By AUNG ZAW
World attention is focused on Rangoon and the trial there of Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and a man who appears to be responsible for her appearance in court—the American intruder John W Yettaw.
Exiled Burmese and Suu Kyi’s colleagues accuse Yettaw of recklessness and plain stupidity. Suu Kyi’s lawyer has called the American a fool.
Yettaw is by no means the only fool in this bizarre affair, however. Consider for a moment the question: who is behind the affair, and why did junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe dare to go this far?
Than Shwe, it must be remembered, was implicated in the Depayin massacre in 2003, when Suu Kyi’s motorcade was attacked by pro-regime thugs. In September 2007, he was again implicated in the killing of monks and activists who peacefully took to the streets.
The September crackdown and subsequent arrests could not have occurred without Than Shwe’s approval.
Under Than Shwe’s command, Burmese Army forces have been guilty of countless crimes against ethnic minorities. The reports of forced labor, conscription, extortion, torture and other human rights abuses are endless.
On this record, Than Shwe is the one who should now be standing trial.
Than Shwe commits his crimes with impunity, in the knowledge that previous protests quickly die away. The former psychological warfare officer knows how to manipulate international opinion and is fully aware of the meaning of global hypocrisy.
Perhaps Than Shwe anticipated the short-lived outcry and outrage that greeted his action against Suu Kyi. He was confident he could get away with the preposterous charge that has now been brought against her—knowing that his confidence could be placed in a company of fools and idiots.
They include hypocritical leaders in the West and Asia and officials sitting comfortably in their UN offices in New York. They acted swiftly, trotting out their customary condemnation of the regime—like so many times in the past.
These people—not just Yettaw—should be nailed. The UN “special envoys,” including Ibrahim Gambari, even UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon himself, all those who put their name to statements hailing Burma’s “progress” and calling for a “new page” of national reconciliation to be turned.
When these crackpots take the podium, don’t they consider consequences of what they say?
Nail, too, their “partners in crime,” who insisted all along that the generals were just misunderstood men who were willing to cooperate with the international community. These misguided experts, scholars, diplomats and apologists—where are they hiding now?
Until Suu Kyi’s arraignment in the prison court, they had been loud enough, defending the regime’s human rights record and belittling Suu Kyi and her movement.
The question of Suu Kyi’s relevance in Burmese politics crops up constantly in discussions I participate in. Perhaps Than Shwe has now shown those who doubt Suu Kyi’s relevance that she remains a force to be reckoned with. Ironically, Than Shwe has caused them to lose face, as they can no longer even justify a policy of engagement.
We have no shortage of fools—not only activists but also some diplomats, government officials and self-appointed experts on Burma. They talk nonsense on Burma—a western ambassador recently told me: “You’ll all be going home after the 2010 election.” What naïve rubbish!
Instead of writing an open letter to Suu Kyi, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown would do better to address large oil companies like US-based Chevron, French Total, Malaysia’s Petronas and South Korea's Daewoo International Corp, which do so much to prop up Than Shwe and his regime.
US President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy could offer moral support by wiring letters to the leaders of China, India, Russia and Thailand, countries which are among the principal backers of the regime.
The truth is that Than Shwe is still in the driver’s seat. Asean, the UN, China, and the rest of the world are again just reacting to Than Shwe’s latest dirty trick. All the statements of support for Suu Kyi and condemnation of her tormentors will soon evaporate into thin air. Global outrage will then turn into global hypocrisy.
Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts
May 19, 2009
Foreign Companies in Burma Must Review Their Involvement
By YENI
As the Burmese regime brutally increases its isolation of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the US and countries of the European Union remain steadfast in applying their pressure on the junta. US President Barack Obama formally extended his administration’s sanctions, while the EU is considering whether to step up its own measures.
Burma's stubborn, thuggish military leaders can shrug off Western pressure, however, knowing they can rely on support from such friendly and powerful neighbors as China and India. While neither Beijing nor New Delhi has officially commented on the latest moves against Suu Kyi, many Southeast Asian countries, some of whom have significant trade and investment links with Burma, are also inclined to follow a live-and-let-live policy towards the regime.
However, both camps—supporters of sanctions and proponents of engagement— acknowledge failure in their efforts to influence Burma’s military leaders. That is why US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in February correctly said that sanctions applied by the US and the European Union, as well as the policy of constructive engagement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and Burma’s neighbors, were not working.
So the question remains: who can influence the Burmese generals to listen to world opinion?
Many observers agree that a start could be made on at least ending ongoing human rights abuses if oil and gas companies operating in Burma use their influence with Burma's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
Current investors in Burma’s oil and gas industry include companies from Australia, the British Virgin Islands, China, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Russia and the US.
Those companies are funding the Burmese dictatorship. At the height of the monk-led demonstrations in September 2007, Marco Simons, US legal director at EarthRights International, an environmental and human rights group with offices in Thailand and Washington, declared: "The oil and gas companies have been one of the major industries keeping the regime in power."
The concept of "corporate social responsibility" is often advanced by companies operating in Burma, although that’s usually just a shield behind which they campaign against international environmental and human rights regulations.
For instance, there have been documented abuses connected to the Yadana project operated by the French company Total and the US-based Unocal, including land confiscation, forced labor, rape, torture and killings within the communities along the pipeline. Compensation was paid to some victims after human rights groups filed legal actions against the companies before a federal court in the US.
Foreign investment in Burma’s oil and natural gas sector is significant. But there is no transparency in Burma about how much the government receives in oil and gas payments, nor clarity about how the funds are spent.
The military receives the largest share of the official budget and the Burmese regime allocates little to public sectors such as health and education. Instead, hundreds of millions of dollars disappear annually into the pockets of the ruling generals, their cronies and their pet projects, such as the new administrative capital, Naypyidaw, the cyber city, Yadanabon, and even a nuclear research reactor.
The latest action against Suu Kyi, following the regime’s criminal mismanagement of Cyclone Nargis relief and its crackdown on the September 2007 demonstrations should lead companies to search their consciences when contemplating deals with the regime.
ERI Project Coordinator Matthew Smith believes there are also business reasons to think twice about accepting Burma contracts. "Financing the Burmese regime in this way can only reflect poorly on a company’s reputation and that will ultimately affect their bottom line and ability to capitalize on deals in the future,” he says. “It’s simply bad business.”
Of course, good business must come with ethics, morality and responsibility. This is the time for shareholders of global and regional oil and gas companies operating in Burma not only to think about maximizing profits but also to face up to their responsibilities by evaluating the human rights impact and the criteria for continuing to invest there.
As the Burmese regime brutally increases its isolation of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the US and countries of the European Union remain steadfast in applying their pressure on the junta. US President Barack Obama formally extended his administration’s sanctions, while the EU is considering whether to step up its own measures.
Burma's stubborn, thuggish military leaders can shrug off Western pressure, however, knowing they can rely on support from such friendly and powerful neighbors as China and India. While neither Beijing nor New Delhi has officially commented on the latest moves against Suu Kyi, many Southeast Asian countries, some of whom have significant trade and investment links with Burma, are also inclined to follow a live-and-let-live policy towards the regime.
However, both camps—supporters of sanctions and proponents of engagement— acknowledge failure in their efforts to influence Burma’s military leaders. That is why US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in February correctly said that sanctions applied by the US and the European Union, as well as the policy of constructive engagement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and Burma’s neighbors, were not working.
So the question remains: who can influence the Burmese generals to listen to world opinion?
Many observers agree that a start could be made on at least ending ongoing human rights abuses if oil and gas companies operating in Burma use their influence with Burma's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
Current investors in Burma’s oil and gas industry include companies from Australia, the British Virgin Islands, China, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Russia and the US.
Those companies are funding the Burmese dictatorship. At the height of the monk-led demonstrations in September 2007, Marco Simons, US legal director at EarthRights International, an environmental and human rights group with offices in Thailand and Washington, declared: "The oil and gas companies have been one of the major industries keeping the regime in power."
The concept of "corporate social responsibility" is often advanced by companies operating in Burma, although that’s usually just a shield behind which they campaign against international environmental and human rights regulations.
For instance, there have been documented abuses connected to the Yadana project operated by the French company Total and the US-based Unocal, including land confiscation, forced labor, rape, torture and killings within the communities along the pipeline. Compensation was paid to some victims after human rights groups filed legal actions against the companies before a federal court in the US.
Foreign investment in Burma’s oil and natural gas sector is significant. But there is no transparency in Burma about how much the government receives in oil and gas payments, nor clarity about how the funds are spent.
The military receives the largest share of the official budget and the Burmese regime allocates little to public sectors such as health and education. Instead, hundreds of millions of dollars disappear annually into the pockets of the ruling generals, their cronies and their pet projects, such as the new administrative capital, Naypyidaw, the cyber city, Yadanabon, and even a nuclear research reactor.
The latest action against Suu Kyi, following the regime’s criminal mismanagement of Cyclone Nargis relief and its crackdown on the September 2007 demonstrations should lead companies to search their consciences when contemplating deals with the regime.
ERI Project Coordinator Matthew Smith believes there are also business reasons to think twice about accepting Burma contracts. "Financing the Burmese regime in this way can only reflect poorly on a company’s reputation and that will ultimately affect their bottom line and ability to capitalize on deals in the future,” he says. “It’s simply bad business.”
Of course, good business must come with ethics, morality and responsibility. This is the time for shareholders of global and regional oil and gas companies operating in Burma not only to think about maximizing profits but also to face up to their responsibilities by evaluating the human rights impact and the criteria for continuing to invest there.
May 15, 2009
The Lady, a “Fool” and a Crazy Dictator
By AUNG ZAW
Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyer, Kyi Win, is an angry man. His client is now in jail as a result of a madcap escapade by the American intruder John William Yettaw.
“Everyone is very angry with this wretched American,” said Kyi Win. “He is the cause of all these problems. He's a fool.”
While creating serious problems for Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD), the American swimmer was a
blessing in disguise for the regime leaders in Naypyidaw. They now have an excuse to extend Suu Kyi’s current six-year term of detention, which was to have ended this month.
The bizarre affair pits an eccentric American against a man who probably is really insane—the junta’s cunning leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe.
Indications of the state of Than Shwe’s unsound mind first surfaced in the early 2000s, when he and his family were reported to be behaving like royalty.
In 2005, Than Shwe relocated Burma’s capital to Naypyidaw after secretly constructing a new power center in the rural depths of Burma, at an estimated cost running into billions of dollars.
Than Shwe then bought a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor from Russia and declared to a doubting world that the secrecy-shrouded investment was for peaceful purposes. He reportedly confided to his subordinates that he planned to make Burma a nuclear nation.
He is said to be a devout Buddhist and recently participated with family members in the consecration of a replica of Rangoon’s famous Shwedagon Pagoda.
For all his devout piety, however, family sources suggest that Than Shwe and his wife are superstitious and often consult astrologers, even when making major policy decisions.
Among these decisions were moves to steer Burma into an even darker corner of the world—by restoring formal diplomatic ties, for instance, with North Korea.
Relations between the two countries were broken off in 1983 after a Rangoon bomb attack by North Korean terrorists on a visiting South Korean delegation headed by then-President Chun Doo-hwan.
Burma has sent secret missions to North Korea, and although little news emerges about these visits it is known that the regime is buying arms, including short-range missiles, from the hermit state.
In May 2003, Than Shwe and his hard-line ministers launched an attack on a Suu Kyi motorcade in the heartland of Burma.
The thuggish attack on Suu Kyi and her supporters sparked outrage within the international community. Than Shwe and his regime responded by placing her under house arrest.
Despite the treatment she received at the hands of the regime, Suu Kyi made clear she bore no grudge and extended an olive branch to Than Shwe, seeking political dialogue and national reconciliation.
Than Shwe, however, made clear for his part that he had no interest in meeting Suu Kyi. Instead, he introduced the country to a “road map” leading to what he promised would be “disciplined democracy.”
A new constitution was drawn up and put to the country in 2008 in a national referendum which not even Cyclone Nargis could delay.
The regime made the preposterous claim that the rigged referendum had been approved by more than 90 percent of the electorate. The document provided for a general election to be held in 2010, although no precise date has yet been announced—and even an election law is still awaited.
Suu Kyi’s NLD—outright winner of the 1990 election—recently took a bold step and said it would participate in the 2010 election if the regime met a series of demands, including the release of all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, changes to the constitution and for international observers to be allowed to monitor the poll.
Interestingly, the NLD did not call on the regime to honor the outcome of the 1990 election. Analysts greeted the moderate stance.
Than Shwe had other things on his mind and rejected an appeal by Suu Kyi’s lawyers to free her. He was clearly looking for a reason to justify an extension of her detention.
He was also eager to build the regime’s image and inform the public about “progress” in his country.
Two weeks ago, while not bothering to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Than Shwe arrogantly claimed at a top brass meeting that his country had almost tripled its rice production over the past two decades. He claimed a food surplus existed, despite the destruction in the delta and reports of famine in Chin State.
“There is no need to worry about food even when the nation's population reaches 100 million,” Than Shwe boasted.
His message appeared to be that since Burma has enough rice all its problems are solved. He enjoys living in this world of his own.
The xenophobic regime supremo shuns visiting UN envoys and doesn’t like meeting ambassadors who raise the issue of Suu Kyi’s detention. He is said to take refuge in pre-emptive action when meeting foreign dignitaries who dare to raise the issue.
With Yettaw and Suu Kyi in prison, Than Shwe may have thought that he has more justification to lecture his foreign guests on the reasons for keeping the Lady behind bars.
If any foreign officials are ready to accept such an explanation, Than Shwe will not need to seek psychiatric treatment.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyer, Kyi Win, is an angry man. His client is now in jail as a result of a madcap escapade by the American intruder John William Yettaw.
“Everyone is very angry with this wretched American,” said Kyi Win. “He is the cause of all these problems. He's a fool.”
While creating serious problems for Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD), the American swimmer was a
blessing in disguise for the regime leaders in Naypyidaw. They now have an excuse to extend Suu Kyi’s current six-year term of detention, which was to have ended this month.
The bizarre affair pits an eccentric American against a man who probably is really insane—the junta’s cunning leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe.
Indications of the state of Than Shwe’s unsound mind first surfaced in the early 2000s, when he and his family were reported to be behaving like royalty.
In 2005, Than Shwe relocated Burma’s capital to Naypyidaw after secretly constructing a new power center in the rural depths of Burma, at an estimated cost running into billions of dollars.
Than Shwe then bought a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor from Russia and declared to a doubting world that the secrecy-shrouded investment was for peaceful purposes. He reportedly confided to his subordinates that he planned to make Burma a nuclear nation.
He is said to be a devout Buddhist and recently participated with family members in the consecration of a replica of Rangoon’s famous Shwedagon Pagoda.
For all his devout piety, however, family sources suggest that Than Shwe and his wife are superstitious and often consult astrologers, even when making major policy decisions.
Among these decisions were moves to steer Burma into an even darker corner of the world—by restoring formal diplomatic ties, for instance, with North Korea.
Relations between the two countries were broken off in 1983 after a Rangoon bomb attack by North Korean terrorists on a visiting South Korean delegation headed by then-President Chun Doo-hwan.
Burma has sent secret missions to North Korea, and although little news emerges about these visits it is known that the regime is buying arms, including short-range missiles, from the hermit state.
In May 2003, Than Shwe and his hard-line ministers launched an attack on a Suu Kyi motorcade in the heartland of Burma.
The thuggish attack on Suu Kyi and her supporters sparked outrage within the international community. Than Shwe and his regime responded by placing her under house arrest.
Despite the treatment she received at the hands of the regime, Suu Kyi made clear she bore no grudge and extended an olive branch to Than Shwe, seeking political dialogue and national reconciliation.
Than Shwe, however, made clear for his part that he had no interest in meeting Suu Kyi. Instead, he introduced the country to a “road map” leading to what he promised would be “disciplined democracy.”
A new constitution was drawn up and put to the country in 2008 in a national referendum which not even Cyclone Nargis could delay.
The regime made the preposterous claim that the rigged referendum had been approved by more than 90 percent of the electorate. The document provided for a general election to be held in 2010, although no precise date has yet been announced—and even an election law is still awaited.
Suu Kyi’s NLD—outright winner of the 1990 election—recently took a bold step and said it would participate in the 2010 election if the regime met a series of demands, including the release of all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, changes to the constitution and for international observers to be allowed to monitor the poll.
Interestingly, the NLD did not call on the regime to honor the outcome of the 1990 election. Analysts greeted the moderate stance.
Than Shwe had other things on his mind and rejected an appeal by Suu Kyi’s lawyers to free her. He was clearly looking for a reason to justify an extension of her detention.
He was also eager to build the regime’s image and inform the public about “progress” in his country.
Two weeks ago, while not bothering to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Than Shwe arrogantly claimed at a top brass meeting that his country had almost tripled its rice production over the past two decades. He claimed a food surplus existed, despite the destruction in the delta and reports of famine in Chin State.
“There is no need to worry about food even when the nation's population reaches 100 million,” Than Shwe boasted.
His message appeared to be that since Burma has enough rice all its problems are solved. He enjoys living in this world of his own.
The xenophobic regime supremo shuns visiting UN envoys and doesn’t like meeting ambassadors who raise the issue of Suu Kyi’s detention. He is said to take refuge in pre-emptive action when meeting foreign dignitaries who dare to raise the issue.
With Yettaw and Suu Kyi in prison, Than Shwe may have thought that he has more justification to lecture his foreign guests on the reasons for keeping the Lady behind bars.
If any foreign officials are ready to accept such an explanation, Than Shwe will not need to seek psychiatric treatment.
May 14, 2009
Burmese Junta’s Rubber-band Laws Trap Suu Kyi
By KYAW ZWA MOE
Eventually, an apparently unwitting American citizen has helped the Burmese military regime find a way to extend the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi just before her current period of house arrest was set to expire on May 27.
The 63-year-old, pro-democracy leader was taken to Insein Prison early Thursday morning and charged with breaching the conditions of her house arrest, under Section 22 of the Law Safeguarding the State from Dangers of Subversive Elements.
She was charged after an American, John William Yettaw, 53, was arrested last week for swimming across Inya Lake and intruding into her home where he remained for several days.
Suu Kyi will appear in count in the prison on Monday, and she could be sentenced to a maximum of five years.
Yettaw appeared in court in Insein Prison on Thursday and was charged with breaching security laws and with immigration violations. Kyi Win, Suu Kyi’s attorney, said, “Everyone is very angry with this wretched American. He is the cause of all these problems.”
That’s true, but only partly. Actually, Yettaw just gave the regime what it has been searching for: Any “reasonable” excuse to continue her detention before it expired on May 27, marking six years since May 2003 when her motorcade was attacked by a junta-backed mob in upper Burma, and she was detained under house arrest for the second time. She has been under house arrest for 13 of the past 19 years.
Suu Kyi’s lawyer said last month that according to Burmese law, she should be released on May 27. He’s correct technically, but the generals typically redo their own rules and laws, using them like a rubber band—to stretch and shrink at will.
For example, Suu Kyi was detained for the first time in 1989 under 10 (b) of the State Provision Act, under which a person could be detained for a maximum of three years. But one year later, the government changed the law to a maximum of five years. She was detained until 1995, a total of six years.
This is a critical moment for the generals, since they plan to hold a national election in 2010. If Suu Kyi was free, it would greatly complicate the election. In 1990, the junta held an election while she was under house arrest, believing the state-backed National Unity Party, formed by former members of the late dictator Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party, could win the election. Instead, Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy party won by landslide.
If Suu Kyi was set free this time, her most loyal supporters and the general public would return to the political activism of 1995 and 2002, when she actively led the NLD.
In light of that, the generals were searching for any excuse not to release her, in spite of their own law. Suddenly, they were presented with a golden opportunity following Yettaw’s misguided intrusion.
Yet, that’s not end of the story. In the long-term, there’s the issue of her viability as the icon of the pro-democracy movement. Here’s a relevant question: Is the junta deliberately manipulating events in hope that Suu Kyi will die from natural causes in detention, which—in this case—would not be natural at all?
Too farfetched, you say? The ruling generals in Naypyidaw, the capital, see the pro-democracy movement leader as an “enemy of the state.” She’s their No 1 enemy, the leader of the “destructive elements” that have sabotaged “the peace and stability of the country” and threaten their dictatorial rule.
So, is it out of the question that the generals would be happy if Suu Kyi died by natural causes or was so physically impaired she couldn’t lead the pro-democracy movement? The generals can’t assassinate her because of the counterproductive reaction from the international community, even from such loyal allies as China and Russia. But they can ensure that her medical treatment is lacking or dispensed at a minimum level.
You can judge for yourself regarding the incidents that unfolded last week at her lakeside house at No 54 University Avenue. Actually the house is not a real home, it’s a prison.
Suu Kyi was suffering from low blood pressure; she was dehydrated; she had difficulty eating. In short, she was ill again, but on the day her doctor was scheduled to visit her for her regular monthly checkup, he was barred and detained for questioning. Another doctor treated her with an intravenous drip the following day.
"We are worried about Suu's health,” said NLD spokesman Nyan Win last week.
“Authorities should allow free access of her doctor to give Suu the required medical treatment."
If you look at that incident, and similar others, in light of basic law and human rights you can see a pattern of willful negligence by the generals.
The fact is that Suu Kyi has been detained illegally for 14 years, with no just cause and only the minimum of proper medical care, which could lead to an early death or a premature loss her ability to function fully.
The access to proper medical treatment is a serious issue, but it pales now in comparison to the charges against her and her trumped-up trial.
There’s little doubt, the junta’s rubber-band laws will find a way to keep Suu Kyi in detention, preventing her from taking part in the 2010 election.
Burma’s ruling generals are smiling now as Suu Kyi’s show trial is set to begin, and the pro-democracy movement has been dealt another cruel blow.
Eventually, an apparently unwitting American citizen has helped the Burmese military regime find a way to extend the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi just before her current period of house arrest was set to expire on May 27.
The 63-year-old, pro-democracy leader was taken to Insein Prison early Thursday morning and charged with breaching the conditions of her house arrest, under Section 22 of the Law Safeguarding the State from Dangers of Subversive Elements.
She was charged after an American, John William Yettaw, 53, was arrested last week for swimming across Inya Lake and intruding into her home where he remained for several days.
Suu Kyi will appear in count in the prison on Monday, and she could be sentenced to a maximum of five years.
Yettaw appeared in court in Insein Prison on Thursday and was charged with breaching security laws and with immigration violations. Kyi Win, Suu Kyi’s attorney, said, “Everyone is very angry with this wretched American. He is the cause of all these problems.”
That’s true, but only partly. Actually, Yettaw just gave the regime what it has been searching for: Any “reasonable” excuse to continue her detention before it expired on May 27, marking six years since May 2003 when her motorcade was attacked by a junta-backed mob in upper Burma, and she was detained under house arrest for the second time. She has been under house arrest for 13 of the past 19 years.
Suu Kyi’s lawyer said last month that according to Burmese law, she should be released on May 27. He’s correct technically, but the generals typically redo their own rules and laws, using them like a rubber band—to stretch and shrink at will.
For example, Suu Kyi was detained for the first time in 1989 under 10 (b) of the State Provision Act, under which a person could be detained for a maximum of three years. But one year later, the government changed the law to a maximum of five years. She was detained until 1995, a total of six years.
This is a critical moment for the generals, since they plan to hold a national election in 2010. If Suu Kyi was free, it would greatly complicate the election. In 1990, the junta held an election while she was under house arrest, believing the state-backed National Unity Party, formed by former members of the late dictator Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party, could win the election. Instead, Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy party won by landslide.
If Suu Kyi was set free this time, her most loyal supporters and the general public would return to the political activism of 1995 and 2002, when she actively led the NLD.
In light of that, the generals were searching for any excuse not to release her, in spite of their own law. Suddenly, they were presented with a golden opportunity following Yettaw’s misguided intrusion.
Yet, that’s not end of the story. In the long-term, there’s the issue of her viability as the icon of the pro-democracy movement. Here’s a relevant question: Is the junta deliberately manipulating events in hope that Suu Kyi will die from natural causes in detention, which—in this case—would not be natural at all?
Too farfetched, you say? The ruling generals in Naypyidaw, the capital, see the pro-democracy movement leader as an “enemy of the state.” She’s their No 1 enemy, the leader of the “destructive elements” that have sabotaged “the peace and stability of the country” and threaten their dictatorial rule.
So, is it out of the question that the generals would be happy if Suu Kyi died by natural causes or was so physically impaired she couldn’t lead the pro-democracy movement? The generals can’t assassinate her because of the counterproductive reaction from the international community, even from such loyal allies as China and Russia. But they can ensure that her medical treatment is lacking or dispensed at a minimum level.
You can judge for yourself regarding the incidents that unfolded last week at her lakeside house at No 54 University Avenue. Actually the house is not a real home, it’s a prison.
Suu Kyi was suffering from low blood pressure; she was dehydrated; she had difficulty eating. In short, she was ill again, but on the day her doctor was scheduled to visit her for her regular monthly checkup, he was barred and detained for questioning. Another doctor treated her with an intravenous drip the following day.
"We are worried about Suu's health,” said NLD spokesman Nyan Win last week.
“Authorities should allow free access of her doctor to give Suu the required medical treatment."
If you look at that incident, and similar others, in light of basic law and human rights you can see a pattern of willful negligence by the generals.
The fact is that Suu Kyi has been detained illegally for 14 years, with no just cause and only the minimum of proper medical care, which could lead to an early death or a premature loss her ability to function fully.
The access to proper medical treatment is a serious issue, but it pales now in comparison to the charges against her and her trumped-up trial.
There’s little doubt, the junta’s rubber-band laws will find a way to keep Suu Kyi in detention, preventing her from taking part in the 2010 election.
Burma’s ruling generals are smiling now as Suu Kyi’s show trial is set to begin, and the pro-democracy movement has been dealt another cruel blow.
May 13, 2009
Suu Kyi’s Stalker Swimmer
By AUNG ZAW
Since John William Yettaw was arrested last week, several rumors and speculations have been aired.
Did he really swim across Inya Lake—some two kilometers—to meet Aung San Suu Kyi? If so, what was his motive? Had he really been there before? Who was backing him?
Unconfirmed reports suggest that he managed to find a way into Suu Kyi’s home once before, but was made unwelcome and told to leave.
This time—according to the rumor mill in my dissident circle—he pleaded with Suu Kyi to be allowed to stay there for a few days. The NLD leader, who is currently fighting for her freedom through legal channels, obviously did not want the American stalker there. Apparently, Suu Kyi’s caretaker even threatened to call the police.
Conspiracy theorists believe he was coaxed into breaking into Suu Kyi’s house so that the regime would have an excuse to extend her detention.
Junta supporters would rather see it as collaboration between the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a foreign intelligence intermediary—a real-life secret agent, an aquatic James Bond.
As a result, Dr Tin Myo Win is under investigation. Opposition members fear that Suu Kyi’s personal physician may be charged if the regime decides to implicate him in the swimmer’s case.
But informed sources conclude that John William Yettaw is no 007. He is simply a weird character who acted alone.
The American had also turned up in Thailand; he met with some exiled Burmese groups and reportedly told them he was working on a faith-based book on heroism.
They said he is interested in Burma’s plight; that his heart is in right place even if his head is not.
And this is exactly what belies the passion of his action—that he did not think it through; that he did not consider the consequences.
If the regime leaders were looking for an excuse to extend Suu Kyi’s house arrest, he has given them one on a plate.
Indeed, Suu Kyi can be deemed to have broken the “law”—in Burma, you must inform the authorities if you want to invite a guest to stay overnight at your home.
John William Yettaw probably didn’t know this; he apparently didn’t conduct much research into the knock-on effects of his stupidity.
Burma’s pro-democracy movement has long been an attraction for fantasists, fanatics and adventure tourists.
Apart from the usual Walter Mittys that roam the Western world, Burma’s self-appointed saviors have included activists, experts, apologists, lobbyists, scholars, opportunists, do-or-die religious zealots and mercenaries.
While the Karen stronghold of Manerplaw remained undefeated in the early 1990s, foreign mercenaries—or “freedom fighters”—flocked to the border to leap Rambo-like to the Karen front lines.
In August 1999, James Mawdsley, a young Englishman, was arrested in Rangoon after distributing pro-democracy leaflets in the street. It was his third visit to Burma to protest against the military regime. His ambition was to spend time in a Burmese gulag.
He was given a 17-year sentence, but spent only 300 days in Kengtung prison, Shan State, before being released in October 2000 due to mounting international pressure.
Mawdsley was indeed lucky. If he were a Burmese, he would be serving a full sentence and there would be little outcry from abroad.
Unabashed, he later authored a book titled “The Heart Must Break” and threatened to stand in a British election.
“Mawdsley is one of the most outstanding young people Britain has produced since World War Two,” wrote David Alton, an independent cross-bench peer and founder of the Jubilee Campaign, in Mawdsley’s book.
But not everyone was so enthused about Mawdsley’s protest.
The Guardian reported: “In Britain, the response to him was ambivalent. There was a degree of cynicism about his professed Christian zeal, and suggestions that he was reckless to have stuck two fingers up at a dictatorship that has slaughtered thousands of its own people. But there was also grudging respect for his conviction, altruism and bravery.”
I remember a Burmese woman in her 30s who was involved in NGO work at the Thai-Burmese border. Bluntly, she told me: “I could not stand that he was talking about Burma and restoring democracy in my country. He has no clue what’s going on in Burma. I’m not going to listen to what he says and I’ve also told my colleagues not to listen to him.”
She added, “By using Burma and our problems, he has tried to seek fame and personal gain. He was a nobody [in London], but by getting involved in Burma, he became somebody.”
Aside from Mawdsley, there are several other do-gooders who could appear on her hit list.
Another young misguided Brit was Rachel Goldwyn, who was arrested in 1999 for singing a protest song in Rangoon. Her “act of revolution” earned her a seven-year sentence, but she only served two months in Insein.
Shortly before Goldwyn’s petty act of defiance, 18 foreign human rights activists, including a handful of Thais, staged a protest in Rangoon. They were immediately arrested and detained. Again—an international outcry and they were soon on a plane home.
But was Burma liberated?
Critics have noted that these naïve acts cause more harm than good.
Foreign activists know that the Burmese authorities won’t keep them in jail forever. They know that their arrest in Burma will make headlines back home. In his book, Mawdsley discusses the special treatment he received in Kengtung prison. He was allowed to read books, meet diplomats and relatives, and eat Western food.
Former political prisoners of Burma have spoken ironically of these foreign heroes. They noted that if every political prisoner received as much attention as Mawdsley and Goldwyn there would be empty prisons around Burma.
Make no mistake, there is no shortage of foreign volunteers and activists who genuinely want to help Burma and its people. But they do not indulge themselves without considering the effect of their actions on others.
Did John William Yettaw consider the consequences? Did he think for a minute that he would do more harm than good?
Probably not. Next time a foreign activist undertakes a publicity stunt, let’s hope they check the depth of the water before they go swimming.
Since John William Yettaw was arrested last week, several rumors and speculations have been aired.
Did he really swim across Inya Lake—some two kilometers—to meet Aung San Suu Kyi? If so, what was his motive? Had he really been there before? Who was backing him?
Unconfirmed reports suggest that he managed to find a way into Suu Kyi’s home once before, but was made unwelcome and told to leave.
This time—according to the rumor mill in my dissident circle—he pleaded with Suu Kyi to be allowed to stay there for a few days. The NLD leader, who is currently fighting for her freedom through legal channels, obviously did not want the American stalker there. Apparently, Suu Kyi’s caretaker even threatened to call the police.
Conspiracy theorists believe he was coaxed into breaking into Suu Kyi’s house so that the regime would have an excuse to extend her detention.
Junta supporters would rather see it as collaboration between the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a foreign intelligence intermediary—a real-life secret agent, an aquatic James Bond.
As a result, Dr Tin Myo Win is under investigation. Opposition members fear that Suu Kyi’s personal physician may be charged if the regime decides to implicate him in the swimmer’s case.
But informed sources conclude that John William Yettaw is no 007. He is simply a weird character who acted alone.
The American had also turned up in Thailand; he met with some exiled Burmese groups and reportedly told them he was working on a faith-based book on heroism.
They said he is interested in Burma’s plight; that his heart is in right place even if his head is not.
And this is exactly what belies the passion of his action—that he did not think it through; that he did not consider the consequences.
If the regime leaders were looking for an excuse to extend Suu Kyi’s house arrest, he has given them one on a plate.
Indeed, Suu Kyi can be deemed to have broken the “law”—in Burma, you must inform the authorities if you want to invite a guest to stay overnight at your home.
John William Yettaw probably didn’t know this; he apparently didn’t conduct much research into the knock-on effects of his stupidity.
Burma’s pro-democracy movement has long been an attraction for fantasists, fanatics and adventure tourists.
Apart from the usual Walter Mittys that roam the Western world, Burma’s self-appointed saviors have included activists, experts, apologists, lobbyists, scholars, opportunists, do-or-die religious zealots and mercenaries.
While the Karen stronghold of Manerplaw remained undefeated in the early 1990s, foreign mercenaries—or “freedom fighters”—flocked to the border to leap Rambo-like to the Karen front lines.
In August 1999, James Mawdsley, a young Englishman, was arrested in Rangoon after distributing pro-democracy leaflets in the street. It was his third visit to Burma to protest against the military regime. His ambition was to spend time in a Burmese gulag.
He was given a 17-year sentence, but spent only 300 days in Kengtung prison, Shan State, before being released in October 2000 due to mounting international pressure.
Mawdsley was indeed lucky. If he were a Burmese, he would be serving a full sentence and there would be little outcry from abroad.
Unabashed, he later authored a book titled “The Heart Must Break” and threatened to stand in a British election.
“Mawdsley is one of the most outstanding young people Britain has produced since World War Two,” wrote David Alton, an independent cross-bench peer and founder of the Jubilee Campaign, in Mawdsley’s book.
But not everyone was so enthused about Mawdsley’s protest.
The Guardian reported: “In Britain, the response to him was ambivalent. There was a degree of cynicism about his professed Christian zeal, and suggestions that he was reckless to have stuck two fingers up at a dictatorship that has slaughtered thousands of its own people. But there was also grudging respect for his conviction, altruism and bravery.”
I remember a Burmese woman in her 30s who was involved in NGO work at the Thai-Burmese border. Bluntly, she told me: “I could not stand that he was talking about Burma and restoring democracy in my country. He has no clue what’s going on in Burma. I’m not going to listen to what he says and I’ve also told my colleagues not to listen to him.”
She added, “By using Burma and our problems, he has tried to seek fame and personal gain. He was a nobody [in London], but by getting involved in Burma, he became somebody.”
Aside from Mawdsley, there are several other do-gooders who could appear on her hit list.
Another young misguided Brit was Rachel Goldwyn, who was arrested in 1999 for singing a protest song in Rangoon. Her “act of revolution” earned her a seven-year sentence, but she only served two months in Insein.
Shortly before Goldwyn’s petty act of defiance, 18 foreign human rights activists, including a handful of Thais, staged a protest in Rangoon. They were immediately arrested and detained. Again—an international outcry and they were soon on a plane home.
But was Burma liberated?
Critics have noted that these naïve acts cause more harm than good.
Foreign activists know that the Burmese authorities won’t keep them in jail forever. They know that their arrest in Burma will make headlines back home. In his book, Mawdsley discusses the special treatment he received in Kengtung prison. He was allowed to read books, meet diplomats and relatives, and eat Western food.
Former political prisoners of Burma have spoken ironically of these foreign heroes. They noted that if every political prisoner received as much attention as Mawdsley and Goldwyn there would be empty prisons around Burma.
Make no mistake, there is no shortage of foreign volunteers and activists who genuinely want to help Burma and its people. But they do not indulge themselves without considering the effect of their actions on others.
Did John William Yettaw consider the consequences? Did he think for a minute that he would do more harm than good?
Probably not. Next time a foreign activist undertakes a publicity stunt, let’s hope they check the depth of the water before they go swimming.
May 12, 2009
Threatening Suu Kyi’s Health
By KYAW ZWA MOE
Here’s a relevant question that no one has raised yet: is the Burmese junta deliberately manipulating events in hope that Aung San Suu Kyi will die from natural causes, which—in this case—would not be natural at all?
That’s not possible, you say? The ruling generals in Naypyidaw see the 63-year-old pro-democracy movement leader as an “enemy of the state.” They believe she’s the No 1 enemy, the leader of the “destructive elements” that threaten their rule and who have sabotaged “the peace and stability of the country.”
So, is it out of the question that the generals would be happy if Suu Kyi died by natural causes or was physically impaired? They can’t assassinate her because of the counterproductive reaction from the international community, even from such loyal allies as China and Russia. But they can ensure that her medical treatment is lacking or dispensed at a minimum level.
You can judge for yourself regarding the incidents that unfolded last week at her lakeside house at No 54 University Avenue. Actually, the house is not a real home for the Nobel peace laureate. For 13 years, it’s been her prison.
Suu Kyi now has low blood pressure; she is dehydrated; she has difficulty eating. In short, she is ill again, but on Thursday her primary physician was barred from visiting her for a routine medical checkup and detained for questioning.
Another doctor treated her with an intravenous drip on Friday. Following her request and demands by the National League for Democracy (NLD), she was allowed to return on Saturday and Monday.
"We are worried about Daw Suu's health,” said NLD spokesman Nyan Win last week.
“Authorities should allow free access of her doctor to give Daw Suu the required medical treatment."
If you look at these and earlier incidents in light of basic humanity, law and human rights you can see a pattern of willful negligence by the regime. Of course, in Burma the local population is used to neglect.
The fact is that Suu Kyi has been detained illegally for 13 years, with no just cause and only the minimum of proper medical treatment, which could lead to an early death or a premature loss of physical strength.
This month is more critical than ever for the junta. Suu Kyi’s lawyer, Kyi Win, said that according to the law, she should be released on May 27, the date marking six years since May 2003 when her NLD motorcade was attacked by a junta-backed mob in upper Burma and she was detained.
Suu Kyi’s lawyer is right, but the generals redo their own rules and laws, using them like a rubber band—to stretch and shrink at will.
For example, Suu Kyi was detained for the first time in 1989 under 10 (b) of the State Provision Act, under which a person could be detained under house arrest for a maximum of three years under the existing law. But one year later, the government changed the law to a maximum of five years. Suu Kyi was detained at that time until 1995, a total of six years.
This is a critical moment for the generals, since they plan to hold a national election in 2010. If Suu Kyi is free, it greatly complicates the election. In 1990, the junta held an election while Suu Kyi was under house arrest, believing the state-backed National Unity Party, formed by former members of the dictator Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party, could win the election. Instead, Suu Kyi’s NLD party won by landslide.
If a healthy Suu Kyi is free prior to the 2010 election her most loyal supporters and the general public will return to the political activism of 1995 and 2002 when she was free.
In light of that, you should expect the generals to find a way not to release Suu Kyi, in spite of their own law.
So what now? Several options could play out during the course of the next year.
The junta’s rubber-band law could find a way to keep her under house arrest. Or perhaps Suu Kyi does develop a serious illness, effectively limiting her leadership ability.
Or, if the regime does release her—somehow seeing a political gain in that act—it could always fabricate a new reason for her arrest, as it did in 2003.
Here’s a relevant question that no one has raised yet: is the Burmese junta deliberately manipulating events in hope that Aung San Suu Kyi will die from natural causes, which—in this case—would not be natural at all?
That’s not possible, you say? The ruling generals in Naypyidaw see the 63-year-old pro-democracy movement leader as an “enemy of the state.” They believe she’s the No 1 enemy, the leader of the “destructive elements” that threaten their rule and who have sabotaged “the peace and stability of the country.”
So, is it out of the question that the generals would be happy if Suu Kyi died by natural causes or was physically impaired? They can’t assassinate her because of the counterproductive reaction from the international community, even from such loyal allies as China and Russia. But they can ensure that her medical treatment is lacking or dispensed at a minimum level.
You can judge for yourself regarding the incidents that unfolded last week at her lakeside house at No 54 University Avenue. Actually, the house is not a real home for the Nobel peace laureate. For 13 years, it’s been her prison.
Suu Kyi now has low blood pressure; she is dehydrated; she has difficulty eating. In short, she is ill again, but on Thursday her primary physician was barred from visiting her for a routine medical checkup and detained for questioning.
Another doctor treated her with an intravenous drip on Friday. Following her request and demands by the National League for Democracy (NLD), she was allowed to return on Saturday and Monday.
"We are worried about Daw Suu's health,” said NLD spokesman Nyan Win last week.
“Authorities should allow free access of her doctor to give Daw Suu the required medical treatment."
If you look at these and earlier incidents in light of basic humanity, law and human rights you can see a pattern of willful negligence by the regime. Of course, in Burma the local population is used to neglect.
The fact is that Suu Kyi has been detained illegally for 13 years, with no just cause and only the minimum of proper medical treatment, which could lead to an early death or a premature loss of physical strength.
This month is more critical than ever for the junta. Suu Kyi’s lawyer, Kyi Win, said that according to the law, she should be released on May 27, the date marking six years since May 2003 when her NLD motorcade was attacked by a junta-backed mob in upper Burma and she was detained.
Suu Kyi’s lawyer is right, but the generals redo their own rules and laws, using them like a rubber band—to stretch and shrink at will.
For example, Suu Kyi was detained for the first time in 1989 under 10 (b) of the State Provision Act, under which a person could be detained under house arrest for a maximum of three years under the existing law. But one year later, the government changed the law to a maximum of five years. Suu Kyi was detained at that time until 1995, a total of six years.
This is a critical moment for the generals, since they plan to hold a national election in 2010. If Suu Kyi is free, it greatly complicates the election. In 1990, the junta held an election while Suu Kyi was under house arrest, believing the state-backed National Unity Party, formed by former members of the dictator Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party, could win the election. Instead, Suu Kyi’s NLD party won by landslide.
If a healthy Suu Kyi is free prior to the 2010 election her most loyal supporters and the general public will return to the political activism of 1995 and 2002 when she was free.
In light of that, you should expect the generals to find a way not to release Suu Kyi, in spite of their own law.
So what now? Several options could play out during the course of the next year.
The junta’s rubber-band law could find a way to keep her under house arrest. Or perhaps Suu Kyi does develop a serious illness, effectively limiting her leadership ability.
Or, if the regime does release her—somehow seeing a political gain in that act—it could always fabricate a new reason for her arrest, as it did in 2003.
May 6, 2009
No Room for Wishful Thinking in Sanctions Debate
By AUNG ZAW
Burma’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win has called during a recent visit to Cuba for an end to sanctions imposed on developing countries—including his own. Nyan Win’s call came as the US conducts a review of its policy on Burma.
The former army officer, whose loyalty to Than Shwe is not in doubt, may have thought that Cuba is the right place to call for lifting sanctions as President Barack Obama recently made some conciliatory gestures towards the regime in Cuba. But Cuba is not alone.
Obama has been extending an olive branch to the members of the “axis of evil” and “outposts of tyranny” so loudly condemned by his predecessor, George W Bush. They include North Korea, Iran, Belarus and Burma.
Now the Burma policy forged by the Bush administration is under review, a process that began when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Asia in February.
During her Asian tour, Clinton said neither sanctions nor engagement had succeeded in bringing about change in Burma.
A month later, Stephen Blake, director of the US State Department’s Office of Mainland Southeast Asia, visited the Burmese capital, Naypyidaw, where he met Nyan Win. Blake was the highest-ranking US official to visit Burma in recent years.
Burma’s state-run media reported that Blake and Nyan Win discussed issues of mutual interest and the promotion of bilateral relations.
Blake’s visit and Clinton’s remarks on Burma stirred speculation about a possible policy shift by the Obama administration. There has even been some talk of a relaxation of sanctions—although Richard Verma, the assistant secretary for legislative affairs who handles relations between the State Department and Congress, wrote a letter to Republican Congressman Peter King saying reports that the US would lift sanctions were “incorrect.”
According to an AFP report, Verma said: “The sanctions that the United States and other countries maintain against the regime are an important part of our efforts to support change in Burma.
“While we are currently reviewing our Burma policy, we can assure you that we remain committed to delivering a firm message on the need for real reform, including the initiation of a credible and inclusive dialogue with the democratic opposition and the release of political prisoners.”
In July 2008, the US signed into law the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act 2008. The act has three aims: to impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates; to tighten the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the US; and to create a new position of “US Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.”
Recently, the EU renewed its own economic sanctions on Burma for a further year, during a foreign ministers’ meeting in Luxembourg.
The EU said it would continue to work to establish an open dialogue with the ruling
generals. It also called for the junta to conduct a genuine dialogue with opposition and ethnic groups.
So in the foreseeable future, Burma will continue to be punished by the Western sanctions since no single tangible positive development has been detected in the country. But, on the other hand, the old debate over sanctions has returned.
Thaung Htun, representative of the exiled government of Burma, wrote in European Voice that the debate so far has tended to see sanctions as a silver bullet.
“However, it defies logic or precedent to assume sanctions can, as a lone policy tool, generate the sort of drastic reform in Burma that is needed,” Thaung Htun said.
He argued that the government in exile supported sanctions because “they have an impact on the Burmese regime and this has been admitted time and again by the generals.”
But, he added, “it has never envisaged a system of Cuba-style blanket blocks on Burmese economic activity. Any sanctions must be targeted to maximize the impact on the junta and to minimize pressure on ordinary Burmese people.”
However, Burmese opposition and critics of the regime inside and outside Burma favor US engagement in Burma but they are cautious. They want sanctions to be maintained until the regime relaxes its grip on power.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who has advocated pressure and sanctions on Burma, wrote in the Washington Post recently: “America should engage Burma, but it should not engage in wishful thinking.
“Nothing in our experience suggests that offers of aid will cause Burma’s generals to change course; unlike some authoritarian regimes, this one seems to care not a bit for the economic well being of its country.”
The irony is that the regime in Burma is eager to improve its relations with the US but is not ready to offer anything tangible.
Burma still holds more than 2,100 political prisoners, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, and there are no signs that the regime is going to free them and embark on genuine political reform.
So what is the US policy on Burma and rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran likely to be?
Jackson Diehl wrote in the Washington Post recently: “The first wake-up call has come from North Korea—a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled ‘evil’ by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering ‘incentives’ for good behavior.”
How has North Korea reacted to the arrival of Obama in the White House? It has fired its missile, anyway, expelled UN inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
What about Iran? Jackson Diehl wrote: “Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage.”
Than Shwe, for his part, is eager to normalize relations with the US but he is one sided and doesn’t understand the language of compromise.
First, the regime rejects all international appeals to release Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. Nor does Than Shwe listen to international appeals for a review of his “road map” to make it inclusive. He is not interested.
While not bothering to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Than Shwe has arrogantly claimed at a top brass meeting that Burma has almost tripled its rice production over the past two decades, boasting a food surplus despite the destruction in the delta and reports of famine and food shortage in Chin State.
“There is no need to worry about food even when the nation's population reaches 100 million,” Than Shwe boasted.
A leader of one of the poorest countries in the world clearly doesn’t believe in wishful thinking.
Burma’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win has called during a recent visit to Cuba for an end to sanctions imposed on developing countries—including his own. Nyan Win’s call came as the US conducts a review of its policy on Burma.
The former army officer, whose loyalty to Than Shwe is not in doubt, may have thought that Cuba is the right place to call for lifting sanctions as President Barack Obama recently made some conciliatory gestures towards the regime in Cuba. But Cuba is not alone.
Obama has been extending an olive branch to the members of the “axis of evil” and “outposts of tyranny” so loudly condemned by his predecessor, George W Bush. They include North Korea, Iran, Belarus and Burma.
Now the Burma policy forged by the Bush administration is under review, a process that began when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Asia in February.
During her Asian tour, Clinton said neither sanctions nor engagement had succeeded in bringing about change in Burma.
A month later, Stephen Blake, director of the US State Department’s Office of Mainland Southeast Asia, visited the Burmese capital, Naypyidaw, where he met Nyan Win. Blake was the highest-ranking US official to visit Burma in recent years.
Burma’s state-run media reported that Blake and Nyan Win discussed issues of mutual interest and the promotion of bilateral relations.
Blake’s visit and Clinton’s remarks on Burma stirred speculation about a possible policy shift by the Obama administration. There has even been some talk of a relaxation of sanctions—although Richard Verma, the assistant secretary for legislative affairs who handles relations between the State Department and Congress, wrote a letter to Republican Congressman Peter King saying reports that the US would lift sanctions were “incorrect.”
According to an AFP report, Verma said: “The sanctions that the United States and other countries maintain against the regime are an important part of our efforts to support change in Burma.
“While we are currently reviewing our Burma policy, we can assure you that we remain committed to delivering a firm message on the need for real reform, including the initiation of a credible and inclusive dialogue with the democratic opposition and the release of political prisoners.”
In July 2008, the US signed into law the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act 2008. The act has three aims: to impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates; to tighten the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the US; and to create a new position of “US Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.”
Recently, the EU renewed its own economic sanctions on Burma for a further year, during a foreign ministers’ meeting in Luxembourg.
The EU said it would continue to work to establish an open dialogue with the ruling
generals. It also called for the junta to conduct a genuine dialogue with opposition and ethnic groups.
So in the foreseeable future, Burma will continue to be punished by the Western sanctions since no single tangible positive development has been detected in the country. But, on the other hand, the old debate over sanctions has returned.
Thaung Htun, representative of the exiled government of Burma, wrote in European Voice that the debate so far has tended to see sanctions as a silver bullet.
“However, it defies logic or precedent to assume sanctions can, as a lone policy tool, generate the sort of drastic reform in Burma that is needed,” Thaung Htun said.
He argued that the government in exile supported sanctions because “they have an impact on the Burmese regime and this has been admitted time and again by the generals.”
But, he added, “it has never envisaged a system of Cuba-style blanket blocks on Burmese economic activity. Any sanctions must be targeted to maximize the impact on the junta and to minimize pressure on ordinary Burmese people.”
However, Burmese opposition and critics of the regime inside and outside Burma favor US engagement in Burma but they are cautious. They want sanctions to be maintained until the regime relaxes its grip on power.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who has advocated pressure and sanctions on Burma, wrote in the Washington Post recently: “America should engage Burma, but it should not engage in wishful thinking.
“Nothing in our experience suggests that offers of aid will cause Burma’s generals to change course; unlike some authoritarian regimes, this one seems to care not a bit for the economic well being of its country.”
The irony is that the regime in Burma is eager to improve its relations with the US but is not ready to offer anything tangible.
Burma still holds more than 2,100 political prisoners, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, and there are no signs that the regime is going to free them and embark on genuine political reform.
So what is the US policy on Burma and rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran likely to be?
Jackson Diehl wrote in the Washington Post recently: “The first wake-up call has come from North Korea—a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled ‘evil’ by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering ‘incentives’ for good behavior.”
How has North Korea reacted to the arrival of Obama in the White House? It has fired its missile, anyway, expelled UN inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
What about Iran? Jackson Diehl wrote: “Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage.”
Than Shwe, for his part, is eager to normalize relations with the US but he is one sided and doesn’t understand the language of compromise.
First, the regime rejects all international appeals to release Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. Nor does Than Shwe listen to international appeals for a review of his “road map” to make it inclusive. He is not interested.
While not bothering to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Than Shwe has arrogantly claimed at a top brass meeting that Burma has almost tripled its rice production over the past two decades, boasting a food surplus despite the destruction in the delta and reports of famine and food shortage in Chin State.
“There is no need to worry about food even when the nation's population reaches 100 million,” Than Shwe boasted.
A leader of one of the poorest countries in the world clearly doesn’t believe in wishful thinking.
May 4, 2009
A Mature Response
By YENI
At its special two-day national party meeting last week, Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), indicated that it would take part in elections next year if the ruling junta responds positively to a set of three basic requirements: the unconditional release of all political prisoners; amendment of any provisions in the 2008 constitution “not in accord with the democratic principles”; and an all-inclusive, free and fair poll under international supervision.
In a policy statement dubbed the “Shwegondaing Declaration,” the NLD made it clear that it would not stand on principle and insist that the regime allow the party to form a government based upon the results of the last election in 1990. It would, however, expect the junta to acknowledge that the outcome of the election favored the NLD, even though it has never been allowed to take power.
Although the NLD has not made any unconditional commitment to participating in the election, its newly declared willingness to consider such a move marks a significant shift. In fact, it could be considered a sign that the party still has what it takes to continue playing a major role in the country’s political process.
Critics of the NLD have long accused the party of having an unhealthy obsession with its stolen victory. In the Shwegondaing Declaration, however, the party states that elections should not be regarded as obstacles, but rather as “landmarks to be passed in the journey to democracy.”
Why, at this juncture, has the NLD decided to lend some of its legitimacy to the regime by agreeing, in principle, to participate in an election designed by the generals in Naypyidaw to entrench military rule behind a facade of civilian government?
One reason, of course, is that it has little choice but to make a move that can at least keep open the possibility of a future political dialogue. But more than that, it is responding with a renewed sense of urgency to the senseless suffering that two decades of political stalemate and economic stagnation have imposed on the country.
Khin Maung Swe, a leading member of the NLD, emphasized this point when he told The Irrawaddy: “We appeal to the military leaders for the sake of the families of the political prisoners and for the rest of the people, who have suffered socially and economically for decades in the political conflicts.”
Burma desperately needs to rebuild its ruined economy and social infrastructure, which lag far behind those in other developing countries in the region. Around 30 percent of Burma’s estimated 50 million people survive on less than $1 a day. Public investment in education and healthcare is amongst the lowest in the world. One child in ten dies before the age of five.
In an Armed Forces Day speech to the nation on March 27, the regime’s supreme leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe said that political parties that carry out “mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government” in next year’s election.
With its latest statement, the NLD has demonstrated that it is mature enough to set aside its own claims to legitimacy for the sake of the country’s future. The only question that remains is whether Than Shwe, the enfant terrible of Burmese politics, can do the same.
At its special two-day national party meeting last week, Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), indicated that it would take part in elections next year if the ruling junta responds positively to a set of three basic requirements: the unconditional release of all political prisoners; amendment of any provisions in the 2008 constitution “not in accord with the democratic principles”; and an all-inclusive, free and fair poll under international supervision.
In a policy statement dubbed the “Shwegondaing Declaration,” the NLD made it clear that it would not stand on principle and insist that the regime allow the party to form a government based upon the results of the last election in 1990. It would, however, expect the junta to acknowledge that the outcome of the election favored the NLD, even though it has never been allowed to take power.
Although the NLD has not made any unconditional commitment to participating in the election, its newly declared willingness to consider such a move marks a significant shift. In fact, it could be considered a sign that the party still has what it takes to continue playing a major role in the country’s political process.
Critics of the NLD have long accused the party of having an unhealthy obsession with its stolen victory. In the Shwegondaing Declaration, however, the party states that elections should not be regarded as obstacles, but rather as “landmarks to be passed in the journey to democracy.”
Why, at this juncture, has the NLD decided to lend some of its legitimacy to the regime by agreeing, in principle, to participate in an election designed by the generals in Naypyidaw to entrench military rule behind a facade of civilian government?
One reason, of course, is that it has little choice but to make a move that can at least keep open the possibility of a future political dialogue. But more than that, it is responding with a renewed sense of urgency to the senseless suffering that two decades of political stalemate and economic stagnation have imposed on the country.
Khin Maung Swe, a leading member of the NLD, emphasized this point when he told The Irrawaddy: “We appeal to the military leaders for the sake of the families of the political prisoners and for the rest of the people, who have suffered socially and economically for decades in the political conflicts.”
Burma desperately needs to rebuild its ruined economy and social infrastructure, which lag far behind those in other developing countries in the region. Around 30 percent of Burma’s estimated 50 million people survive on less than $1 a day. Public investment in education and healthcare is amongst the lowest in the world. One child in ten dies before the age of five.
In an Armed Forces Day speech to the nation on March 27, the regime’s supreme leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe said that political parties that carry out “mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government” in next year’s election.
With its latest statement, the NLD has demonstrated that it is mature enough to set aside its own claims to legitimacy for the sake of the country’s future. The only question that remains is whether Than Shwe, the enfant terrible of Burmese politics, can do the same.
April 29, 2009
Crossing the Great Divide
By AUNG ZAW
Last week, I was at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT) to attend a panel discussion organized by the BBC Burmese Service to mark the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Burma’s worst recorded natural disaster.
My first question to Tin Htar Swe, the head of the BBC Burmese Service in London, was why there were no Burmese NGO workers or monks on the panel. Both groups are widely recognized as key participants in the post-Nargis relief effort.
She replied that local aid workers and monks were initially invited to speak, but they all turned down the invitation when they learned that the discussion would be videotaped and aired.
After hearing this response, a Burmese colleague joked that it looked like Burma’s humanitarian workers were sharing the fate of the country’s political activists, who have long been forced to carry out most of their activities “underground.”
But two of the panelists—Chris Kaye, the World Food Program’s country director for Burma, and Dr Frank Smithius, the country representative for MSF (Holland)—disagreed with the suggestion that the Burmese regime was impeding relief efforts.
They said that aid could be delivered to the needy without interference from the junta. But they also emphasized that much more work needed to be done to improve the lives of cyclone survivors. The recovery process in the delta would take time and more assistance was needed, they said. No one disagreed with them.
The third panelist, Britain’s ambassador to Burma, Mark Canning, also had a message that few people could disagree with. He said that Burma remained one of the most repressive places on earth, and insisted that real political progress could only begin after the regime released all of the country’s political prisoners.
At the same time, however, he stressed that while searching for a solution to Burma’s political problems, the basic needs of the Burmese people could not be ignored.
But meeting these needs continues to be a serious challenge for all involved. Although more international NGOs have entered Burma since Cyclone Nargis and large numbers of ordinary Burmese have joined the relief effort, it remains unclear how far the regime will go in allowing a larger “humanitarian space” to open in the country.
While many observers outside the country remain skeptical about the international aid agencies’ claims of being able to work freely (“What else do you expect them to say?” asked one cynical senior journalist at the FCCT), the regime itself is as suspicious as ever of these outsiders.
According to official sources in Naypyidaw, top leaders have shown little interest in humanitarian relief efforts in the delta, but are paying close attention to what’s going on there, as they remain ever watchful of signs of anything that could undermine their grip on power.
Indeed, when the microphones were off, some aid workers admitted that the junta has often been less than helpful, confirming comments from some Burmese observers who attended the FCCT event, who said that the real situation in the delta was very different from the picture being painted by the international aid groups.
Some foreign NGO workers also expressed doubts about the three-year recovery project receiving the $700 million it is estimated to need—something that will hinge largely on their ability to convince foreign donors that the regime is not hindering their efforts.
Last week, Koos Richelle, the director general of the European Commission’s EuropeAid Cooperation Office, told reporters in Manila that Burma must open up to dialogue with donors if it wants to receive much-needed development assistance. He added, however, that there has been little progress in providing aid to Burma because the military regime refuses to discuss development programs.
Although the regime has extended the mandate of the relief-coordinating body, the Tripartite Core Group—consisting of representatives of the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the junta—for another year, Naypyidaw appears to be reluctant to allow more foreign aid workers into the country.
This is a disappointment for aid workers who say that they have been able to collaborate effectively with officials committed to helping their fellow Burmese citizens through cooperation with international relief groups and UN agencies.
One panelist even said that his organization was able to work inside Burma without sacrificing any of its core principles. But a foreign aid worker with in-depth knowledge of Burma was dismissive of this claim. The only organization in Burma that has strictly adhered to its principles is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), he said. Although the ICRC stopped its activities, including prison visits, in Burma after the regime imposed restrictions, it has maintained its office in Rangoon.
Meanwhile, some aid workers active inside Burma are countering such recriminations by arguing that advocacy groups and activists outside the country are attempting to paint an overly bleak picture of the difficulties of working with the junta.
Recently, 21 international NGOs involved in Nargis-related relief and recovery work slammed a joint report by the Center for Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Thailand-based Emergency Assistance Team (EAT) which was highly critical of the relief effort in the delta.
In a joint letter, the NGO group said that the report, titled “After the Storm: Voices from the Delta,” published on February 27, was “both inaccurate and does a disservice to the courageous and resilient survivors of Cyclone Nargis.”
The report focused on human rights violations in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.
The response letter said, “We found a number of shortcomings in the report, including its premise, methodology and most of its findings.”
Defending the relief effort, the letter said: “Dozens of international and local relief agencies along with foreign embassies are continually examining humanitarian and delivery from inside Burma. They are able to do so independently and first-hand.
“The international humanitarian assistance delivered to date has been life-saving and life sustaining for millions of cyclone survivors. It has reached them without significant interference,” the letter claimed.
The letter also claimed that misleading reports could undermine further aid to cyclone survivors.
Although others have also questioned the Johns Hopkins/EAT report’s methodology, most observers agree that it has succeeded in initiating a healthy debate. Some researchers who advocate increased aid defended the report, saying that it helps to raise awareness of the need for transparency and accountability in the distribution of aid and use of funds.
As the relief effort approaches the one-year mark, this would be a good time for the aid community inside and outside Burma to open a dialogue, instead of undermining the missions inside and along the border.
Burmese aid workers on both sides of this artificial divide have many shared concerns. One is that the fight over aid money could obscure more important issues and even intensify divisions between Burmese inside and outside of the country.
A year ago, there was unprecedented cooperation between Burmese living in exile and those still inside the country, as both struggled to find a way to come to the assistance of their fellow citizens. Now, however, many fear that a dispute among foreign aid groups could weaken their shared resolve, with consequences that can only add to the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis.
Last week, I was at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT) to attend a panel discussion organized by the BBC Burmese Service to mark the one-year anniversary of Cyclone Nargis, Burma’s worst recorded natural disaster.
My first question to Tin Htar Swe, the head of the BBC Burmese Service in London, was why there were no Burmese NGO workers or monks on the panel. Both groups are widely recognized as key participants in the post-Nargis relief effort.
She replied that local aid workers and monks were initially invited to speak, but they all turned down the invitation when they learned that the discussion would be videotaped and aired.
After hearing this response, a Burmese colleague joked that it looked like Burma’s humanitarian workers were sharing the fate of the country’s political activists, who have long been forced to carry out most of their activities “underground.”
But two of the panelists—Chris Kaye, the World Food Program’s country director for Burma, and Dr Frank Smithius, the country representative for MSF (Holland)—disagreed with the suggestion that the Burmese regime was impeding relief efforts.
They said that aid could be delivered to the needy without interference from the junta. But they also emphasized that much more work needed to be done to improve the lives of cyclone survivors. The recovery process in the delta would take time and more assistance was needed, they said. No one disagreed with them.
The third panelist, Britain’s ambassador to Burma, Mark Canning, also had a message that few people could disagree with. He said that Burma remained one of the most repressive places on earth, and insisted that real political progress could only begin after the regime released all of the country’s political prisoners.
At the same time, however, he stressed that while searching for a solution to Burma’s political problems, the basic needs of the Burmese people could not be ignored.
But meeting these needs continues to be a serious challenge for all involved. Although more international NGOs have entered Burma since Cyclone Nargis and large numbers of ordinary Burmese have joined the relief effort, it remains unclear how far the regime will go in allowing a larger “humanitarian space” to open in the country.
While many observers outside the country remain skeptical about the international aid agencies’ claims of being able to work freely (“What else do you expect them to say?” asked one cynical senior journalist at the FCCT), the regime itself is as suspicious as ever of these outsiders.
According to official sources in Naypyidaw, top leaders have shown little interest in humanitarian relief efforts in the delta, but are paying close attention to what’s going on there, as they remain ever watchful of signs of anything that could undermine their grip on power.
Indeed, when the microphones were off, some aid workers admitted that the junta has often been less than helpful, confirming comments from some Burmese observers who attended the FCCT event, who said that the real situation in the delta was very different from the picture being painted by the international aid groups.
Some foreign NGO workers also expressed doubts about the three-year recovery project receiving the $700 million it is estimated to need—something that will hinge largely on their ability to convince foreign donors that the regime is not hindering their efforts.
Last week, Koos Richelle, the director general of the European Commission’s EuropeAid Cooperation Office, told reporters in Manila that Burma must open up to dialogue with donors if it wants to receive much-needed development assistance. He added, however, that there has been little progress in providing aid to Burma because the military regime refuses to discuss development programs.
Although the regime has extended the mandate of the relief-coordinating body, the Tripartite Core Group—consisting of representatives of the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the junta—for another year, Naypyidaw appears to be reluctant to allow more foreign aid workers into the country.
This is a disappointment for aid workers who say that they have been able to collaborate effectively with officials committed to helping their fellow Burmese citizens through cooperation with international relief groups and UN agencies.
One panelist even said that his organization was able to work inside Burma without sacrificing any of its core principles. But a foreign aid worker with in-depth knowledge of Burma was dismissive of this claim. The only organization in Burma that has strictly adhered to its principles is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), he said. Although the ICRC stopped its activities, including prison visits, in Burma after the regime imposed restrictions, it has maintained its office in Rangoon.
Meanwhile, some aid workers active inside Burma are countering such recriminations by arguing that advocacy groups and activists outside the country are attempting to paint an overly bleak picture of the difficulties of working with the junta.
Recently, 21 international NGOs involved in Nargis-related relief and recovery work slammed a joint report by the Center for Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Thailand-based Emergency Assistance Team (EAT) which was highly critical of the relief effort in the delta.
In a joint letter, the NGO group said that the report, titled “After the Storm: Voices from the Delta,” published on February 27, was “both inaccurate and does a disservice to the courageous and resilient survivors of Cyclone Nargis.”
The report focused on human rights violations in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.
The response letter said, “We found a number of shortcomings in the report, including its premise, methodology and most of its findings.”
Defending the relief effort, the letter said: “Dozens of international and local relief agencies along with foreign embassies are continually examining humanitarian and delivery from inside Burma. They are able to do so independently and first-hand.
“The international humanitarian assistance delivered to date has been life-saving and life sustaining for millions of cyclone survivors. It has reached them without significant interference,” the letter claimed.
The letter also claimed that misleading reports could undermine further aid to cyclone survivors.
Although others have also questioned the Johns Hopkins/EAT report’s methodology, most observers agree that it has succeeded in initiating a healthy debate. Some researchers who advocate increased aid defended the report, saying that it helps to raise awareness of the need for transparency and accountability in the distribution of aid and use of funds.
As the relief effort approaches the one-year mark, this would be a good time for the aid community inside and outside Burma to open a dialogue, instead of undermining the missions inside and along the border.
Burmese aid workers on both sides of this artificial divide have many shared concerns. One is that the fight over aid money could obscure more important issues and even intensify divisions between Burmese inside and outside of the country.
A year ago, there was unprecedented cooperation between Burmese living in exile and those still inside the country, as both struggled to find a way to come to the assistance of their fellow citizens. Now, however, many fear that a dispute among foreign aid groups could weaken their shared resolve, with consequences that can only add to the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis.
April 27, 2009
When Good News Goes Bad
By YENI
“No news is good news.” For most, this means that a day without incident is a good day, indeed. But for journalists, it tends to mean that truly newsworthy stories are rarely “good news”: death, disease, disaster and downfall will always trump feel-good tales of triumph on the front page.
Journalists are often accused of focusing on the negative and ignoring the positive. But when you are trying to shed light on a situation, you are bound to cast some shadows. This is especially true in the case of Burma, a country run by benighted generals who prefer to keep their people in the dark.
At a media workshop I attended recently, a fellow journalist asked me if there was any good news to report about Burma’s recovery from Cyclone Nargis one year after the disaster claimed nearly 140,000 lives and severely affected 2.4 million people.
In a way, the best news is that the bad news is still coming out of Burma, despite the junta’s efforts to suppress reporting of the realities on the ground. The international and exiled Burmese media have both played an important role in revealing how far from normal the situation in the Irrawaddy delta remains.
A year ago, Cyclone Nargis dominated international headlines and news networks for nearly a month. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Burma, and the junta agreed to allow aid workers into the country to assist people in some of the worst-hit areas. End of story, at least as far as many people were concerned.
But for The Irrawaddy and some other news outlets, this was just the beginning of the story. For the past year, we have been watching developments in the delta closely and listening to the testimony of ordinary people as well as the pronouncements of the junta and their partners in the recovery efforts.
What we have learned is not to take the official version of developments at face value, even when it is coming from respected international aid agencies. We have found that many relief workers who offer an optimistic assessment in public will often privately confide that the situation in the delta is a mess, and is likely to remain one as long as the regime continues to set the priorities.
The other good news coming out of Burma is that, despite all the constraints imposed upon them, many ordinary Burmese continue to do everything in their power to help heal the delta. We have learned that local private relief groups, formed by monks, students, celebrities, medical groups, businessmen, charitable organizations and others are still very active in the relief effort, laying the groundwork not only for renewal in the delta, but also cultivating hope for the country’s prospects of achieving justice, pluralism and, ultimately, democracy.
But even this good news has its dark side. The junta, ever fearful of any emerging alternative to their brutal rule, has initiated a crackdown on independent aid workers. To date, twenty-one volunteers have been arrested and detained in connection with their relief work in the Irrawaddy delta. Meanwhile, Burma’s most famous satirist, Zarganar, is said to be suffering from jaundice and hypertension in Myitkyina Prison, where he is serving a 35-year prison term for his relief role.
The survival of these private efforts now depends on their ability to continue operating under the radar. This means that many are reluctant to speak to us about their work, because it would attract unwelcome attention from the military authorities.
“If the media focuses on our efforts today, tomorrow the authorities will shut us down,” said one aid worker.
For Burma’s generals, it seems, any real news is bad news.
“No news is good news.” For most, this means that a day without incident is a good day, indeed. But for journalists, it tends to mean that truly newsworthy stories are rarely “good news”: death, disease, disaster and downfall will always trump feel-good tales of triumph on the front page.
Journalists are often accused of focusing on the negative and ignoring the positive. But when you are trying to shed light on a situation, you are bound to cast some shadows. This is especially true in the case of Burma, a country run by benighted generals who prefer to keep their people in the dark.
At a media workshop I attended recently, a fellow journalist asked me if there was any good news to report about Burma’s recovery from Cyclone Nargis one year after the disaster claimed nearly 140,000 lives and severely affected 2.4 million people.
In a way, the best news is that the bad news is still coming out of Burma, despite the junta’s efforts to suppress reporting of the realities on the ground. The international and exiled Burmese media have both played an important role in revealing how far from normal the situation in the Irrawaddy delta remains.
A year ago, Cyclone Nargis dominated international headlines and news networks for nearly a month. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Burma, and the junta agreed to allow aid workers into the country to assist people in some of the worst-hit areas. End of story, at least as far as many people were concerned.
But for The Irrawaddy and some other news outlets, this was just the beginning of the story. For the past year, we have been watching developments in the delta closely and listening to the testimony of ordinary people as well as the pronouncements of the junta and their partners in the recovery efforts.
What we have learned is not to take the official version of developments at face value, even when it is coming from respected international aid agencies. We have found that many relief workers who offer an optimistic assessment in public will often privately confide that the situation in the delta is a mess, and is likely to remain one as long as the regime continues to set the priorities.
The other good news coming out of Burma is that, despite all the constraints imposed upon them, many ordinary Burmese continue to do everything in their power to help heal the delta. We have learned that local private relief groups, formed by monks, students, celebrities, medical groups, businessmen, charitable organizations and others are still very active in the relief effort, laying the groundwork not only for renewal in the delta, but also cultivating hope for the country’s prospects of achieving justice, pluralism and, ultimately, democracy.
But even this good news has its dark side. The junta, ever fearful of any emerging alternative to their brutal rule, has initiated a crackdown on independent aid workers. To date, twenty-one volunteers have been arrested and detained in connection with their relief work in the Irrawaddy delta. Meanwhile, Burma’s most famous satirist, Zarganar, is said to be suffering from jaundice and hypertension in Myitkyina Prison, where he is serving a 35-year prison term for his relief role.
The survival of these private efforts now depends on their ability to continue operating under the radar. This means that many are reluctant to speak to us about their work, because it would attract unwelcome attention from the military authorities.
“If the media focuses on our efforts today, tomorrow the authorities will shut us down,” said one aid worker.
For Burma’s generals, it seems, any real news is bad news.
April 24, 2009
Regime Faces Crushing Defeat if Election is Free and Fair
By KYAW ZWA MOE
If Burma’s upcoming election in 2010 is free and fair, it can be predicted with certainty that the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Aung San Suu Kyi will win with no less than the 82 percent of the votes it secured in the 1990 poll.
One basic reason for such optimism is that the NLD has committed none of the crimes laid at the door of the current military regime—killing innocent people, including revered monks, and sentencing dissidents to harsh and lengthy terms of imprisonment.
There are several other valid reasons: the NLD is an elected party, while the government is a ruthless regime; the stark contrast between their leaders, Than Shwe and Suu Kyi. There’s absolutely no comparison between the cold-blood monk killer and the sincere and candid NLD leader.
However, critics would say that the popularity of the NLD is declining because of its inability to bring about democratic reforms despite the mandate a large majority of the people bestowed on it two decades ago. That’s true if we don’t take into consideration just how oppressive the regime is.
The same majority won’t see any difference between the regime and the proxy parties which are now being formed ahead of the 2010 election.
It’s logical to assume that the regime, having failed to honor the result of the 1990 election, will not accept an NLD victory in the 2010 poll. The generals in Naypyidaw aren’t keen to see a resurrection of the “ghost” that has haunted them since 1990.
In order not to repeat their mistake, the generals will choose a means to make sure that their proxy parties will largely win in the election, even though they’ve secured 25 percent of the seats in both the upper and lower houses of parliament with handpicked military officials, according to the constitution which was drawn up by the junta’s delegates.
Logic, therefore, says that there is no reason for the generals to hold a free and fair election in 2010.
Regional events such as the anti-government riots in neighboring Thailand would have made the generals more determined to keep walking on their own “roadmap.”
Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein would have reported to his colleagues in Naypyidaw how he was evacuated by helicopter from the disrupted Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Pattaya, and together they would surely have ridiculed Thailand’s democracy, noting its “anarchy”—a word they like to use.
Consequently, they would now be more determined than ever to keep walking toward what they have called “disciplined democracy.”
Nothing—including the criticism and demands of the international community—can seem to affect the determination of the Burmese generals.
Since taking office in January, US President Barack Obama and his administration have been reviewing the policies of the previous George W Bush government against authoritarian countries such as Iran, North Korea and Burma.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February that the US administration was reviewing its policy on Burma, saying the sanctions imposed on Burma since 1997 had got nowhere. Constructive engagement applied by neighboring countries of Burma has also failed to bring about change.
The prospect of a change in US approach towards Burma doesn’t appear, however, to have persuaded the regime to review its own policies.
The international community has demanded a review by the junta of its constitution to ensure the inclusion of all opposition and ethnic parties in the 2010 election. But the junta has said that anyone who is against the constitution is an “enemy of the state.”
In other words, the military regime will definitely proceed with its roadmap, including the 2010 election, according to its own norms without considering any suggestions and demands by domestic and international communities.
So it’s clear how the 2010 election will be organized and what the result will be. There’s surely no chance of the regime risking another election defeat along the lines of the 1990 debacle.
If Burma’s upcoming election in 2010 is free and fair, it can be predicted with certainty that the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Aung San Suu Kyi will win with no less than the 82 percent of the votes it secured in the 1990 poll.
One basic reason for such optimism is that the NLD has committed none of the crimes laid at the door of the current military regime—killing innocent people, including revered monks, and sentencing dissidents to harsh and lengthy terms of imprisonment.
There are several other valid reasons: the NLD is an elected party, while the government is a ruthless regime; the stark contrast between their leaders, Than Shwe and Suu Kyi. There’s absolutely no comparison between the cold-blood monk killer and the sincere and candid NLD leader.
However, critics would say that the popularity of the NLD is declining because of its inability to bring about democratic reforms despite the mandate a large majority of the people bestowed on it two decades ago. That’s true if we don’t take into consideration just how oppressive the regime is.
The same majority won’t see any difference between the regime and the proxy parties which are now being formed ahead of the 2010 election.
It’s logical to assume that the regime, having failed to honor the result of the 1990 election, will not accept an NLD victory in the 2010 poll. The generals in Naypyidaw aren’t keen to see a resurrection of the “ghost” that has haunted them since 1990.
In order not to repeat their mistake, the generals will choose a means to make sure that their proxy parties will largely win in the election, even though they’ve secured 25 percent of the seats in both the upper and lower houses of parliament with handpicked military officials, according to the constitution which was drawn up by the junta’s delegates.
Logic, therefore, says that there is no reason for the generals to hold a free and fair election in 2010.
Regional events such as the anti-government riots in neighboring Thailand would have made the generals more determined to keep walking on their own “roadmap.”
Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein would have reported to his colleagues in Naypyidaw how he was evacuated by helicopter from the disrupted Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Pattaya, and together they would surely have ridiculed Thailand’s democracy, noting its “anarchy”—a word they like to use.
Consequently, they would now be more determined than ever to keep walking toward what they have called “disciplined democracy.”
Nothing—including the criticism and demands of the international community—can seem to affect the determination of the Burmese generals.
Since taking office in January, US President Barack Obama and his administration have been reviewing the policies of the previous George W Bush government against authoritarian countries such as Iran, North Korea and Burma.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February that the US administration was reviewing its policy on Burma, saying the sanctions imposed on Burma since 1997 had got nowhere. Constructive engagement applied by neighboring countries of Burma has also failed to bring about change.
The prospect of a change in US approach towards Burma doesn’t appear, however, to have persuaded the regime to review its own policies.
The international community has demanded a review by the junta of its constitution to ensure the inclusion of all opposition and ethnic parties in the 2010 election. But the junta has said that anyone who is against the constitution is an “enemy of the state.”
In other words, the military regime will definitely proceed with its roadmap, including the 2010 election, according to its own norms without considering any suggestions and demands by domestic and international communities.
So it’s clear how the 2010 election will be organized and what the result will be. There’s surely no chance of the regime risking another election defeat along the lines of the 1990 debacle.
April 22, 2009
Than Shwe’s Empty Well
By AUNG ZAW
If you want to know what Snr-Gen Than Shwe is thinking these days, I suggest you read his recent Armed Forces Day speech in Naypyidaw.
There was nothing new in his annual speech, which contained an admonition that the democratization process would be slow.
Here is part of his speech:
“Democracy in Myanmar [Burma] today is at a fledgling stage and still requires patient care and attention,” the general said.
“As a Myanmar proverb puts it, a recently dug well cannot be expected to produce clear water immediately; understanding the process of gradual maturity is crucial, as is contributing to it through concerted constructive efforts in an environment of peace and tranquility,” he added.
Phew. This is disappointing indeed. How many times have we heard this nonsense over the past two decades?
After hearing about his speech, some Burmese joked that maybe Than Shwe was digging his well in the wrong soil.
Clearly, it is Than Shwe who is not ready for democracy, and not the people of Burma, who have often demonstrated that they are more than ready to return to life in a democratic society.
Than Shwe is not interested in amending the new constitution, and has shown no inclination to make his “road map” more inclusive, as the intentional community has repeatedly requested.
In his speech, Than Shwe warned against efforts to undermine the constitution, which he said had been adopted by the people in last year’s referendum.
He also warned potential participants in next year’s planned election against engaging in personal attacks.
“I would like to request those who will be involved in organizing work for parties to refrain from inciting unrest, to avoid personal attacks and smear campaigns against other parties and to find unity in diversity by practicing tolerance, forgiveness and understanding toward one another. Everyone following such ways and means of mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government,” he said.
It is obvious that Than Shwe intends to plow ahead with his road map, even if there is good reason to believe that most people, including many in the military, are unconvinced that it will extract the country from its current quagmire.
Sources in Naypyidaw say that Than Shwe and top leaders are having difficulty selling the road map, which will culminate in the 2010 election, even to soldiers and officers. The army is divided on the election issue and some senior army officers want Than Shwe to extend an olive branch to opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the sources said. But the stubborn old general has shown no signs of backing off.
To Than Shwe, the road map is his own personal exit strategy, which he hopes will enable him to relax his iron grip on power so that he can spend his dotage without fears of reprisal, either from his military successors or from some future civilian government.
Official sources said that Than Shwe knows that he and his family are intensely disliked both in Burma and in countries where Burmese political exiles have largely succeeded in portraying his regime as the epitome of oppression.
The sources said that he has been closely monitoring news and criticism of his regime. What he sees when he holds this mirror to his face must indeed be truly frightening.
Than Shwe knows that in the dog-eat-dog world of Burmese despotism, there is a very real danger that he could end up spending his final days as a prisoner, just as his own boss did.
Gen Ne Win, who ruled Burma for 26 years, spent his last days as a prisoner of the regime and died while under house arrest in 2002. This is not the fate that Than Shwe wants to find awaiting him.
So does this mean that Than Shwe could yet find it within his heart to make a compromise with the opposition and bend somewhat to international opinion?
Not likely. When United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently visited the region, Than Shwe did not extend an invitation because he knew that he would be asked to make concessions that are anathema to him.
Officials close to Than Shwe say that he spends a great deal of time pondering the possibility of releasing prisoners, including Suu Kyi, before the election, as a gesture to placate the international community. But at this stage, he still feels that such a move would be too risky.
Than Shwe, a former psychological warfare officer who takes great care to anticipate his enemies’ every move, is no gambler. He doesn’t dare risk releasing Suu Kyi even if it is a guaranteed way to win the world’s applause.
Suu Kyi, for her part, has shown no reluctance to discuss any issue on the table, including sanctions. She has signaled her willingness to meet with the regime’s leadership through the junta’s liaison minister, Aung Kyi.
The thought of such an encounter with his nemesis no doubt sends chills up Than Shwe’s spine. Better to break out the shovels and tell his minions to keep digging that well that could take forever to finally yield water fit to drink.
But the Burmese people are getting thirsty, and the soldiers are getting tired of the backbreaking labor required to keep a hated regime in power. Sooner or later, Than Shwe will learn that you can’t keep people waiting forever.
If you want to know what Snr-Gen Than Shwe is thinking these days, I suggest you read his recent Armed Forces Day speech in Naypyidaw.
There was nothing new in his annual speech, which contained an admonition that the democratization process would be slow.
Here is part of his speech:
“Democracy in Myanmar [Burma] today is at a fledgling stage and still requires patient care and attention,” the general said.
“As a Myanmar proverb puts it, a recently dug well cannot be expected to produce clear water immediately; understanding the process of gradual maturity is crucial, as is contributing to it through concerted constructive efforts in an environment of peace and tranquility,” he added.
Phew. This is disappointing indeed. How many times have we heard this nonsense over the past two decades?
After hearing about his speech, some Burmese joked that maybe Than Shwe was digging his well in the wrong soil.
Clearly, it is Than Shwe who is not ready for democracy, and not the people of Burma, who have often demonstrated that they are more than ready to return to life in a democratic society.
Than Shwe is not interested in amending the new constitution, and has shown no inclination to make his “road map” more inclusive, as the intentional community has repeatedly requested.
In his speech, Than Shwe warned against efforts to undermine the constitution, which he said had been adopted by the people in last year’s referendum.
He also warned potential participants in next year’s planned election against engaging in personal attacks.
“I would like to request those who will be involved in organizing work for parties to refrain from inciting unrest, to avoid personal attacks and smear campaigns against other parties and to find unity in diversity by practicing tolerance, forgiveness and understanding toward one another. Everyone following such ways and means of mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government,” he said.
It is obvious that Than Shwe intends to plow ahead with his road map, even if there is good reason to believe that most people, including many in the military, are unconvinced that it will extract the country from its current quagmire.
Sources in Naypyidaw say that Than Shwe and top leaders are having difficulty selling the road map, which will culminate in the 2010 election, even to soldiers and officers. The army is divided on the election issue and some senior army officers want Than Shwe to extend an olive branch to opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the sources said. But the stubborn old general has shown no signs of backing off.
To Than Shwe, the road map is his own personal exit strategy, which he hopes will enable him to relax his iron grip on power so that he can spend his dotage without fears of reprisal, either from his military successors or from some future civilian government.
Official sources said that Than Shwe knows that he and his family are intensely disliked both in Burma and in countries where Burmese political exiles have largely succeeded in portraying his regime as the epitome of oppression.
The sources said that he has been closely monitoring news and criticism of his regime. What he sees when he holds this mirror to his face must indeed be truly frightening.
Than Shwe knows that in the dog-eat-dog world of Burmese despotism, there is a very real danger that he could end up spending his final days as a prisoner, just as his own boss did.
Gen Ne Win, who ruled Burma for 26 years, spent his last days as a prisoner of the regime and died while under house arrest in 2002. This is not the fate that Than Shwe wants to find awaiting him.
So does this mean that Than Shwe could yet find it within his heart to make a compromise with the opposition and bend somewhat to international opinion?
Not likely. When United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently visited the region, Than Shwe did not extend an invitation because he knew that he would be asked to make concessions that are anathema to him.
Officials close to Than Shwe say that he spends a great deal of time pondering the possibility of releasing prisoners, including Suu Kyi, before the election, as a gesture to placate the international community. But at this stage, he still feels that such a move would be too risky.
Than Shwe, a former psychological warfare officer who takes great care to anticipate his enemies’ every move, is no gambler. He doesn’t dare risk releasing Suu Kyi even if it is a guaranteed way to win the world’s applause.
Suu Kyi, for her part, has shown no reluctance to discuss any issue on the table, including sanctions. She has signaled her willingness to meet with the regime’s leadership through the junta’s liaison minister, Aung Kyi.
The thought of such an encounter with his nemesis no doubt sends chills up Than Shwe’s spine. Better to break out the shovels and tell his minions to keep digging that well that could take forever to finally yield water fit to drink.
But the Burmese people are getting thirsty, and the soldiers are getting tired of the backbreaking labor required to keep a hated regime in power. Sooner or later, Than Shwe will learn that you can’t keep people waiting forever.
April 20, 2009
NLD Still Represents Moral Strength for the Powerless
By YENI
Next week, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma’s leading political party, which has its legitimacy through a landslide victory in the 1990 election, plans to hold a national-level special meeting. The party executive, those NLD members who were successful in the 1990 election, senior members and representatives of the women’s and youth sections of the party from throughout the country have been invited to attend.
In the two decades since the 1990 election, the NLD has been able to hold only two large-scale meetings, once before the country went to the polls and a second in 1997. An attempt to arrange a meeting in August 1998 of members elected in the 1990 poll failed when the junta arrested several who had planned to take part. Restrictions were also placed on members’ travel.
With the memory of August 1998 in mind, NLD members and observers inside and outside the country are anxiously waiting to see how the authorities react to next week’s planned meeting.
According to the invitations to the special meeting sent out earlier this month by the NLD's 91-year-old chairman Aung Shwe, the party's executive committee would read “a paper” to participants. Although the contents of the paper have not been disclosed, it is expected to cover several issues confronting the party—especially the proposed 2010 general election.
The NLD's current position on the 2010 election is to show readiness to negotiate with the Burmese generals if Naypyidaw agrees to review the constitution, which guarantees the continuation of military domination of the country’s political future, and to free the imprisoned members and leaders of the party.
In an Armed Forces Day speech to the nation on March 27, Burma's supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe rejected the NLD demands, seeing no need for compromise over his so-called "roadmap to democracy." The junta's deputy leader, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, also urged military officers recently to take responsibility for the success of the 2010 election.
According to the election law of 1990, a political party which can not provide candidates for at least three constituencies must disband. This may represent a serious threat if NLD decides to boycott the 2010 elections, and the junta naturally wants to see all opposition groups fall into this trap. Afterward the military will not hesitate to crack down on them, regardless of the reaction of the international community.
The regime won’t have it all its own way, however, if the NLD agrees to participate in the 2010 election. Observers point out that there is no political party other than the NLD that could win a landslide. The regime would be forced to use traditional techniques—physical abuse and harassments of the opposition parties and their supporters; and electoral fraud—in order to block an NLD victory.
In its 20 years’ existence, the NLD has been a frequent target of the regime. Some elected members for parliament have died and some have fled into exile. Party leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo have been detained and imprisoned. NLD offices across the country have been closed down, their members harassed and forced to leave the party.
Burma's main opposition party realizes that it must continue to carry out its task of tackling the economic and political problems of the country as a leading political party that still has nationwide influence. It knows that its toughest challenge is to confront a brutal, malicious regime.
But the NLD should also know that it is still an organization which could strike fear into the hearts of heavily armed men.
Nevertheless it must remember that whether or not it agrees to participate in the 2010 election NLD will still represent moral strength for the country’s powerless.
Next week, the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma’s leading political party, which has its legitimacy through a landslide victory in the 1990 election, plans to hold a national-level special meeting. The party executive, those NLD members who were successful in the 1990 election, senior members and representatives of the women’s and youth sections of the party from throughout the country have been invited to attend.
In the two decades since the 1990 election, the NLD has been able to hold only two large-scale meetings, once before the country went to the polls and a second in 1997. An attempt to arrange a meeting in August 1998 of members elected in the 1990 poll failed when the junta arrested several who had planned to take part. Restrictions were also placed on members’ travel.
With the memory of August 1998 in mind, NLD members and observers inside and outside the country are anxiously waiting to see how the authorities react to next week’s planned meeting.
According to the invitations to the special meeting sent out earlier this month by the NLD's 91-year-old chairman Aung Shwe, the party's executive committee would read “a paper” to participants. Although the contents of the paper have not been disclosed, it is expected to cover several issues confronting the party—especially the proposed 2010 general election.
The NLD's current position on the 2010 election is to show readiness to negotiate with the Burmese generals if Naypyidaw agrees to review the constitution, which guarantees the continuation of military domination of the country’s political future, and to free the imprisoned members and leaders of the party.
In an Armed Forces Day speech to the nation on March 27, Burma's supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe rejected the NLD demands, seeing no need for compromise over his so-called "roadmap to democracy." The junta's deputy leader, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, also urged military officers recently to take responsibility for the success of the 2010 election.
According to the election law of 1990, a political party which can not provide candidates for at least three constituencies must disband. This may represent a serious threat if NLD decides to boycott the 2010 elections, and the junta naturally wants to see all opposition groups fall into this trap. Afterward the military will not hesitate to crack down on them, regardless of the reaction of the international community.
The regime won’t have it all its own way, however, if the NLD agrees to participate in the 2010 election. Observers point out that there is no political party other than the NLD that could win a landslide. The regime would be forced to use traditional techniques—physical abuse and harassments of the opposition parties and their supporters; and electoral fraud—in order to block an NLD victory.
In its 20 years’ existence, the NLD has been a frequent target of the regime. Some elected members for parliament have died and some have fled into exile. Party leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo have been detained and imprisoned. NLD offices across the country have been closed down, their members harassed and forced to leave the party.
Burma's main opposition party realizes that it must continue to carry out its task of tackling the economic and political problems of the country as a leading political party that still has nationwide influence. It knows that its toughest challenge is to confront a brutal, malicious regime.
But the NLD should also know that it is still an organization which could strike fear into the hearts of heavily armed men.
Nevertheless it must remember that whether or not it agrees to participate in the 2010 election NLD will still represent moral strength for the country’s powerless.
April 17, 2009
Burmese Join in Praise for Abhisit’s Crisis Strategy
By AUNG ZAW
The countries of Southeast Asia followed with special interest the dramatic Songkran events in Thailand, where red-shirted anti-government protesters rampaged through Bangkok and the resort town of Pattaya. But probably none of Thailand’s neighbors displayed more interest than Burma—even though the regime and its official media acted as if nothing had happened.
Burma’s generals, who insisted they were practicing “disciplined democracy” when they suppressed protesters in Rangoon, must have trained keen eyes on how Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his government handled the rioting.
Here’s the question I’d like to put to those generals and the oppressed people of Burma: which side did you support during the crisis? I think we all know the answer.
As Burma’s Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein was whisked away to safety by helicopter from the disrupted Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting in Pattaya, some exiled Burmese speculated in whispered tones that junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe might be gleefully thinking how his vision of “disciplined democracy” would be enhanced because of the mayhem in Thailand. But that can’t really be true.
Many dissident Burmese living in Thailand were astonished to witness such lax security at the Asean ministerial meeting. They said Burma would never allow a rowdy crowd to go that far.
In Burma’s 1988 uprising the regime itself created anarchy—at one point provoking some monks and students to attack security forces. The anarchy and provocation were excuses for the military to stage a bloody coup in September 1988, killing hundreds on the streets. For the following two decades they have jealously held on to power, and there is no sign of them relinquishing it.
In Thailand’s case, Abhisit emerged the winner, with his leadership strengthened. In the face of red-shirted rioters baying for his blood, the young prime minister kept his cool and the troops under control—probably a major factor in avoiding widespread carnage.
It was a baptism of fire for Abhisit and he came through unscathed.
Soldiers called out to keep order were widely supported by Bangkok residents shocked and angered by the actions of the mob.
Casualties were surprisingly low—the official toll was two dead and 135 injured. By a morbid irony, the road accident over the Songkran holiday was more than 300 dead and nearly 4,000 injured.
For Burmese, there’s another statistical comparison to be made: how many monks and civilians were killed in the September 2007 clashes with government security forces claiming to be firing only “rubber bullets”?
Abhisit deserves recognition not only for his handling of the crisis but for the open way he kept an anxious world and his own people informed about the events as they occurred.
He remains open, too, to reconciliation with his opponents, telling a meeting of foreign ambassadors and diplomats that his government would consider an amnesty for those convicted of political offences. Such a conciliatory tone is bound to win public support.
However, that doesn’t mean that the battle is over. The Bangkok Post warned in an editorial: “One battle has ended but the war is not over. Several leaders of the red shirt movement have made it clear that their decision to call off the protest was just a tactical retreat, before launching another offensive to bring down the administration of PM Abhisit Vejjajiva.”
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the institute of security and international studies at Chulalongkorn University’s faculty of political science, wrote in the same paper: “The red’s miscalculated gamble has made their months-long movement futile. What is needed is willingness of the establishment forces to accept, address and accommodate the reds’ sense of injustice and inequality.”
But the Thai scholar warned that one could not underestimate the undercurrents against establishment forces. A lack of recognition and accommodation would make these undercurrents pent-up and dangerous, he said.
If Abhisit cannot fix it and ignores society’s demands for greater justice and a larger share of the pie, the opposition may well reappear in other shapes, forms and colors farther on down the road, Thitinan warned.
It will be an uphill task for Thailand to emerge stronger from this crisis and to build an open society based on democratic values.
The question is: who wants Thailand to fail? Burmese colleagues inside and outside certainly don’t—they want to see a strong Thailand, a country of inclusive political reconciliation, ruled by the kind of calmness displayed by Abhisit. At least, any version of “disciplined democracy” has disappeared from the scene.
The countries of Southeast Asia followed with special interest the dramatic Songkran events in Thailand, where red-shirted anti-government protesters rampaged through Bangkok and the resort town of Pattaya. But probably none of Thailand’s neighbors displayed more interest than Burma—even though the regime and its official media acted as if nothing had happened.
Burma’s generals, who insisted they were practicing “disciplined democracy” when they suppressed protesters in Rangoon, must have trained keen eyes on how Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his government handled the rioting.
Here’s the question I’d like to put to those generals and the oppressed people of Burma: which side did you support during the crisis? I think we all know the answer.
As Burma’s Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein was whisked away to safety by helicopter from the disrupted Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting in Pattaya, some exiled Burmese speculated in whispered tones that junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe might be gleefully thinking how his vision of “disciplined democracy” would be enhanced because of the mayhem in Thailand. But that can’t really be true.
Many dissident Burmese living in Thailand were astonished to witness such lax security at the Asean ministerial meeting. They said Burma would never allow a rowdy crowd to go that far.
In Burma’s 1988 uprising the regime itself created anarchy—at one point provoking some monks and students to attack security forces. The anarchy and provocation were excuses for the military to stage a bloody coup in September 1988, killing hundreds on the streets. For the following two decades they have jealously held on to power, and there is no sign of them relinquishing it.
In Thailand’s case, Abhisit emerged the winner, with his leadership strengthened. In the face of red-shirted rioters baying for his blood, the young prime minister kept his cool and the troops under control—probably a major factor in avoiding widespread carnage.
It was a baptism of fire for Abhisit and he came through unscathed.
Soldiers called out to keep order were widely supported by Bangkok residents shocked and angered by the actions of the mob.
Casualties were surprisingly low—the official toll was two dead and 135 injured. By a morbid irony, the road accident over the Songkran holiday was more than 300 dead and nearly 4,000 injured.
For Burmese, there’s another statistical comparison to be made: how many monks and civilians were killed in the September 2007 clashes with government security forces claiming to be firing only “rubber bullets”?
Abhisit deserves recognition not only for his handling of the crisis but for the open way he kept an anxious world and his own people informed about the events as they occurred.
He remains open, too, to reconciliation with his opponents, telling a meeting of foreign ambassadors and diplomats that his government would consider an amnesty for those convicted of political offences. Such a conciliatory tone is bound to win public support.
However, that doesn’t mean that the battle is over. The Bangkok Post warned in an editorial: “One battle has ended but the war is not over. Several leaders of the red shirt movement have made it clear that their decision to call off the protest was just a tactical retreat, before launching another offensive to bring down the administration of PM Abhisit Vejjajiva.”
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the institute of security and international studies at Chulalongkorn University’s faculty of political science, wrote in the same paper: “The red’s miscalculated gamble has made their months-long movement futile. What is needed is willingness of the establishment forces to accept, address and accommodate the reds’ sense of injustice and inequality.”
But the Thai scholar warned that one could not underestimate the undercurrents against establishment forces. A lack of recognition and accommodation would make these undercurrents pent-up and dangerous, he said.
If Abhisit cannot fix it and ignores society’s demands for greater justice and a larger share of the pie, the opposition may well reappear in other shapes, forms and colors farther on down the road, Thitinan warned.
It will be an uphill task for Thailand to emerge stronger from this crisis and to build an open society based on democratic values.
The question is: who wants Thailand to fail? Burmese colleagues inside and outside certainly don’t—they want to see a strong Thailand, a country of inclusive political reconciliation, ruled by the kind of calmness displayed by Abhisit. At least, any version of “disciplined democracy” has disappeared from the scene.
April 1, 2009
It’s Time to Play the Villains’ Game
By KYAW ZWA MOE
Sometimes it’s necessary to play the villains’ game, particularly when there’s no one else around to defeat them.
Players with the will to bring Burma’s villainous regime to book aren’t to be found, so no “High Noon” confrontation between the good guys and the baddies can be realistically expected.
Burma’s potential heroes are locked up and out of action. They need to be rescued—as do the suffering 50 million people of Burma.
Regime apologists have the luxury of being able to defend the actions of the military government. That’s their right. But they can’t ignore the evidence of the regime’s crimes—the bloody suppression of all opposition to its iron rule.
The opposition—whether locked away or still free—needs to be cleverer, more organized and united in order to break political, social and economic barriers. They need a more pragmatic and strategic approach when it comes to playing with the villains.
Burma’s pro-democracy forces can’t deny that over the past 20 years they missed some windows of opportunity despite gaining legitimacy through the 1990 elections. Most of the opposition groups have been weakened by systematic attacks by the very villains they describe as “dumb.”
Whatever has happened in the past, the basic goal remains the same: to bring positive change to Burma and to create a country whose people can enjoy a better life. It doesn’t matter whether the strategy is to attack the villains or play their game—the current strategies are limited enough, reduced to a choice between sanctions and constructive engagement. In other words: punishment and incentive.
Each of those approaches has failed to bring about a dialogue between the junta and the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by detained pro-democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi. Dialogue is undeniably the best and most peaceful way to reach a national reconciliation among the military leaders, opposition and ethnic leaders in the country, as a first step towards opening up opportunities to all citizens.
Until now, the world has been divided into two camps when it comes to how to deal with Burma—those who support sanctions and those who urge constructive engagement. Western countries led by the US have applied sanctions, while Burma’s neighbors, including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China and India, have favored engagement.
But things seem to be changing.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted at a shift in Western thinking when she said during a recent Asia tour: “Clearly, the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn’t influenced the Burmese junta.”
But she also made clear that the alternative policy followed by Burma’s neighbors is also ineffective, adding: “Reaching out and trying to engage them [the Burmese generals] hasn’t influenced them, either.”
Clinton announced that the new US administration is reviewing its Burma policy—“because we want to see the best ideas about how to influence the Burmese regime.” It’s obvious, however, that US policy makers have no clear idea which idea is best.
Nevertheless, a departure from the policy that first applied sanctions against Burma in 1997 can be expected.
US President Barack Obama indicated a less confrontational approach to the world’s dictators when he said during his inaugural address in January: “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”
The question now is how to play this new game and what rules to follow. If a more realistic and proactive US policy towards Burma emerges from Washington, others—including China and Asean countries—will surely follow.
US policy could accommodate both sanctions and constructive engagement. It needs to be both flexible and firm.
As a first step, there are only two core political bargaining chips on the table—the release of all political prisoners and the removal of economic sanctions. The first is a key demand of pro-democracy forces, including Suu Kyi’s NLD, while the second is one of the junta main desires.
The two issues probably hold the key to unlocking the frustrating political status quo in Burma. President Obama and Clinton should make the two issues the focus of direct talks or “back channel” negotiations with the junta. The sooner the better.
To drive home the message that direct talks are required, the US administration needs its own special envoy to Burma. A succession of UN special envoys have achieved nothing.
Although former President George W Bush appointed Michael Green as his special Burma policy coordinator, President Obama has yet to nominate anyone for the job.
With a special envoy installed at the State Department, the US can get down to business, focusing on a basic quid pro quo: the release of all political prisoners for a lifting of economic sanctions. Playing the villains’ game will probably then open up the beginning of a new chapter for Burma.
This article appeared in the March-April issue of the Irrawaddy magazine.
Sometimes it’s necessary to play the villains’ game, particularly when there’s no one else around to defeat them.
Players with the will to bring Burma’s villainous regime to book aren’t to be found, so no “High Noon” confrontation between the good guys and the baddies can be realistically expected.
Burma’s potential heroes are locked up and out of action. They need to be rescued—as do the suffering 50 million people of Burma.
Regime apologists have the luxury of being able to defend the actions of the military government. That’s their right. But they can’t ignore the evidence of the regime’s crimes—the bloody suppression of all opposition to its iron rule.
The opposition—whether locked away or still free—needs to be cleverer, more organized and united in order to break political, social and economic barriers. They need a more pragmatic and strategic approach when it comes to playing with the villains.
Burma’s pro-democracy forces can’t deny that over the past 20 years they missed some windows of opportunity despite gaining legitimacy through the 1990 elections. Most of the opposition groups have been weakened by systematic attacks by the very villains they describe as “dumb.”
Whatever has happened in the past, the basic goal remains the same: to bring positive change to Burma and to create a country whose people can enjoy a better life. It doesn’t matter whether the strategy is to attack the villains or play their game—the current strategies are limited enough, reduced to a choice between sanctions and constructive engagement. In other words: punishment and incentive.
Each of those approaches has failed to bring about a dialogue between the junta and the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by detained pro-democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi. Dialogue is undeniably the best and most peaceful way to reach a national reconciliation among the military leaders, opposition and ethnic leaders in the country, as a first step towards opening up opportunities to all citizens.
Until now, the world has been divided into two camps when it comes to how to deal with Burma—those who support sanctions and those who urge constructive engagement. Western countries led by the US have applied sanctions, while Burma’s neighbors, including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China and India, have favored engagement.
But things seem to be changing.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted at a shift in Western thinking when she said during a recent Asia tour: “Clearly, the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn’t influenced the Burmese junta.”
But she also made clear that the alternative policy followed by Burma’s neighbors is also ineffective, adding: “Reaching out and trying to engage them [the Burmese generals] hasn’t influenced them, either.”
Clinton announced that the new US administration is reviewing its Burma policy—“because we want to see the best ideas about how to influence the Burmese regime.” It’s obvious, however, that US policy makers have no clear idea which idea is best.
Nevertheless, a departure from the policy that first applied sanctions against Burma in 1997 can be expected.
US President Barack Obama indicated a less confrontational approach to the world’s dictators when he said during his inaugural address in January: “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”
The question now is how to play this new game and what rules to follow. If a more realistic and proactive US policy towards Burma emerges from Washington, others—including China and Asean countries—will surely follow.
US policy could accommodate both sanctions and constructive engagement. It needs to be both flexible and firm.
As a first step, there are only two core political bargaining chips on the table—the release of all political prisoners and the removal of economic sanctions. The first is a key demand of pro-democracy forces, including Suu Kyi’s NLD, while the second is one of the junta main desires.
The two issues probably hold the key to unlocking the frustrating political status quo in Burma. President Obama and Clinton should make the two issues the focus of direct talks or “back channel” negotiations with the junta. The sooner the better.
To drive home the message that direct talks are required, the US administration needs its own special envoy to Burma. A succession of UN special envoys have achieved nothing.
Although former President George W Bush appointed Michael Green as his special Burma policy coordinator, President Obama has yet to nominate anyone for the job.
With a special envoy installed at the State Department, the US can get down to business, focusing on a basic quid pro quo: the release of all political prisoners for a lifting of economic sanctions. Playing the villains’ game will probably then open up the beginning of a new chapter for Burma.
This article appeared in the March-April issue of the Irrawaddy magazine.
March 31, 2009
Than Shwe’s Election Plans
By YENI
Without Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s say-so, Burma can’t make a move. That was the subtext of his message to the nation on March 27, Armed Forces Day. It was a sobering reminder to the world and the Burmese people that this is a general who sees no need for compromise, and who expects the whole country to fall in line with his plans with the same unquestioning obedience as the 13,000 troops who paraded past him in a display of military might.
In his 17-minute speech, delivered at his new “royal” capital of Naypyidaw, Than Shwe rejected calls from the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) for a review of a new constitution approved last year in a referendum widely denounced as a sham. There will be no review, the general said, because the “constitution [was] adopted by the people.”
In defiance of diplomatic pressure to engage with the NLD and other pro-democracy forces, Than Shwe has made it abundantly clear that he is in no mood for reconciliation. After nearly twenty years of relentlessly persecuting the winners of the last election in 1990, he now believes that he is close to achieving his ultimate victory: an electoral outcome that guarantees his perpetual grip on power.
So far, the junta has disclosed few details about the election it has promised to hold sometime in 2010. No date has been set, and no candidates have been named. But in his speech, Than Shwe left no doubt about his intention to keep a firm hold over the proceedings. Political parties that carry out “mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government,” he said, implying that those who are “immature” enough to question the military’s right to rule as it sees fit can expect to be sidelined, or worse.
The regime has made no secret of the fact that “disciplined democracy” is essentially an extension of the current political arrangement, which elevates the armed forces above all other institutions.
Under its new constitution, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces—currently Than Shwe—is entitled to appoint military officials to 25 percent of the seats in each of the country’s two legislative assemblies, the 440-seat People’s Parliament and the 224-seat National Parliament. And if this is not enough to guarantee that other political forces march to his tune, there is another provision which permits the commander-in-chief to reinstate direct military rule at his discretion.
It was not surprising, then, to hear in Than Shwe’s speech this year a note of growing confidence that was absent from his last Armed Forces Day address, in which he reassured any who cared to listen that he was not power hungry and would, in due course, hand over power to an elected successor.
A lot has changed since then. A year ago, Than Shwe was still under intense international pressure following the brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrations led by Buddhist monks in late 2007. But by May, he had successfully pulled off a rigged constitutional referendum that delivered more than 90 percent approval. And while this farce was playing out in the background, the world’s attention was transfixed by a humanitarian catastrophe that also, ultimately, played directly into the hands of the generals. Unlike the killing of untold numbers of monks in 2007, the regime’s callous disregard for the suffering caused by Cyclone Nargis was easily redeemed by belated and grudging cooperation with international aid groups.
This year, there was no need to talk about transferring power. Instead, Than Shwe used his speech to issue a series of warnings. Politicians should “refrain from inciting unrest [and] avoid personal attacks and smear campaigns against other parties.” And, most importantly, candidates must not follow the example of another, unnamed opposition group that went astray because it looked to foreign countries for “guidance and inspiration [and] followed the imported ideologies and directives irrationally.”
At the moment, Than Shwe seems quite certain that he will achieve his goal of legitimizing perpetual military rule. But if his plans hit a snag, don’t be surprised if the election is suspended indefinitely. Even as he approaches his moment of triumph, he appears to be wary of raising expectations. That is why he quoted a well-known Burmese proverb—“a recently dug well cannot be expected to produce clear water immediately”—and concluded his speech with these words: “Democracy in [Burma] today is at a fledgling stage and still requires patient care and attention.”
Keeping the hopes of the Burmese people at bay while satisfying the international community’s perfunctory calls for something resembling democracy in Burma are all part of the delicate balancing act that Than Shwe has had to perform over the past two decades. Now, however, he appears to be reaching the end of his tightrope. But one small misstep—or a sudden gust of outrage from a nation that is more at the mercy of economic forces than almost any other—and he could soon find that the heights that he now commands are not as unassailable as he imagines.
Without Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s say-so, Burma can’t make a move. That was the subtext of his message to the nation on March 27, Armed Forces Day. It was a sobering reminder to the world and the Burmese people that this is a general who sees no need for compromise, and who expects the whole country to fall in line with his plans with the same unquestioning obedience as the 13,000 troops who paraded past him in a display of military might.
In his 17-minute speech, delivered at his new “royal” capital of Naypyidaw, Than Shwe rejected calls from the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) for a review of a new constitution approved last year in a referendum widely denounced as a sham. There will be no review, the general said, because the “constitution [was] adopted by the people.”
In defiance of diplomatic pressure to engage with the NLD and other pro-democracy forces, Than Shwe has made it abundantly clear that he is in no mood for reconciliation. After nearly twenty years of relentlessly persecuting the winners of the last election in 1990, he now believes that he is close to achieving his ultimate victory: an electoral outcome that guarantees his perpetual grip on power.
So far, the junta has disclosed few details about the election it has promised to hold sometime in 2010. No date has been set, and no candidates have been named. But in his speech, Than Shwe left no doubt about his intention to keep a firm hold over the proceedings. Political parties that carry out “mature party organizing work will receive the blessing of the government,” he said, implying that those who are “immature” enough to question the military’s right to rule as it sees fit can expect to be sidelined, or worse.
The regime has made no secret of the fact that “disciplined democracy” is essentially an extension of the current political arrangement, which elevates the armed forces above all other institutions.
Under its new constitution, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces—currently Than Shwe—is entitled to appoint military officials to 25 percent of the seats in each of the country’s two legislative assemblies, the 440-seat People’s Parliament and the 224-seat National Parliament. And if this is not enough to guarantee that other political forces march to his tune, there is another provision which permits the commander-in-chief to reinstate direct military rule at his discretion.
It was not surprising, then, to hear in Than Shwe’s speech this year a note of growing confidence that was absent from his last Armed Forces Day address, in which he reassured any who cared to listen that he was not power hungry and would, in due course, hand over power to an elected successor.
A lot has changed since then. A year ago, Than Shwe was still under intense international pressure following the brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrations led by Buddhist monks in late 2007. But by May, he had successfully pulled off a rigged constitutional referendum that delivered more than 90 percent approval. And while this farce was playing out in the background, the world’s attention was transfixed by a humanitarian catastrophe that also, ultimately, played directly into the hands of the generals. Unlike the killing of untold numbers of monks in 2007, the regime’s callous disregard for the suffering caused by Cyclone Nargis was easily redeemed by belated and grudging cooperation with international aid groups.
This year, there was no need to talk about transferring power. Instead, Than Shwe used his speech to issue a series of warnings. Politicians should “refrain from inciting unrest [and] avoid personal attacks and smear campaigns against other parties.” And, most importantly, candidates must not follow the example of another, unnamed opposition group that went astray because it looked to foreign countries for “guidance and inspiration [and] followed the imported ideologies and directives irrationally.”
At the moment, Than Shwe seems quite certain that he will achieve his goal of legitimizing perpetual military rule. But if his plans hit a snag, don’t be surprised if the election is suspended indefinitely. Even as he approaches his moment of triumph, he appears to be wary of raising expectations. That is why he quoted a well-known Burmese proverb—“a recently dug well cannot be expected to produce clear water immediately”—and concluded his speech with these words: “Democracy in [Burma] today is at a fledgling stage and still requires patient care and attention.”
Keeping the hopes of the Burmese people at bay while satisfying the international community’s perfunctory calls for something resembling democracy in Burma are all part of the delicate balancing act that Than Shwe has had to perform over the past two decades. Now, however, he appears to be reaching the end of his tightrope. But one small misstep—or a sudden gust of outrage from a nation that is more at the mercy of economic forces than almost any other—and he could soon find that the heights that he now commands are not as unassailable as he imagines.
March 27, 2009
Generals Go Marching Down Memory Lane
By AUNG ZAW
Some retired generals and senior officers in Burma have created a storm in Burma’s literary circles by publishing their autobiographies, which are being read with interest inside and outside the country. The books shed light on the inner thoughts of the reclusive military veterans and the famous battles they waged against Burmese communists, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) and ethnic rebels.
But the authors aren’t telling their readers all. The draconian publishing laws that followed the 1988 uprising affected them, too, and they can be counted among the victims of self-censorship, with only limited freedom to share their stories with the reading public.
Among the autobiographies that have been well received by the Burmese public is a colorful memoir by Lt-Gen Chit Swe, 75.
Chit Swe was head of the bureau of special operations (South) before the 1988 uprising and a member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council that took power in that year. He last served as forestry minister and was removed from that office in 1997.
Other prominent generals who have published memoirs include Maj-Gen Hla Myint Swe, former transport minister, Brig-Gen Than Tin, deputy prime minister, Brig-Gen Ko Ko, Col Tun Tin, former prime minister, Col Nyunt Swe, former deputy foreign minister, and Major P Kyaw Han, former chairman of Pegu Division.
Their books include impressive accounts of battlefield experiences. On the other hand, their understanding of politics, democracy, diplomacy, economics and the ethnic diversity of Burma is limited. Indeed, this limitation no doubt has led the country to its present state. The generals were trained to repel enemies and defend the nation—and not to run a government.
Brig-Gen Than Tin, who led successful “four cuts” operations against communist insurgents in the Pegu Yoma mountains and ethnic insurgencies in the Irrawaddy delta in the late 1960s early 1970s, was a no-nonsense military officer determined to wipe out the insurgents.
In his autobiography, the general, now in his 80s, proudly claims that he defeated the multi-faceted insurgency and asks whether insurgents dare repeat their past mistakes.
Than Tin recalls that before setting out for Pegu Yoma he breakfasted with the War Office commander in chief, Gen San Yu, finding him gentle and modest. This is the impression of San Yu conveyed in other books, too.
Thus it was chilling to hear the general, handpicked by Gen Ne Win, issue a firm order to turn the insurgent-prone Pegu Yoma into a so-called “White Zone,” free of all insurgents. The Burmese army considered Pegu Yoma to be the enemy’s “brain” and the Irrawaddy delta its “stomach.”
In the next few years, Than Tin applied the “four cuts” strategy against villages and communist insurgents. Two hard-core leaders, Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit, were killed and the insurgency was over.
The “four cuts” strategy—involving forced resettlement of entire communities and confinement of villagers in special camps—had been learnt from the British by another author, Col Tun Tin, while studying in London. Tun Tin became prime minister in 1988.
Tun Tin, veteran of many military actions, including the “Battle of Insein,” set up a three-day war game plan attended by senior officers, including Ne Win. The plan demonstrated “four cuts operations” in practice—resettling villagers, cutting supplies, establishing intelligence, recruiting and raising funds.
It is clear from their writings that the veteran military leaders have little regret for their actions, claiming to have brought law, order and peace to Burma in the 1960s and 1970s.
Aside from their fighting skills, they were loyal to their superiors.
Ne Win invited Than Tin to join him on a trip to upper Burma soon after the general’s successful operation in Pegu Yoma, leaving him in the dark about the purpose.
Ne Win met Than Tin at the airport early in the morning and, addressing him as
“Bo Than Tin” (Ne Win liked to call his subordinates “Bo,” meaning lieutenant), said: “We are going to the north and today I will appoint you as deputy minister for mining so you are flying with me (to oversee mining projects).”
With those few words, the reshuffle procedure was over. The battle-hardened commander Than Tin, victor over the communists, never questioned his boss’s decision.
In Chit Swe’s books, Ne Win’s name is carefully replaced by “Lugyi,” meaning a senior person or high-ranking official. The reason for the substitution is that the former forestry minister’s books were published after Ne Win’s family members were arrested in 2001, accused of plotting a coup against top military leaders. Ne Win himself was placed under house arrest and died there—and since then his name is not allowed to be mentioned in any publications.
Chit Swe, who was then deputy commander in the southern region, recalls an eventful trip he made with Ne Win in the mid-1970s to a pearl-producing island.
Ne Win stayed up late into the night, and his physicians became nervous. Their concern was shared by senior officers at the War Office in Rangoon, who repeatedly called Chit Swe and his boss, Col Myo Aung, commander of the Southern Region, to ask whether Ne Win had yet retired to bed.
Ne Win kept all awake by strolling along the beach, followed by dozens of security guards and worried army officers, cracking jokes that nobody shared.
Chit Swe engaged Ne Win in a conversation about a common interest, horse-racing, finally steering him in the direction of the dictator’s sleeping quarters. But Ne Win demanded to sleep at a small jetty.
Chit Swe and a group of soldiers hurriedly prepared a bed and settled the dictator down for the night with some of his guards. Chit Swe later suggested in his book that Ne Win might have been nervous on the island because local security arrangements were in the hands of Col Myo Aung—a younger brother of Ba Thein Tin, chairman of the Communist Party of Burma.
Chit Swe’s books contain many stories of encounters with Thai counterparts, including army chief Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Gen Wimol Wongwanich and some senior officials. He admired Thailand’s growth and reputation and expressed high respect for the Thai king and the queen.
While based in the south, Chit Swe once persuaded his boss, Gen San Yu, during a visit to Kawthaung, to listen to the Thai king’s birthday speech. Perhaps Chit Swe indirectly wanted his boss to learn how to engage in public speaking.
San Yu sat and listened for a while and finally left the room, saying that leaders should occasionally speak to the nation. But he returned to the task of signing official papers—San Yu was indeed one of Ne Win’s yes-men.
In one section of his book, Chit Swe recalls a visit he made to Thailand with Gen Than Shwe, then deputy commander in chief of the armed forces. They received special treatment and found Thai generals eager to please their Burmese guests—because of their interest in the natural resources of Burma, Chit Swe notes.
As Chit Swe and Than Shwe were greeted by Thai officers, young female parachutists landed in front of them and presented them with garlands and flowers. Not surprisingly, all the young women were beautiful, Chit Swe notes.
Chit Swe was eager to repair relations with the US, and he led a semi-official delegation on a visit there in 1994. Speaking to this correspondent, he often mentioned the US election, US president Obama, Bush’s policy on Burma, sanctions and the current economic crisis.
During his US visit, Chit Swe met Senators John McCain, Richard Shelby, Jesse Helms, as well as officials and American scholars. Whenever human rights and democracy issues were raised, Chit Swe and his delegation defended the regime.
Chit Swe and other generals and senior military men who have written autobiographies have all been careful when writing about the 1988 uprising, often toeing the official line and expressing the need for the spirit of union and for the armed forces to maintain law and order. As long as the army is united, the country will never disintegrate, Chit Swe asserts.
But Chit Swe was one of the moderate soldiers. He admitted the failure of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” in 1988. At one point during the uprising, he was assigned to calm air force officers who were joining the demonstrators. He was ridiculed by the rebellious officers, but his calm approach pacified them.
Chit Swe says in his book that the armed forces had no intention to hold onto power for long. But it has now been 20 years, and Chit Swe has had little influence in telling his boss Than Shwe how to steer the country.
Likewise, Tun Tin, who briefly became prime minister in 1988, says in his book that he and his cabinet were preparing to reform the country’s economy and create an open market, but it was too late.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Tun Tin often flew to the German Federal Republic and Japan to get soft loans and assistance, knowing that his country’s economy was falling apart. But during that time, none of these battle-hardened soldiers took a bold step, and it seems now that they look back with some regret and sadness.
In any case, all their books are colorful and interesting to read. They illustrate the psyche of tough soldiers and generals who blindly loved their country and jealously controlled their power in the past—as well as their thirst for golf and whisky.
All in all, the books written by generals and senior army officers demonstrate that patriotism was the main reason they entered the armed forces, believing they were saving the country from insurgency and external threat.
There’s no doubt that the armed forces command their absolute love and faith. They want to see the country prosper in peace, but they don’t have the wisdom to cure its ills.
To be fair, the books show that their authors are human beings—but it must be said that they share responsibility for much human suffering in Burma.
They are now retired and in their old age, happy to talk about most topics apart from current politics. They realize that all is not well in Burma but they can’t speak out—they are also prisoners in their own country.
Some retired generals and senior officers in Burma have created a storm in Burma’s literary circles by publishing their autobiographies, which are being read with interest inside and outside the country. The books shed light on the inner thoughts of the reclusive military veterans and the famous battles they waged against Burmese communists, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) and ethnic rebels.
But the authors aren’t telling their readers all. The draconian publishing laws that followed the 1988 uprising affected them, too, and they can be counted among the victims of self-censorship, with only limited freedom to share their stories with the reading public.
Among the autobiographies that have been well received by the Burmese public is a colorful memoir by Lt-Gen Chit Swe, 75.
Chit Swe was head of the bureau of special operations (South) before the 1988 uprising and a member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council that took power in that year. He last served as forestry minister and was removed from that office in 1997.
Other prominent generals who have published memoirs include Maj-Gen Hla Myint Swe, former transport minister, Brig-Gen Than Tin, deputy prime minister, Brig-Gen Ko Ko, Col Tun Tin, former prime minister, Col Nyunt Swe, former deputy foreign minister, and Major P Kyaw Han, former chairman of Pegu Division.
Their books include impressive accounts of battlefield experiences. On the other hand, their understanding of politics, democracy, diplomacy, economics and the ethnic diversity of Burma is limited. Indeed, this limitation no doubt has led the country to its present state. The generals were trained to repel enemies and defend the nation—and not to run a government.
Brig-Gen Than Tin, who led successful “four cuts” operations against communist insurgents in the Pegu Yoma mountains and ethnic insurgencies in the Irrawaddy delta in the late 1960s early 1970s, was a no-nonsense military officer determined to wipe out the insurgents.
In his autobiography, the general, now in his 80s, proudly claims that he defeated the multi-faceted insurgency and asks whether insurgents dare repeat their past mistakes.
Than Tin recalls that before setting out for Pegu Yoma he breakfasted with the War Office commander in chief, Gen San Yu, finding him gentle and modest. This is the impression of San Yu conveyed in other books, too.
Thus it was chilling to hear the general, handpicked by Gen Ne Win, issue a firm order to turn the insurgent-prone Pegu Yoma into a so-called “White Zone,” free of all insurgents. The Burmese army considered Pegu Yoma to be the enemy’s “brain” and the Irrawaddy delta its “stomach.”
In the next few years, Than Tin applied the “four cuts” strategy against villages and communist insurgents. Two hard-core leaders, Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit, were killed and the insurgency was over.
The “four cuts” strategy—involving forced resettlement of entire communities and confinement of villagers in special camps—had been learnt from the British by another author, Col Tun Tin, while studying in London. Tun Tin became prime minister in 1988.
Tun Tin, veteran of many military actions, including the “Battle of Insein,” set up a three-day war game plan attended by senior officers, including Ne Win. The plan demonstrated “four cuts operations” in practice—resettling villagers, cutting supplies, establishing intelligence, recruiting and raising funds.
It is clear from their writings that the veteran military leaders have little regret for their actions, claiming to have brought law, order and peace to Burma in the 1960s and 1970s.
Aside from their fighting skills, they were loyal to their superiors.
Ne Win invited Than Tin to join him on a trip to upper Burma soon after the general’s successful operation in Pegu Yoma, leaving him in the dark about the purpose.
Ne Win met Than Tin at the airport early in the morning and, addressing him as
“Bo Than Tin” (Ne Win liked to call his subordinates “Bo,” meaning lieutenant), said: “We are going to the north and today I will appoint you as deputy minister for mining so you are flying with me (to oversee mining projects).”
With those few words, the reshuffle procedure was over. The battle-hardened commander Than Tin, victor over the communists, never questioned his boss’s decision.
In Chit Swe’s books, Ne Win’s name is carefully replaced by “Lugyi,” meaning a senior person or high-ranking official. The reason for the substitution is that the former forestry minister’s books were published after Ne Win’s family members were arrested in 2001, accused of plotting a coup against top military leaders. Ne Win himself was placed under house arrest and died there—and since then his name is not allowed to be mentioned in any publications.
Chit Swe, who was then deputy commander in the southern region, recalls an eventful trip he made with Ne Win in the mid-1970s to a pearl-producing island.
Ne Win stayed up late into the night, and his physicians became nervous. Their concern was shared by senior officers at the War Office in Rangoon, who repeatedly called Chit Swe and his boss, Col Myo Aung, commander of the Southern Region, to ask whether Ne Win had yet retired to bed.
Ne Win kept all awake by strolling along the beach, followed by dozens of security guards and worried army officers, cracking jokes that nobody shared.
Chit Swe engaged Ne Win in a conversation about a common interest, horse-racing, finally steering him in the direction of the dictator’s sleeping quarters. But Ne Win demanded to sleep at a small jetty.
Chit Swe and a group of soldiers hurriedly prepared a bed and settled the dictator down for the night with some of his guards. Chit Swe later suggested in his book that Ne Win might have been nervous on the island because local security arrangements were in the hands of Col Myo Aung—a younger brother of Ba Thein Tin, chairman of the Communist Party of Burma.
Chit Swe’s books contain many stories of encounters with Thai counterparts, including army chief Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Gen Wimol Wongwanich and some senior officials. He admired Thailand’s growth and reputation and expressed high respect for the Thai king and the queen.
While based in the south, Chit Swe once persuaded his boss, Gen San Yu, during a visit to Kawthaung, to listen to the Thai king’s birthday speech. Perhaps Chit Swe indirectly wanted his boss to learn how to engage in public speaking.
San Yu sat and listened for a while and finally left the room, saying that leaders should occasionally speak to the nation. But he returned to the task of signing official papers—San Yu was indeed one of Ne Win’s yes-men.
In one section of his book, Chit Swe recalls a visit he made to Thailand with Gen Than Shwe, then deputy commander in chief of the armed forces. They received special treatment and found Thai generals eager to please their Burmese guests—because of their interest in the natural resources of Burma, Chit Swe notes.
As Chit Swe and Than Shwe were greeted by Thai officers, young female parachutists landed in front of them and presented them with garlands and flowers. Not surprisingly, all the young women were beautiful, Chit Swe notes.
Chit Swe was eager to repair relations with the US, and he led a semi-official delegation on a visit there in 1994. Speaking to this correspondent, he often mentioned the US election, US president Obama, Bush’s policy on Burma, sanctions and the current economic crisis.
During his US visit, Chit Swe met Senators John McCain, Richard Shelby, Jesse Helms, as well as officials and American scholars. Whenever human rights and democracy issues were raised, Chit Swe and his delegation defended the regime.
Chit Swe and other generals and senior military men who have written autobiographies have all been careful when writing about the 1988 uprising, often toeing the official line and expressing the need for the spirit of union and for the armed forces to maintain law and order. As long as the army is united, the country will never disintegrate, Chit Swe asserts.
But Chit Swe was one of the moderate soldiers. He admitted the failure of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” in 1988. At one point during the uprising, he was assigned to calm air force officers who were joining the demonstrators. He was ridiculed by the rebellious officers, but his calm approach pacified them.
Chit Swe says in his book that the armed forces had no intention to hold onto power for long. But it has now been 20 years, and Chit Swe has had little influence in telling his boss Than Shwe how to steer the country.
Likewise, Tun Tin, who briefly became prime minister in 1988, says in his book that he and his cabinet were preparing to reform the country’s economy and create an open market, but it was too late.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Tun Tin often flew to the German Federal Republic and Japan to get soft loans and assistance, knowing that his country’s economy was falling apart. But during that time, none of these battle-hardened soldiers took a bold step, and it seems now that they look back with some regret and sadness.
In any case, all their books are colorful and interesting to read. They illustrate the psyche of tough soldiers and generals who blindly loved their country and jealously controlled their power in the past—as well as their thirst for golf and whisky.
All in all, the books written by generals and senior army officers demonstrate that patriotism was the main reason they entered the armed forces, believing they were saving the country from insurgency and external threat.
There’s no doubt that the armed forces command their absolute love and faith. They want to see the country prosper in peace, but they don’t have the wisdom to cure its ills.
To be fair, the books show that their authors are human beings—but it must be said that they share responsibility for much human suffering in Burma.
They are now retired and in their old age, happy to talk about most topics apart from current politics. They realize that all is not well in Burma but they can’t speak out—they are also prisoners in their own country.
March 25, 2009
Will Suu Kyi Be Soon Free? And What Then?
By THE IRRAWADDY
Persistent rumors have been circulating since late last year predicting that Burma’s opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi will be released soon from house arrest.
Several Western governments and international campaign groups accuse the Burmese regime of detaining her illegally and have been stepping up their demands for her release.
Some diplomats in Rangoon and Bangkok even suggest that Suu Kyi will be released in May this year, the sixth anniversary of her current term of house arrest. Some analysts maintain, however, that the regime will benefit nothing from releasing her at this point in time, but say she could be freed after the 2010 election.
Suu Kyi is being held under the terms of Burma’s State Protection Act of 1975, which provides for the detention for up to five years of persons judged to pose a threat to the sovereignty and security of the State and the peace of the people. Under the provisions of the Act, Suu Kyi should have been released in May 2008, and the Burmese regime is being accused of transgressing its own laws by continuing to detain her.
UN Special Human Rights envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana raised her case with government officials when he visited Burma this month. He was told by the country’s Chief Justice that since the detention was an administrative order, the legal case had not been sent to the Supreme Court.
Government officials also said that Suu Kyi had been placed in “quasi-judicial” detention. But even experts in international law are asking what this means.
Since there is no rule of law in Burma, it would be naïve to expect the regime to honor existing laws it doesn’t respect, let alone hope the junta will bow to demands for Suu Kyi’s release.
Nevertheless, important questions are raised by the rumors that she could indeed be freed soon.
Question: What will happen if
Suu Kyi is freed in May this year?
Answer: The Burmese people will be very happy and the regime will try to win kudos and much needed recognition by its most vocal critics, particularly the US and the international community.
It’s probably wishful thinking to suggest that her release in May could show that Snr-Gen Than Shwe wants to include her in the “road map” process and may want her National League for Democracy (NLD) to participate.
If she is freed after the 2010 election it will be because the current regime wants to hand the matter over to a new government. Why should Than Shwe want her and the NLD to contest the election anyway? This is Than Shwe’s election, and it’s likely to be rigged in his favor.
It is possible that after her release she will continue to ask for the release of all political prisoners, including women and Buddhist monks.
The hard fact must be faced that even after her release, Suu Kyi could be rearrested and placed under house detention for a further six years.
In a worst case scenario, Suu Kyi could risk the same kind of physical attack that preceded her detention in 2003, when pro-regime mobs set upon her convoy of supporters in Depayin. That fear has prompted some analysts and diplomats to suggest that if she is freed she should be confined to the city limits of Rangoon.
Q: Some Burma watchers suggest that she should be suspended from the NLD. They say she should be a figurehead and invest her energy on reconciliation with the regime on a national level.
A: The statement by Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in November 2007 provides the best answer to that question. She said: “In full awareness of the essential role of political parties in democratic societies, in deep appreciation of the sacrifices of the members of my party and in my position as General Secretary, I will be guided by the policies and wishes of the National League for Democracy. However, in this time of vital need for democratic solidarity and national unity, it is my duty to give constant and serious considerations to the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations and forces as possible, in particular those of our ethnic nationality races.”
Any suggestion that Suu Kyi should divorce herself even temporarily from the NLD is vehemently opposed on a national scale. She has, however, indicated that she may give serious consideration to any thoughtful and constructive proposal to achieve national reconciliation and democracy in Burma. Without Suu Kyi, the NLD would be inactive. They both need each other.
Q: What is her stance on the 2010 election?
A: If NLD statements on the election issue reflect Suu Kyi’s thinking (although who knows what she is thinking?), she will not agree with the military-sponsored constitution. However, the NLD has called for a constitutional review, indicating the party’s flexibility.
Q: What about sanctions? Could she have a moderating influence on Western sanctions policies?
A: For an answer to that question, read the NLD’s special statement issued in February. The NLD said Suu Kyi had informed the authorities through the mediator Aung Kyi that she is ready to cooperate to avoid the “confrontation, utter devastation, economic sanctions and embargo” which the regime accuses her of supporting.
“Therefore, it is declared once again that the NLD requests with sincere intention that the two leaders who can make decisions regarding these matters, shall unavoidably and practically hold dialogue immediately,” the party statement said.
Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi, the government’s minister for liaison, discussed the sanctions issue during their meetings. There was a suggestion that a joint statement on sanctions could be issued by Suu Kyi and the regime leaders. Than Shwe, some sources said, opposed the idea.
Deep seated mistrust remains on both sides, and some say that a confidence building process may need to be restarted soon at the highest level. But frankly, we’re not suggesting here that the UN and its clueless special envoys jump in to spin and sell “confidence building” projects.
Q: Should Suu Kyi leave Burma?
A: The regime would be more than happy to provide Suu Kyi with a ticket out of the country—a one-way ticket, though.
She would be very popular within the international community. But she is no Dalai Lama.
How long will her popularity last? Regime apologists, sympathizers and governments that support the regime will belittle Suu Kyi and try to sabotage whatever efforts she undertakes. She might not be able to return to Asia, perhaps not even to Japan, but her popularity in the West is assured.
Apologists, policy makers and some scholars who sympathize with the regime are convinced that Suu Kyi is part of the problem. This propaganda has been circulating for some time.
So our conclusion is that Suu Kyi should stay in Burma and work from within.
Q: Would Suu Kyi be as popular as ever with the Burmese public?
A: Like her father Gen Aung San, the Nobel Peace Prize winner remains a beacon of hope. She will be respected and the opposition and democracy movement will be energized and revitalized if she is freed. This is why she is so feared by the regime and why she remains under house arrest.
Q: What should Suu Kyi say if she is freed?
A: Some observers say that she and the regime leaders should inject a tone of pragmatism. They suggest that aside from calling for dialogue and democracy, she should talk about the economy, the country’s humanitarian crisis and poverty and her policy and thoughts on sanctions.
She should again show that she is ready to turn a new page. She should show that her readiness for compromise remains unchanged and prove herself to be a pragmatic politician.
She could reactive the NLD and its supporters nationwide. She should first of all sit down with all the party “uncles,” senior and youth leaders and discuss reform of the party and how to inject new doses of energy and dynamism into the NLD.
She should also speak carefully to those rank and file soldiers and officers who are fed up with the regime and want to see change.
They will see in her their hope for change.
But she should be cautiously aware of the smear campaigns against her within the armed forces. Many officers may view her negatively, and she needs to win them over with tact.
Q: The NLD welcomed Ban Ki-moon’s intention to visit Burma soon, but the regime is silent about the plan. Why is that?
A: Than Shwe doesn’t want to make big concession to the UN. But he may decide to release Suu Kyi soon. If the UN chief is allowed to enter Burma, he should do his homework and be prepared to come out of Burma with some substantial package in his basket. Otherwise, he and his mission will be ridiculed.
Q: Who should Suu Kyi look to outside Burma?
A: She should be prepared to articulate some practical policy on China and India, who are the regime’s chief supporters. Washington will always be behind her, but she must make sure that China and India are on board. It shouldn’t be ignored that the Chinese are pragmatic and are fed up with the Than Shwe regime.
Thus, Suu Kyi must not antagonize Burma’s powerful neighbors or Asean, whose policy is based on pragmatism and economic prosperity. Asean leaders are unpredictable, so Suu Kyi’s message to them has more importance than any she delivers to the West.
It should be kept in mind that some Asean leaders are unhappy with the regime and want to see Suu Kyi as an alternative. Suu Kyi therefore needs to demonstrate that she is relevant and a force to be reckoned with.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text of Aung San Suu Kyi's statement released by U.N. envoy
November 08, 2007
Following is the text of the statement by Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, released Thursday by U.N. envoy Ibrahim Gambari.
I wish to thank all those who have stood by my side all this time, both inside and outside my country. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, for his unwavering support for the cause of national reconciliation, democracy and human rights in my country.
I welcome the appointment on 8 October of Minister Aung Kyi as Minister for Relations. Our first meeting on 25 October was constructive and I look forward to further regular discussions. I expect that this phase of preliminary consultations will conclude soon so that a meaningful and timebound dialogue with the SPDC leadership can start as early as possible.
In the interest of the nation, I stand ready to cooperate with the Government in order to make this process of dialogue a success and welcome the necessary good offices role of the United Nations to help facilitate our efforts in this regard.
In full awareness of the essential role of political parties in democratic societies, in deep appreciation of the sacrifices of the members of my party and in my position as General Secretary, I will be guided by the policies and wishes of the National League for Democracy. However, in this time of vital need for democratic solidarity and national unity, it is my duty to give constant and serious considerations to the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations and forces as possible, in particular those of our ethnic nationality races.
To that end, I am committed to pursue the path of dialogue constructively and invite the Government and all relevant parties to join me in this spirit.
I believe that stability, prosperity and democracy for my country, living at peace with itself and with full respect for human rights, offers the best prospect for my country to fully contribute to the development and stability of the region in close partnership with its neighbors and fellow ASEAN members, and to play a positive role as a respected member of the international community.
Persistent rumors have been circulating since late last year predicting that Burma’s opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi will be released soon from house arrest.
Several Western governments and international campaign groups accuse the Burmese regime of detaining her illegally and have been stepping up their demands for her release.
Some diplomats in Rangoon and Bangkok even suggest that Suu Kyi will be released in May this year, the sixth anniversary of her current term of house arrest. Some analysts maintain, however, that the regime will benefit nothing from releasing her at this point in time, but say she could be freed after the 2010 election.
Suu Kyi is being held under the terms of Burma’s State Protection Act of 1975, which provides for the detention for up to five years of persons judged to pose a threat to the sovereignty and security of the State and the peace of the people. Under the provisions of the Act, Suu Kyi should have been released in May 2008, and the Burmese regime is being accused of transgressing its own laws by continuing to detain her.
UN Special Human Rights envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana raised her case with government officials when he visited Burma this month. He was told by the country’s Chief Justice that since the detention was an administrative order, the legal case had not been sent to the Supreme Court.
Government officials also said that Suu Kyi had been placed in “quasi-judicial” detention. But even experts in international law are asking what this means.
Since there is no rule of law in Burma, it would be naïve to expect the regime to honor existing laws it doesn’t respect, let alone hope the junta will bow to demands for Suu Kyi’s release.
Nevertheless, important questions are raised by the rumors that she could indeed be freed soon.
Question: What will happen if
Suu Kyi is freed in May this year?
Answer: The Burmese people will be very happy and the regime will try to win kudos and much needed recognition by its most vocal critics, particularly the US and the international community.
It’s probably wishful thinking to suggest that her release in May could show that Snr-Gen Than Shwe wants to include her in the “road map” process and may want her National League for Democracy (NLD) to participate.
If she is freed after the 2010 election it will be because the current regime wants to hand the matter over to a new government. Why should Than Shwe want her and the NLD to contest the election anyway? This is Than Shwe’s election, and it’s likely to be rigged in his favor.
It is possible that after her release she will continue to ask for the release of all political prisoners, including women and Buddhist monks.
The hard fact must be faced that even after her release, Suu Kyi could be rearrested and placed under house detention for a further six years.
In a worst case scenario, Suu Kyi could risk the same kind of physical attack that preceded her detention in 2003, when pro-regime mobs set upon her convoy of supporters in Depayin. That fear has prompted some analysts and diplomats to suggest that if she is freed she should be confined to the city limits of Rangoon.
Q: Some Burma watchers suggest that she should be suspended from the NLD. They say she should be a figurehead and invest her energy on reconciliation with the regime on a national level.
A: The statement by Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in November 2007 provides the best answer to that question. She said: “In full awareness of the essential role of political parties in democratic societies, in deep appreciation of the sacrifices of the members of my party and in my position as General Secretary, I will be guided by the policies and wishes of the National League for Democracy. However, in this time of vital need for democratic solidarity and national unity, it is my duty to give constant and serious considerations to the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations and forces as possible, in particular those of our ethnic nationality races.”
Any suggestion that Suu Kyi should divorce herself even temporarily from the NLD is vehemently opposed on a national scale. She has, however, indicated that she may give serious consideration to any thoughtful and constructive proposal to achieve national reconciliation and democracy in Burma. Without Suu Kyi, the NLD would be inactive. They both need each other.
Q: What is her stance on the 2010 election?
A: If NLD statements on the election issue reflect Suu Kyi’s thinking (although who knows what she is thinking?), she will not agree with the military-sponsored constitution. However, the NLD has called for a constitutional review, indicating the party’s flexibility.
Q: What about sanctions? Could she have a moderating influence on Western sanctions policies?
A: For an answer to that question, read the NLD’s special statement issued in February. The NLD said Suu Kyi had informed the authorities through the mediator Aung Kyi that she is ready to cooperate to avoid the “confrontation, utter devastation, economic sanctions and embargo” which the regime accuses her of supporting.
“Therefore, it is declared once again that the NLD requests with sincere intention that the two leaders who can make decisions regarding these matters, shall unavoidably and practically hold dialogue immediately,” the party statement said.
Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi, the government’s minister for liaison, discussed the sanctions issue during their meetings. There was a suggestion that a joint statement on sanctions could be issued by Suu Kyi and the regime leaders. Than Shwe, some sources said, opposed the idea.
Deep seated mistrust remains on both sides, and some say that a confidence building process may need to be restarted soon at the highest level. But frankly, we’re not suggesting here that the UN and its clueless special envoys jump in to spin and sell “confidence building” projects.
Q: Should Suu Kyi leave Burma?
A: The regime would be more than happy to provide Suu Kyi with a ticket out of the country—a one-way ticket, though.
She would be very popular within the international community. But she is no Dalai Lama.
How long will her popularity last? Regime apologists, sympathizers and governments that support the regime will belittle Suu Kyi and try to sabotage whatever efforts she undertakes. She might not be able to return to Asia, perhaps not even to Japan, but her popularity in the West is assured.
Apologists, policy makers and some scholars who sympathize with the regime are convinced that Suu Kyi is part of the problem. This propaganda has been circulating for some time.
So our conclusion is that Suu Kyi should stay in Burma and work from within.
Q: Would Suu Kyi be as popular as ever with the Burmese public?
A: Like her father Gen Aung San, the Nobel Peace Prize winner remains a beacon of hope. She will be respected and the opposition and democracy movement will be energized and revitalized if she is freed. This is why she is so feared by the regime and why she remains under house arrest.
Q: What should Suu Kyi say if she is freed?
A: Some observers say that she and the regime leaders should inject a tone of pragmatism. They suggest that aside from calling for dialogue and democracy, she should talk about the economy, the country’s humanitarian crisis and poverty and her policy and thoughts on sanctions.
She should again show that she is ready to turn a new page. She should show that her readiness for compromise remains unchanged and prove herself to be a pragmatic politician.
She could reactive the NLD and its supporters nationwide. She should first of all sit down with all the party “uncles,” senior and youth leaders and discuss reform of the party and how to inject new doses of energy and dynamism into the NLD.
She should also speak carefully to those rank and file soldiers and officers who are fed up with the regime and want to see change.
They will see in her their hope for change.
But she should be cautiously aware of the smear campaigns against her within the armed forces. Many officers may view her negatively, and she needs to win them over with tact.
Q: The NLD welcomed Ban Ki-moon’s intention to visit Burma soon, but the regime is silent about the plan. Why is that?
A: Than Shwe doesn’t want to make big concession to the UN. But he may decide to release Suu Kyi soon. If the UN chief is allowed to enter Burma, he should do his homework and be prepared to come out of Burma with some substantial package in his basket. Otherwise, he and his mission will be ridiculed.
Q: Who should Suu Kyi look to outside Burma?
A: She should be prepared to articulate some practical policy on China and India, who are the regime’s chief supporters. Washington will always be behind her, but she must make sure that China and India are on board. It shouldn’t be ignored that the Chinese are pragmatic and are fed up with the Than Shwe regime.
Thus, Suu Kyi must not antagonize Burma’s powerful neighbors or Asean, whose policy is based on pragmatism and economic prosperity. Asean leaders are unpredictable, so Suu Kyi’s message to them has more importance than any she delivers to the West.
It should be kept in mind that some Asean leaders are unhappy with the regime and want to see Suu Kyi as an alternative. Suu Kyi therefore needs to demonstrate that she is relevant and a force to be reckoned with.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Text of Aung San Suu Kyi's statement released by U.N. envoy
November 08, 2007
Following is the text of the statement by Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, released Thursday by U.N. envoy Ibrahim Gambari.
I wish to thank all those who have stood by my side all this time, both inside and outside my country. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, for his unwavering support for the cause of national reconciliation, democracy and human rights in my country.
I welcome the appointment on 8 October of Minister Aung Kyi as Minister for Relations. Our first meeting on 25 October was constructive and I look forward to further regular discussions. I expect that this phase of preliminary consultations will conclude soon so that a meaningful and timebound dialogue with the SPDC leadership can start as early as possible.
In the interest of the nation, I stand ready to cooperate with the Government in order to make this process of dialogue a success and welcome the necessary good offices role of the United Nations to help facilitate our efforts in this regard.
In full awareness of the essential role of political parties in democratic societies, in deep appreciation of the sacrifices of the members of my party and in my position as General Secretary, I will be guided by the policies and wishes of the National League for Democracy. However, in this time of vital need for democratic solidarity and national unity, it is my duty to give constant and serious considerations to the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations and forces as possible, in particular those of our ethnic nationality races.
To that end, I am committed to pursue the path of dialogue constructively and invite the Government and all relevant parties to join me in this spirit.
I believe that stability, prosperity and democracy for my country, living at peace with itself and with full respect for human rights, offers the best prospect for my country to fully contribute to the development and stability of the region in close partnership with its neighbors and fellow ASEAN members, and to play a positive role as a respected member of the international community.
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