India’s Burma Policy Built on Shifting Sands

By NEHGINPAO KIPGEN

While the international community continually casts a disapproving eye over the political turmoil in military-ruled Burma, its neighbors play a more supportive role. India, for its part, has a seemingly lukewarm interest in the Burmese democratic movement and has adopted a double-standard policy toward Burma.

It was the 1988 students’ uprising in Burma which brought India significantly into the equation. The failed uprising forced hundreds of refugees across the international border into India. From 1988 to 1992, India’s policy vacillated between support for the pro-democracy movement and diplomatic isolation.

Former Indian premier P.V. Narasimha Rao’s “Look East” policy of 1991-96 initiated a change in foreign policy toward Burma. The dramatic policy shift, however, happened during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s administration (1998-2004).

There were two major factors responsible for India’s policy shift: to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China; and to deal with insurgency problems in the northeast of India. There was also an element of economic interest involved.

Of the two, countering China’s regional influence was the number one concern for India. Having experienced a bitter war with China in 1962, India felt insecure and threatened by China broadening its sphere of influence in the region.

Last year, China-Burma bilateral trade hit US $2.057 billion, up 40.9 percent from 2006. China’s exports to Burma totaled $1.686 billion, up 39.6 percent, while its imports from Burma stood at $371 million, up 46.9 percent. China therefore currently enjoys a trade surplus of $1.315 billion.

India’s has upped its exports to Burma in 2007-2008 to about $185 million, while its imports from Burma were valued at around $810 million for this year. In addition to the Tamu-Kalay-Kalewa highway upgrade, India has made investments in energy and gas exploration projects.

All these moves and counter-moves are the direct result of a scramble for influence between the two Asian powers. India, at least for now, sees engaging with the Burmese military regime an effective means to narrowing Chinese influence.

Another important factor in Indian foreign policy shift was the rise of insurgency in the restive northeastern provinces of India. About 20,000 insurgents from different groups have bases in Burma, mostly in northwestern Sagaing Division.

Talks on coordination between Indian and Burmese security forces in counterinsurgency operations have gained momentum in recent years. During his visit to New Delhi in 2004, Snr-Gen Than Shwe assured the Indian government that he would not allow his country to be used by anti-India elements.

Although the Burmese military, on a number of occasions, has asked the Indian government to silence Burmese dissidents, to date New Delhi has made little more than a wishy-washy response to the request. Similarly, Naypyidaw does not appear to be concentrated on dismantling the bases of Indian insurgents operating from Burma.

India is not totally ignoring the Burmese pro-democracy movement as is evident by the presence of more than 50,000 Burmese refugees in India, including some leading dissidents.

India acts in tandem with her national interests and security in the face of China’s influence in the region. By engaging with the Burmese junta, India feels better served. To many, this looks as if India has adopted a double-standard policy toward Burma.

In the event of Burma becoming a democratic country, India is expected to be one of the first to throw her support behind the movement. Until then, India will continue to compete with China, while the Western world will likely continue with its traditional of economic sanctions.

Nehginpao Kipgen is the General Secretary of the US-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com) and a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004).