Asean’s Relevance in Question

By POKPONG LAWANSIRI

The Thai government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is finally able to hold the postponed 14th Asean Summit after it was postponed in December 2008 following the turbulent seizure of Bangkok’s international airport by the militant People’s Alliance for Democracy.

There was earlier speculation that a re-scheduled summit would face great difficulties after attempts by the anti-government United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship had petitioned other Asean members to boycott the summit claiming the Thai government is undemocratic.

As Asean celebrates its 42nd birthday this year, many observers are wondering if the organization is truly relevant to the Asean population.

During the period of the adoption and ratification of the Asean Charter in 2007-2008, many Asean governments including Thailand insisted that the Asean Charter would make the body a more “people-oriented” organization.

The actual text of the charter, however, does not detail how the people can be involved in Asean decision-making processes.

Indonesian lawmakers and a Jakarta-based think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, spoke in favor of the non-ratification of the charter, seeing no benefit in it.

Asean’s significance has been questioned in several instances.

First, Asean policies have proven to be mostly rhetoric rather than actual implementation. The 1997 document, Asean Vision 2020, talks about Asean’s aim “to build a community of caring and sharing societies”; however, Abhisit as the current chair of Asean, reiterates the quote on one hand and on the other continues to label the Rohingya refugees from Burma as illegal migrants who should be detained and “pushed out” of his country.

It has been noted that less than 50 percent of Asean agreements are implemented, while Asean holds more than 600 meetings annually.

Second, Asean members themselves do not take the organization seriously. Last year, when Thailand and Cambodia were involved with their most critical dispute in decades over the ownership of Preah Vihear Temple—a dispute that was essentially stirred up by the PAD’s ultra-nationalism fervor—Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen ignored Asean and brought the issue directly to the UN Security Council. He must surely have been aware that there is a dispute settlement mechanism within Asean to which he could have referred the issue.

Recently, a former senior staffer from the Asean Foundation, an integral body of Asean that is tasked to “promote greater awareness of Asean and interaction among the peoples of Asean,” said that the Asia-Europe Foundation has been receiving far more funding from Asean governments than Asean’s own foundation. “Asean governments want the foundation to stand on its own,” he noted.

The Asean People’s Assembly (APA)—an annual forum that since 2001has been organized by an Asean think tank network, the Asean Institute for Strategic and International Studies, which attempts to bridge the gaps between the policymakers and civil society groups by bringing the two groups together to a same forum—is facing a similar problem.

Asean is still not supporting its initiative and this mechanism is facing major financial constraints.

Third, “participatory democracy” is a foreign term among many Asean governments. The Asean Charter that talks about “people-oriented” Asean was agreed discreetly, while civic groups called for it to be made public or to have it subjected to a referendum.

Most importantly, civil society and Asean observers are viewing Asean as unable to meet human rights challenges. While Asean bureaucrats often credit Asean for having created peace in the region since its establishment, they forget to acknowledge that Asean stood still during the genocide in Cambodia, which was then not a member of the regional group.

Similarly, Asean allowed Indonesia to take extreme measures against East Timor in the 1970s, which Jakarta viewed as a renegade province. The conflict in Cambodia and East Timor claimed approximately two million and close to 100,000 lives respectively. Not to mention that the human rights situation in Burma has not improved since it was admitted to Asean in 1997.

Although the Asean Charter lays the foundations for establishing an Asean human rights body (AHRB), those who have been following its development hold little hope.

The text of the terms of reference highlights that the body must respect the principle of non-interference and work to defend itself from external interference on human rights issues. Furthermore, it is known that Asean will focus on promotional roles rather than protecting human rights victims; and that it will only serve as a window dressing mechanism for Asean.

On February 20-22, close to 1,000 civil society representatives are due to come together under the banner of the Asean Peoples’ Forum to discuss issues affecting them. One question to be discussed is the relevance of the Southeast Asian body.

It is expected that they will come up with a statement to be delivered to the Asean leaders looking at how the organization can better serve them. As Asean claims itself to be a “people-oriented” body, it must surely move to implement its policies and ensure that it can respond to the needs of its peoples on issues such as democracy and human rights. That is, if it wants to change its image as an irrelevant organization to the people it says it wants to serve.

The writer is a Bangkok-based independent scholar and an analyst on Asean.