Obama's Presidency Would Benefit Asean

By KAVI CHONGKITTAVORN

Last week it became succinct that Asean would gain more from the new US administration under the presidential hopeful Barack Obama. For months what Obama stood for concerning the region was pretty vague other than his much noted childhood's connection in Indonesia.

Without specific policies, stereotypes of a typical Democrat president have permeated among decision makers over here—for instance, tough measures on labor, human rights standards, more trade protection and China-oriented diplomacy.

Frank Jannuzi and Robert Gelbard, Obama's policy advisors on East Asia, have set forth pro-active and pro-engagement of the new US administration towards Asean if their boss wins tomorrow's election. Top on the agenda on Asean is the signatory of 1976 non-aggression Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which has more than two dozens signatories world-wide.

During the two-year long presidential campaign and debates, Asia has not been featured at all, except for US ties with China and Japan and the situation in Pakistan, in Obama's or John McCain's political discourse. It was commonly accepted whoever heads the next US administration would not harm the US-Asean relations. The Bush policy on Asean would continue without changes. That much was clear.

Although the second Bush administration has intensified ties and cooperation with Asean, senior US officials have never made clear about the TAC ascension, let alone the desire to participate in the four-year-old East Asian Summit.

In anticipation of presidential triumph, Obama's team sent out the clearest signal to the region of the Obama administration's intention to join EAS. To do so, the TAC signatory is a prerequisite. If that comes along next year, Obama's calls for changes have contagious effects on the Asean policy as well.

These latest standpoints augur well with Asean, especially during the grouping's transformation into a rule-base organization that will begin on December 15, when the Asean Charter will officially become effective followed the ratification by all the ten members.

Such an outward looking US policy represents a big departure from the previous US administrations, which normally view any formation of regional grouping without the US at its inception as adversarial. For nearly two decades, the US has been anxious and unhappy with the notion of East Asian coming together, particularly when it was propelled by the anti-West leader, former Malaysian prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad.

With the new-found US enthusiasm towards EAS, or Asean plus six as it is known, it would certainly pose new challenges for Asean as never before seen.

Previously, discussions on the US regional roles usually stop at the issue related to TAC ascension because it considers as Washington's Achilles' heels. The argument normally goes like this: the US, as the world's most powerful country, would never compromise its global interests to a regional code of conducts. As Belgard put it, the US can just follow Australia's footstep by signing the TAC with a condition that it will not affect its bilateral and multilateral treaty arrangements nor rights and obligations under the UN Charter.

Notably, the EAS members have not yet agreed to accept new members as the moratorium is still in place today. They also have yet to assess the US overture and its repercussion. It is not certain the EAS would welcome the US participation because it would have a domino effect. Russia has shown a keen interest to be part of EAS.

Nonetheless, the US readiness enables a new strategic environment for increased cooperation as Washington would no longer be a subject of exclusion. First of all, the US will have a bigger space to maneuver to balance with the rise of China and India. Secondly, Washington can play pivotal roles in shaping new regional security architecture. Finally, it could lead to the institutionalization of Asean plus one summit with the US.

Today's condition is a far cry from 1992, when Asean deposited its non-aggression pact to the UN. The grouping used to appeal endlessly for recognition from major powers. But nobody has paid any heed, until China was the first major power to accede to the regional code of conducts in 2003. Other countries followed suit in a rapid succession.

The US is only the member of UN Security Council that has not officially welcome TAC. UK's and EU's ascension plans were delayed due to the political oppression in Burma. In the foreseeable future, the Burmese crisis would remain high on agenda between Asean and the West.

It remains to be seen how the Obama administration can make a breakthrough on Burma. His advisors said the US need to work with Asean on Burma to ensure that Rangoon lives up to its obligations as a member of Asean. It is easily said than done. Both US and EU have up until now imposed the toughest sanction regime against the Burmese junta and its leaders. That hard-lined approach would not change in coming months unless the Rangoon regime has made extraordinary compromise.

However, the aftermath of Nargis cyclone has given unique opportunities for Asean and international communities including US and UN-related agencies to work together in designing and implementing rescue, rehabilitation and recovery plans. Growing recommendations that this cooperation, albeit flaws, should continue or even intensify to draw in the Burmese regime. With its 7-point roadmap and the 2010 election on schedules, the junta has no plan to give-in to any outside pressure.

Fresher US outlook and approach toward Asean would certainly go a long way to augment US influence in new ways. Coming at this time of financial tsunami is very significant as it shows Washington's modesty and humility. If Obama feels comfortable, he could even follow-up on Bush's pending invitation of Asean leaders to the US. It would not be in the Crawford range, however.

Kavi Chongkittavorn is Assistant Group Editors of Thailand's English daily The Nation and this article appeared in The Nation on Monday.