interests, such as expanding open markets, promoting economic development, and combating international terrorism and crime, can be advanced more effectively.
Q: On Burma, Secretary of State Clinton has said that both engagement and sanctions have failed and that the new administration is considering a shift in its Burma policy. Does this mean that the US will start to engage with the Burmese junta? What other options does the administration have?
A: As Secretary Clinton stated while on her tour of Asia, the US administration is currently reviewing its policy towards Burma. In her words, “We want to see the best ideas about how to influence the Burmese regime.” The end policy goal remains the same: the start of a genuine, inclusive political dialogue in Burma and the release of all political prisoners. As you have pointed out, Secretary Clinton noted that neither sanctions nor efforts to reach out and engage the regime have proven successful in influencing the authorities in Burma towards this end, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and Asean Foreign Ministers. Moving forward, the United States intends to consult with a broad range of stakeholders as we conduct our review of US policy on Burma to ensure that it is a collaborative process based on the vital exchange of information with key actors and friends in the region.
Although we welcome the recent release of some political prisoners by the Burmese government, I note that the regime continues to hold more than 2,100 prisoners of conscience. We will continue to call on the government of Burma to immediately set free all remaining political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking members of the country’s democracy movement, so that an inclusive dialogue can begin on Burma’s political future.
Q: The UN reports that there is now 33 percent more land under poppy cultivation in Burma than in 2006. Meanwhile, Burmese-made methamphetamines have been flooding into neighboring Thailand and China for years. What more can the US government do to help control drug production and its trade?
A: The US Mission in Thailand places great importance on combating narcotics trade in the region, while targeting drug trafficking organizations responsible for smuggling controlled substances into the United States and the international market. We have a successful track record in fighting the illegal drug trade that is based on mutual cooperation between US and local law enforcement entities.
Here in Thailand, we work diligently to support the Royal Thai Government's counter-narcotics efforts through initiatives that build domestic capacity to combat trafficking in illegal drugs and related transnational organized crime, and moving forward we will continue to cooperate closely with our partners in the region to stem the flow of the cross-border narcotics trade.
Q: You recently said that the US did not revoke an entry visa for ousted Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra. You have also expressed confidence in Abhisit Vejjajiva, the new prime minister. How seriously has Thailand’s political upheaval affected Thai-US relations?
A: Not at all. The relationship remains rock solid because of our shared long history and our mutual appreciation of freedom and liberty. Thailand is our oldest friend, partner and ally in Asia. Last year marked the 175th anniversary of our two countries’ historic friendship, one that goes back to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed on March 20, 1833. Since that day nearly two centuries ago, ours has been a story about cooperation in times of peace and in times of war, about the exchange of ideas and the exchange of goods and commerce, and about working together to make this region and this world a better place.
Though events in recent years have provided both opportunities and challenges to this relationship, relations between the United States and Thailand continue to be vibrant and strong. The core values at the bedrock of our longstanding friendship remain unfettered: Thais and Americans alike hold close the idea of democracy and political liberty.
It is these common values and shared interests that form the basis of our enduring relationship with Thailand, one that remains as solid and deep today as it has in years past.
Q: Are you concerned about the stability of Thailand’s democracy? Do you feel the political situation here has had an adverse impact on the region?
A: No nation’s path to democracy is smooth or straight. Along the way, there are bound to be stumbles. You need only look at the history of my country to see that. And it is true that democracy in Thailand suffered several setbacks in recent years, but I think we must look beyond these past events and consider the democratic tradition that has long been a part of the Thai political landscape. Democratic values are deeply rooted in Thailand and what we have witnessed during this recent period of tension are political disagreements resolved within a constitutional framework. We must recognize that key pillars of democratic societies—freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to assemble—remained intact through these turbulent times. The strongest democracies flourish from frequent and lively debate emanating from diverse viewpoints, but they endure when people find a way to peacefully set aside differences in service of a greater purpose.
Q: The alleged mistreatment of Rohingya boat people by the Thai navy has hurt Thailand’s reputation and has become a serious concern in other countries in the region. What practical solutions to this problem would you like to see emerge from the Asean summit?
A: Assisting refugees is one of the top strategic priorities of the US Mission in Thailand and one to which I am fully committed. Thailand is home to approximately 140,000 recognized refugees from Burma living in camps along the Thai-Burma border. The United States has resettled more than 33,000 Burmese refugees in our country. Let me also point out that in fiscal year 2008, the Refugee and Migration Affairs office of the US Embassy in Bangkok resettled more refugees to the United States than any other US Embassy office in the world. We will have one of the world’s largest resettlement programs again this fiscal year.
Now, speaking specifically to the Rohingya issue, media coverage over recent months has put a spotlight on the plight of Rohingya refugees, particularly those who have allegedly been mistreated in Thailand.
We must recognize that the root of the problem lies in the situation in Burma. The Rohingya are systematically persecuted for their religion and ethnicity by the Burmese regime, which does not recognize them as citizens despite their centuries-long presence within the modern day boundaries of Burma. They are fleeing a situation of severe persecution, which includes strict limits on their ability to find livelihoods in their own villages, in order to seek opportunities in other countries to feed themselves and their families.
Without improvements in their treatment in Northern Rakhine State, and verifiable guarantees by authorities that they won’t be punished for departing, the United States strictly opposes the forced repatriation of the Rohingya into the hands of Burmese officials. We welcome efforts by concerned governments, particularly those in the Asean region, to work together on a common regional approach for the Rohingya. We are encouraged by reports that the governments of Thailand and Indonesia discussed the issue of Rohingya refugees at the Asean summit that took place in February, as well plans to address a regional approach at the Bali Process forum to be held in Indonesia in early March. We support efforts by Asean nations to develop viable solutions that will ensure that the rights of these individuals are protected and look forward to seeing what concrete plans of action come out of the sideline meetings held at the Asean summit held recently in Thailand.
Q: Human rights issues are a matter of concern in all Asian countries. Asean now has a charter. Do you see any new ways to strengthen human rights protection?
A: The protection of fundamental human rights was a cornerstone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of US foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Asean has taken the steps to fulfill this commitment, but its success will depend on the hard work and resolve of its member nations to act against those who stand in violation of human rights. As a longtime friend of Asean, the United States stands ready to assist in helping Asean live up to its commitments.
The Obama Administration has pledged to reach beyond ministerial buildings and official meeting halls, as important as those are, to engage the public and civil society to strengthen the foundations needed to support human rights, including good governance, religious tolerance, free elections and a free press.
And we are ready to listen, too. President Obama and Secretary Clinton recognize that actively listening to our partners can also be a source of ideas to fuel our common efforts. The United States is committed to a foreign policy that values what others have to say. Secretary Clinton has said she will focus her energies on human rights, engaging a wide range of audiences through both traditional and untraditional means to improve the lives of those around the globe who are deprived of basic human rights. She has espoused the value of open dialogue and has said that we will hold ourselves and others accountable as we work to create a world that respects those rights. I think this approach will only serve to bolster our ability and resolve to strengthen human rights protection.
March 2, 2009
Mon Party Ponders the Constitution and Election
By THE IRRAWADDY
Naing Han Thar is general-secretary of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), a major ethnic armed group based in Mon State. The party signed a cease-fire agreement with the military regime in 1995. Naing Han Thar talked with The Irrawaddy about the party’s policies, the constitution and its view of the 2010 general elections.
Question: Would the NMSP join the election if the military regime reviewed and amended the constitution?
Answer: We continue to wait and see the extent to which the new constitution is allowed to be amended, even if they talk about a review. We will decide whether we join the upcoming election depending on how far or near the amended constitution meets our needs.
Q: What would the NMSP want to see changed [in the constitution]?
A: Currently, the constitution is designed to form a unitary state. There are no ethnic rights. There is no special power though the ethnic states have their administrative autonomy. But Burmans have their rights. The ethnic people don’t have their national, cultural and literature freedoms. Based on these factors, it will be impossible for the constitution to bring about national reconciliation. This is one fact that we are not satisfied with.
Another fact is that there is very little about human rights and democracy in the constitution. The future Burma won’t be a democracy under this constitution. If we were allowed to amend it, the first thing we would do would be to create a democratic system in the constitution. The current constitution gives 25 percent of the seats [to the military] in the House of Nationalities, House of Representatives and the Parliaments in the states. It shouldn’t do that and should be amended. If the military wants to have seats in the parliament, enter the election. The military is actually made up of civil servants.
Also, the military leaders take special powers. They take the positions of some ministries. The commander-in-chief of the military has the special right to appoint these positions in accordance with his desire. That is not a democratic practice. Also, it is not reasonable that the National Security Council has the right to make a coup [rescind the government], if necessary. All these factors should be amended.
Regarding the ethnic nationalities, they should have the right to build their own states. There would be eight, or more than eight [separate] nationalities, with their literature and other characteristics.
The states must have an equal autonomy and administrative power. Some minority ethnic groups also must have administrative powers to govern their own ethnic people.
Q: What is your future strategy if the regime doesn’t offer any concession to your proposals?
A: I can’t say. Our stand is to discuss the problem on the table. We don’t want an armed conflict between us. We will maintain the cease fire as long as we can. For the time being, I can only say what I’ve said.
Q: Do you think the 2010 election can solve any problems?
A: We have no rights in accordance with the current constitution. Therefore, even if we had people elected, what kind of special chance do we have? Our political problems can’t be solved if the election will be held in accordance with this constitution.
Q: What do you say if other cease-fire groups join the election?
A: Do as you wish. We don’t have anything to say. Even if Mon [some] ethnic people enter the election, we don’t criticize them. In the opinion of our party, the current constitution is neither beneficial nor special to us.
Q: At the last NMSP party conference, was an election strategy discussed?
A: We reviewed the constitution in the conference. Then, we discussed our future stands. Nobody discussed the fact that we should enter the election.
Q: Are there factions that want to break away from the NMSP and join the election?
A: We don’t see it for now and don’t think it will happen.
Q: How long will the cease-fire agreement remain in place, if the NMSP doesn’t take part in the election?
A: The principle of a cease-fire is to seek solutions to political problems. This is the right policy. But the opportunity to solve the political problems and achieve mutual cooperation hasn’t occurred after making the cease-fire. We were urged to attend the National Convention to try to seek political solutions. But the majority of participants at the convention were those they handpicked. The [constitutional] principles are their work. The cease-fire armed groups presented their needs, but the regime recognized nothing. In this situation, we didn’t have any more options.
Q: Are there ongoing discussions among the cease-fire groups?
A: Yes, we have regular discussions.
Q: After Gen Khin Nyunt was sacked, who do you now communicate with in the military regime?
A: Currently, we meet with the regional commander of the Southeastern Military Division. Sometimes, we met with his representatives. Mostly, we meet with the regional commander, and our relationship is good.
Q: After issuing statements that didn’t support the National Convention and the constitution, did you experienced any pressure from the regime?
A: No. We did it carefully. And we only talked about our political positions. It didn’t change things, because they have their position and we have our position.
Q: How has the NMSP benefited from the cease-fire?
A: There are some benefits from this cease-fire. Before that time, villagers didn’t live peacefully, and they were on the run. They were forced to be porters and were beaten. There were no economic opportunities. Now, they have a better chance to earn incomes. In some places, roads were built and transportation has improved, resulting in the growth of real estate values. The produce from the farmlands can be transported and sold in the markets of the cities.
Another point is that our party now has better access to the Mon people living in the towns and cities. We have discussions with them about politics and are able to form a consensus. We can also promote the education sector. In the health sector, we can give training to health workers. The NMSP also helped the villagers to regain some of the land that was confiscated by the regime.
Q: What are the difficulties remaining after 14 years of cease-fire?
A: Many difficulties. But we tolerate the situation as much as we can. We need to receive more financial assistance for our people. Currently, we can barely cope with the situation. It is not enough. We tolerate as much as we can for the sake of the people.
Q: Do you think international pressure is effective?
A: In my opinion, some [economic] sanctions affect the regime, and some don’t. There is no consensus among them. Our neighboring countries approach the regime to exploit the country’s natural resources. The pressure is not effective because of a lack of unity.
From the side of the regime, the economic sanctions have prevented an international dialogue. But due to sanctions, the regime is facing difficulties. They also must consider the future. Given these facts, the economic sanctions can’t be said to be ineffective.
Naing Han Thar is general-secretary of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), a major ethnic armed group based in Mon State. The party signed a cease-fire agreement with the military regime in 1995. Naing Han Thar talked with The Irrawaddy about the party’s policies, the constitution and its view of the 2010 general elections.
Question: Would the NMSP join the election if the military regime reviewed and amended the constitution?
Answer: We continue to wait and see the extent to which the new constitution is allowed to be amended, even if they talk about a review. We will decide whether we join the upcoming election depending on how far or near the amended constitution meets our needs.
Q: What would the NMSP want to see changed [in the constitution]?
A: Currently, the constitution is designed to form a unitary state. There are no ethnic rights. There is no special power though the ethnic states have their administrative autonomy. But Burmans have their rights. The ethnic people don’t have their national, cultural and literature freedoms. Based on these factors, it will be impossible for the constitution to bring about national reconciliation. This is one fact that we are not satisfied with.
Another fact is that there is very little about human rights and democracy in the constitution. The future Burma won’t be a democracy under this constitution. If we were allowed to amend it, the first thing we would do would be to create a democratic system in the constitution. The current constitution gives 25 percent of the seats [to the military] in the House of Nationalities, House of Representatives and the Parliaments in the states. It shouldn’t do that and should be amended. If the military wants to have seats in the parliament, enter the election. The military is actually made up of civil servants.
Also, the military leaders take special powers. They take the positions of some ministries. The commander-in-chief of the military has the special right to appoint these positions in accordance with his desire. That is not a democratic practice. Also, it is not reasonable that the National Security Council has the right to make a coup [rescind the government], if necessary. All these factors should be amended.
Regarding the ethnic nationalities, they should have the right to build their own states. There would be eight, or more than eight [separate] nationalities, with their literature and other characteristics.
The states must have an equal autonomy and administrative power. Some minority ethnic groups also must have administrative powers to govern their own ethnic people.
Q: What is your future strategy if the regime doesn’t offer any concession to your proposals?
A: I can’t say. Our stand is to discuss the problem on the table. We don’t want an armed conflict between us. We will maintain the cease fire as long as we can. For the time being, I can only say what I’ve said.
Q: Do you think the 2010 election can solve any problems?
A: We have no rights in accordance with the current constitution. Therefore, even if we had people elected, what kind of special chance do we have? Our political problems can’t be solved if the election will be held in accordance with this constitution.
Q: What do you say if other cease-fire groups join the election?
A: Do as you wish. We don’t have anything to say. Even if Mon [some] ethnic people enter the election, we don’t criticize them. In the opinion of our party, the current constitution is neither beneficial nor special to us.
Q: At the last NMSP party conference, was an election strategy discussed?
A: We reviewed the constitution in the conference. Then, we discussed our future stands. Nobody discussed the fact that we should enter the election.
Q: Are there factions that want to break away from the NMSP and join the election?
A: We don’t see it for now and don’t think it will happen.
Q: How long will the cease-fire agreement remain in place, if the NMSP doesn’t take part in the election?
A: The principle of a cease-fire is to seek solutions to political problems. This is the right policy. But the opportunity to solve the political problems and achieve mutual cooperation hasn’t occurred after making the cease-fire. We were urged to attend the National Convention to try to seek political solutions. But the majority of participants at the convention were those they handpicked. The [constitutional] principles are their work. The cease-fire armed groups presented their needs, but the regime recognized nothing. In this situation, we didn’t have any more options.
Q: Are there ongoing discussions among the cease-fire groups?
A: Yes, we have regular discussions.
Q: After Gen Khin Nyunt was sacked, who do you now communicate with in the military regime?
A: Currently, we meet with the regional commander of the Southeastern Military Division. Sometimes, we met with his representatives. Mostly, we meet with the regional commander, and our relationship is good.
Q: After issuing statements that didn’t support the National Convention and the constitution, did you experienced any pressure from the regime?
A: No. We did it carefully. And we only talked about our political positions. It didn’t change things, because they have their position and we have our position.
Q: How has the NMSP benefited from the cease-fire?
A: There are some benefits from this cease-fire. Before that time, villagers didn’t live peacefully, and they were on the run. They were forced to be porters and were beaten. There were no economic opportunities. Now, they have a better chance to earn incomes. In some places, roads were built and transportation has improved, resulting in the growth of real estate values. The produce from the farmlands can be transported and sold in the markets of the cities.
Another point is that our party now has better access to the Mon people living in the towns and cities. We have discussions with them about politics and are able to form a consensus. We can also promote the education sector. In the health sector, we can give training to health workers. The NMSP also helped the villagers to regain some of the land that was confiscated by the regime.
Q: What are the difficulties remaining after 14 years of cease-fire?
A: Many difficulties. But we tolerate the situation as much as we can. We need to receive more financial assistance for our people. Currently, we can barely cope with the situation. It is not enough. We tolerate as much as we can for the sake of the people.
Q: Do you think international pressure is effective?
A: In my opinion, some [economic] sanctions affect the regime, and some don’t. There is no consensus among them. Our neighboring countries approach the regime to exploit the country’s natural resources. The pressure is not effective because of a lack of unity.
From the side of the regime, the economic sanctions have prevented an international dialogue. But due to sanctions, the regime is facing difficulties. They also must consider the future. Given these facts, the economic sanctions can’t be said to be ineffective.
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