Isolation or Engagement? It’s Than Shwe’s Choice

By AUNG ZAW

Since Gen Ne Win seized power in 1962, Burma has proudly proclaimed its neutrality in international affairs. Under Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the country’s “active and neutral” foreign policy remains in place, although many question whether this accurately describes the way Burma now relates to the rest of the world.

Than Shwe’s regime has long been a target of Western sanctions, which include a visa ban that prohibits the paramount leader himself from traveling to the West. Relations with neighboring countries are, however, more cordial. This has produced a foreign policy that is more selective than neutral.

Last week, the general who routinely snubs visiting UN envoys welcomed Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, who received Than Shwe’s special envoy, Foreign Minister Nyan Win, in September 2007 amid the brutal crackdown on monk-led protests.

State-run papers reported that Than Shwe briefed the Chinese minister on Burma’s domestic situation, including the progress of reconstruction work in the cyclone-hit Irrawaddy delta. More importantly, the general reported on the country’s “democratic process and economic development, based on the principles of independence and self-determination,” according to China’s Xinhua news agency.

The junta chief also reassured his visitor that Burma continued to value its paukphaw (fraternal) friendship with China.

Burmese leaders have traditionally used the term “paukphaw” to refer to relations with China. This special relationship has, however, been subject to numerous strains over the years. This was especially true in the 1960s and 70s, when China aided the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).

Although the “big brothers” in Beijing dubbed Ne Win a “fascist,” the Burmese strongman was pragmatic and visited China several times to repair ties. He held high-level talks with Chinese leaders and maintained a good relationship. In return, leaders from China also paid several state-level visits to Burma.

But as Ne Win dined with leaders in Beijing, Than Shwe and other mid-ranking officers posted in the northern frontier region in the 1970s and 80s continued the fight against Chinese-backed communists. They would never forget China’s efforts to overthrow the government in Rangoon.

Today the CPB is gone, and its troops never did march down to Rangoon. China has been the regime’s major ally since the military coup of September 1988, supplying the regime with military and economic aid. Border trade between the two countries has also expanded, to an estimated annual level of US $1.5 billion.

Now China is planning to build a gas pipeline in 2009, linking Sittwe on the Arakanese coast with China’s landlocked province of Yunnan. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will head the $2.5 billion pipeline project with a 50.9 percent stake, while Burma’s state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) will hold the rest.

Besides the MOGE’s stake in the project, Beijing will also be counting on the regime to keep armed groups along the China-Burma border under control.

Although military leaders in Burma have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of some of the military hardware and jet fighters they have purchased from China, they still appreciate Beijing’s unwavering support, including exercising its veto at the UN Security Council.

However, it is important not to overestimate China’s influence over Burma. China could also be looking for an alternative to Than Shwe, and like everyone else, Chinese officials are looking at the post-Than Shwe era and beyond the planned 2010 election.

Chinese know that the aid policy and economic cooperation over the past 20 years has not paid off much.

Chinese remain skeptical that the aid, economic cooperation and investment in Burma will translate into meaningful economic development. It is obvious that Burma is descending into a failed state. China is only helping to preserve the regime.

It is unfortunate that China, which once sought to overthrow the Ne Win regime, is now backing one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Than Shwe often tells his generals that as long as he can count on three countries—China, India and Russia—for backing, his regime will survive. Of these three, China is obviously the most crucial.

Increasingly, however, the junta has been looking beyond China for new friends, new markets and economic cooperation.

This month, Burma confirmed that it will open an embassy in Kuwait. Tomorrow marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Burma and Kuwait.

Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah visited Burma in August and signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries.

During a meeting with the visiting prime minister, Than Shwe informed him of his “road map” to “disciplined democracy” and explained the need for the army to safeguard Burma’s unity and stability. Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint visited Kuwait recently looking to expand Burma’s trade and business activities there.

This is not the first time the regime has looked to the Middle East to expand its diplomatic relationships. In 2006, Iran’s deputy minister for oil paid a visit to Burma to express his country’s interest in cooperating with the junta.

In April of last year, we also saw Burma formally restore its ties with North Korea. Relations between the two countries had been severed for more than two decades after North Korean state-sponsored terrorists launched a deadly bomb attack on a high-ranking South Korean delegation of politicians who were visiting Rangoon.

However, a clandestine diplomatic relationship had been restored as early as the 1990s. In recent years, North Korean technicians have been seen in Rangoon and in the newly built capital. Well-informed sources reported that North Korean agents usually stay at state-owned guesthouses on the outskirts of Rangoon. The lack of transparency surrounding the North Korean agents’ frequent visits to Burma has fueled rumors about the nature of the cooperation between these two “outposts of tyranny.”

But even as Than Shwe looks to broaden Burma’s diplomatic horizons, it is clear that he remains very selective when choosing potential allies. In May, Cyclone Nargis offered an opportunity to forge friendlier ties with the US and the West, but Than Shwe opted to spurn their offers of assistance because they came in warships.

The paramount leader doesn’t really count the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) as an ally, but maintains a normal relationship with the regional grouping. His regime’s recent decision to send prominent dissidents to jail demonstrated his disregard for the principles laid out in the Asean charter.

With regard to Burma’s closest neighbor, Thailand, we have seen many ups and downs in the relationship over the past two decades. Thaksin Shinawatra, the billionaire Thai prime minister who was ousted in 2006, cultivated close business ties to the Burmese junta. But even during the relatively amicable period of Thaksin’s rule, Burma felt compelled to buy state-of-the-art MiG 29 jet fighters from Russia to counter the Thailand’s F16 jet fighters.

When looking for new friends, Than Shwe steers clear of countries that take are likely to take issue with his regime’s human rights record. His treatment of the democratic opposition and detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,000 other political prisoners are also taboo topics.

To return to Ne Win—the charismatic leader frequently visited Western countries for medical treatment or annual vacations. Ne Win and the ministers and generals who served under him acquired a taste for the finer things the West had to offer, even if they had no appetite for Western democratic values.

Ne Win had bank accounts in Switzerland and liked to stay in London. He and top leaders had TVs and video players long before Burma officially introduced these marvels of technology in the late 1980s. Top leaders and their wives were encouraged to go to hospitals in Europe when they needed to have check-ups—not to Singapore, where Than Shwe regularly visits for medical examinations.

Ne Win and his senior ministers often visited Europe to get aid and loans. The former Federal Republic Germany, or West Germany, was a favorite destination. Germany’s Fritz Werner Company helped Burma to build an arms industry as early as the 1950s to suppress ethnic insurgency.

Thanks to his “engagement” with the West, Ne Win even received military assistance from the US to suppress narcotics in the 1970s. US-made helicopters were also used to attack ethnic civilians and insurgents, but there was no protest from Washington.

Under Ne Win, Burmese army officers were not only sent to Asian nations but also to the US and UK for military education. Under former spy chief Gen Khin Nyunt, dozens of army officers were CIA or UK-trained. Ne Win and Than Shwe all benefited from this sort of engagement and cooperation from the West.

Until 2004, Burma’s feared secret police agency ran a ruthless and efficient spy network inside and outside of the country. Ironically, this would not have been possible without the contributions of countries that now regard Burma’s current rulers as international pariahs.

Every time Than Shwe shakes hands with a visiting state leader or foreign diplomat, critics of his regime shake their heads in dismay at the willingness of many in the world to ignore his egregious crimes against the people of Burma. Than Shwe’s occasional forays into international diplomacy may help him to stay in power, but they will do nothing to improve the plight of Burma’s oppressed people.